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NTRODUCTION
Providing a person imprisoned by a jailer, warden, or other public
official with the ability to challenge the justness of confinement through
legal process is not a new idea. The roots of this concept predate the
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Magna Charta of 1215, which states: "No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned ... but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land."' English common law has long recognized the right of an
individual to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a competent court in
order to compel the government agent to bring the prisoner before the
bench. The availability of this writ was recognized in medieval England
as a fundamental protection of free citizens against the power of the
crown.2 Acknowledging the need for such protection in a republic and
following forms of law imported from England during the colonial
period, the framers of the Constitution of the United States specifically
provided that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."' As is typical among the states, Kentucky has
used almost identical language in each version of its constitution to insure
that an imprisoned citizen of the Commonwealth may petition state courts
for a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of his or her detention.4
The early constitutional, statutory, and common law remedies
afforded by federal and state habeas corpus were not aimed primarily
at freeing an unjustly incarcerated defendant after conviction.5
That use of habeas corpus came later.6 In Kentucky, as in all the
states, other well-established remedies were available for that pur-
pose. Early Kentucky statutes and the common law recognized and
used the post-judgment remedies of new trial7 writ of error,' ap-
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 843 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
2 DONALD E. WILES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE PosTcONVICTION REMEDIES § 2-2
(1992) [hereinafter WILKES, PoSTcONvIcION REMEDIEs] (discussing the writ of habeas
corpus in England).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
4 KY. CONST. art. XII, § 16 (1792) ("The privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it."); id art. X, § 16 (1799); id art. XIII, § 18 (1850); id. § 16 (1892). Only
minor variations in punctuation differentiate the texts.
'WILKES, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 2, § 3-1 (discussing the writ of
habeas corpus in North America).
6Id. §§ 3-3, 3-7, 3-9.
Prior to full development of the direct appeal in the modem era, the motion for
new trial was a primary means of attempting to reverse an adverse judgment of a
Kentucky trial court. Its importance is indicated by the large number of reported cases of
an early date. See, e.g., W.W. FRY ET AL., AN ANALYrCAL DIGEsT OF THE DECISIONS
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS Op KENTucKY 290-96 (1852).
' Loudon v. Commonwealth, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 347, 347 (1805) (using writ of error to
reverse criminal conviction). The writ of error, like the modem-day writ of certiorari, was
established in the common law as the writ (or order) of an appellate court directing a
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peal,9 and writ audita quelera, ° as well as writ of error coram nobis,
court of record (trial court) to remit that court's record and judgment to the appellate
court, thus allowing the appellate court to determine if alleged errors required the
judgment to be reversed, corrected, or affirmed. BLACK'S LAW DICnoNAkY 1610 (6th ed.
1990).
9 Appeals were originally taken from decrees of the trial court, while writs of er
were taken from judgments. For this reason, early direct challenges to criminal judgments
were made by writ of error. The number of reported Kentucky criminal cases involving
appeals was very small. By 1809 the distinction between appeal and writ of error had
worn away, and the two were used interchangeably in Kentucky practice. Johnston v.
Commonwealth, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 598, 598 (1809) (observing that "writ of error" and
"appeal" could be used interchangeably).
In 1792, the Kentucky General Assembly recognized the writ of error or appeal in
the statute creating the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 1 WMLIAM Lr=, THE STATUTE
LAw oF KENTucKY 105-07 (1809) [hereinafter LrrmELL, STATUTE LAw 1809]. The
General Assembly could and did eliminate the writ of error or appeal for certain crimes,
as in, for example, an 1804 provision under the act respecting '"iots, routs, and unlawful
assemblies of the people, or under the act respecting the disturbance of religious
societies." 3 WILuAM LITrL, THE STATUTE LAw OF KENTuCKY 241 (1811) [hereinafter
I11TrELL, STATUTE LAW 1811].
In Kentucky, no general right to appeal existed prior to the Code of Practice in
Criminal Cases which became effective on July 1, 1854. Judgments rendered prior to that
time were irreversible and could not be appealed. Commonwealth v. Craig, 54 Ky. (15
B. Mon.) 534, 537 (1855) (holding that criminal conviction rendered in June of 1854 was
irreversible). The only grounds which could result in reversal under § 334 of the Code
of Practice in Criminal Cases were: improper admission or suppression of important
evidence, improper instructions given or proper instructions refused, failure to attest the
judgment, or improper allowance or disallowance of a peremptory challenge. Comely v.
Commonwealth, 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 403, 408 (1856) (listing grounds that could result
in reversal of criminal conviction under Code of Practice in Criminal Cases).
Until 1976, the modem right of appeal was based upon a '!matter of right' statutory
provision and was, therefore, not a constitutional right at all. Mcnteer v. Moss, 139 S.W.
842, 844 (Ky. 1911) (holding that the legislature can determine the rights of appeal from
different Kentucky courts and the respective amount-in-controversy requirements). The
1892 Kentucky constitutional provision stated: "The right to appeal or sue out a writ of
error shall remain as it now exists until altered by law, hereby giving to the General
Assembly the power to change or modify said right." KY. CoNST. § 127 (repealed 1976).
The General Assembly, therefore, could and did limit appeals in certain criminal cases.
See, e.g., Holcomb v. Mayes, 290 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Ky. 1956) (holding that the
legislature may modify the right to appeal as it sees fit); Mclnteer, 139 S.W. at 844.
The 1975 passage of the Judicial Article, reorganizing the court system in Kentucky,
established direct appeal as a constitutional right. KY. CoNsT. § 115 (amended 1976).
The writ of audita querela was identified as being closely related in nature to the
writ of coram nobis and thus seemingly available to test post-conviction detention in
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W.2d 69,71 (Ky. 1939) (holding that, under the facts
presented, neither the writ of coram nobis nor the writ of audita quelera was available for
convicted appellant). The writ of audita querela was never used to test post-conviction
1994-95] 269
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writ of error coram vobis, and writ of habeas corpus. These ancient forms
of action were all well developed by the eighteenth century and "became
a part of our remedial law upon Kentucky's admission into the Union" in
1792.11 Similar rudimentary protections could be utilized in the federal
courts for those convicted of violating the laws of the United States.'
Of these common law remedies, only coram nobis (sometimes called
coram vobis) and habeas corpus were thought adequate to become "post-
conviction remedies" in the modem sense.13 The various new trial-type
motions, common law actions upon writs of error, and appeal, were and
still are direct attacks on the judgment of conviction or the sentence
detention with any regularity or effect. Id. at 70-71. "The technical distinction is that
coram nobis attacks the judgment itself, whereas audita querela may be directed against
the enforcement, or further enforcement, of ajudgment which when rendered was just and
unimpeachable." Balsley v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1967) (holding
that remedy formerly available by way of either writ of error coram nobis or writ of
audita querela was preserved under KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02(5)). The writ of audita querela
was specifically abolished by Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure ("CR") 60.05.
" Jones v. Commonwealth, 108 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1937) (holding writ of error
coram nobis, unless repealed, was still a remedy under Kentucky law). For further
information on the development of early common law remedies in Kentucky, see
generally FRED P. CALDWELL, TnE KENTUCKY JUDICIAL DICTIONARY (1916 & Supp.
1924); OLIVER HOGAN, CRBNAL DIGEST FOR KENTUCKY (1920); BEN MONROE &
JAMES HARLAN, DIGEST OF CASES AT COMMON LAW AND IN EQurrY, DECIDED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY, FROM ITS ORGANIZATION IN 1792, TO THE CLOSE OF
THE WINTER TERM OF 1852-3 (1853); CHARLES S. MOREHEAD & MASON BROWN, A
DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF KENTUCKY (1834).
For further information on early Kentucky criminal law, see generally JAMES P.
GREGORY, GREGORY'S KENTUCKY CRIMuNAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND FORMS (1918); JOHN
E. NEWMAN, A TREATISE ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF
KENTUCKY (2d ed. 1907); JAMES M. ROBmRSON, KENTUCKY CRMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE (1899).
'
2 See MARY K.B. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY
1789-1816, at 3-13 (1978). This Kentucky historian has noted the difficulty in attempting
to fathom the intricacies of the old forms of action.
The law then had a language all its own, a highly stylized English interspersed
with Latin. ... Until the reforms of the codification movement of the
mid-nineteenth century, all court cases at the trial level were pursued in forms
of action that have since been superseded and largely forgotten. Not only is the
nature of a grievance obscured by language barriers, but also the methods of
resolving it seem almost incomprehensibly ritualistic. There are no adequate
guidebooks, ancient or modern, to help one through this most unfamiliar terrain.
What was once so obvious and elementary that it did not seem worth writing
down and explaining is now elusive and abstruse to a conventionally trained
historian.
Id. at 8.
, WILKES, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 2, § 3-7.
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imposed. As direct remedies, these procedures suffer from various flaws.
With limited exceptions, they become permanently unavailable within a
short period of time, 14 are subject to various procedural bars, and are of
no help in responding to allegations outside of the trial court record. Thus
the necessity for a relatively new type of review, one which would stretch
beyond the trial court record in search of constitutional error, became
apparent. Modem post-conviction review proceedings were designed to
bridge this gap.
In the United States, the long and significant judicial development of
federal habeas corpus provided the model for state post-conviction
review. Habeas corpus moved from its English origins as a mechanism
to challenge arbitrary detention without legal process (which normally
occurs prior to conviction), to an expanded federal remedy for federal
prisoners, to its dominant and present use in American criminal law as a
means for state prisoners to obtain federal review of the legality of state
criminal proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court evidenced its willingness to
continually broaden the coverage of federal habeas corpus relief available
to state prisoners, and the number of federal habeas corpus "reversals" of
state court convictions greatly increased. State judiciaries and legislatures
were forced to react. 5 At the same time, the Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply an ever-broader array of federal
constitutional rights to the states. 6
By the 1930s and 1940s, Kentucky's high court had begun to experi-
ment with the modification of the common law writs of coram nobis and
14 DONALD E. WLKEs, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE PosTcoNvicnoN REMEDIES AND
RELIEF 3 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WILKES, REMEDIES AND RELIEF] (providing a concise
history of post-conviction relief in the United States); Note, State Post-Conviction
Remedies, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 681 n.1 (1961) (discussing extraordinary remedies
that continue to be available after time limit for appeal has expired). Generally, a motion
for new trial under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure ("RCr") 10.02 must be made
within five days of the verdict, although such a motion based upon newly discovered
evidence may be made up to one year after the entry of judgment or "at a later time if
the court for good cause so permits.' KY. R. CIUM. P. 10.06(1). A notice of appeal in a
crminal case must be filed within ten days after the entry of judgment. Id. 12.04(3).
15 Kentucky was no exception. In reviewing a 1943 Kentucky decision which
significantly expanded the common law writ of coram nobis, an observer noted that "[iln
reaching its decision in the instant case, the court appears to have been much impressed
by the fact that after denying coram nobis in Jones v. Commonwealth, the defendant
appealed to the federal courts and won his release on a writ of habeas corpus." Leo E.
Oxley, Note, Perjured Testimony as a Ground for Coram Nobis in Kentucky, 32 KY. L.J.
296, 297 (1943-1944).
16 See WILKES, REMEDIES AND RELIEF, supra note 14, at 3.
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habeas corpus and to maximize state court fact-finding, one of the few areas
left to the states, in an attempt to save state court convictions from falling
prey to the federal courts. This experiment, however, was not successful. Both
coram nobis and habeas corpus were traditionally and logically inadequate
means to perform a task that was becoming more complex and difficult each
day. It was widely recognized, even by 1951, that the increasingly compre-
hensive federal concept of due process "put pressure on the state courts and
legislatures to liberalize existing remedies, and provide new procedures and
safeguards to citizens being tried on a criminal charge"' 7 In 1955, Kentucky
Assistant Attorney General Jo. M. Ferguson 8 wrote to Kentucky Governor
Lawrence Wetherby to complain that federal habeas corpus was being abused
by prisoners seeking only "to delay and impede execution of state judg-
ments." 9 In 1965, the Kentucky high court indicated its disapproval to what
it termed the "new look" in federal constitutional rights," yet neither state
governors nor state judges could control these events. In the end, the
flexibility provided by the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure was the
deciding factor in choosing to utilize court rules as the most effective way to
meet an evident need.
On January 1, 1963, RCr 11.42 became effective, making Kentucky one
of the first states to modernize its post-conviction procedures' On March
13, 1964, the high court of Kentucky held that RCr 11.42 was the exclusive
" John W. Sublett, Comment, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis -Kentucky's Answer
to the Expanding Federal Concept of Procedural Due Process in Criminal Cases, 39 KY.
L.J. 440, 445 (1950-1951).
12 Ferguson became Attorney General in 1956.
'9 Kentucky's Attorney General Attaclk Criminal Procedure, 19 KY. ST. B.J. 83, 97
(1955).
20 Coles v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ky. 1965) (explaining that KY.
R. CGlM. P. 11.42 provides a method by which a prisoner's claim of unconstitutional
infiingement, no matter how "unfounded" that claim may be, can be settled in one
proceeding).
"' By mid-1965, when it appeared the U.S. Supreme Court was poised to require this
modernization as a matter of constitutional law, six states had already enacted post-
conviction relief statutes. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -7 (1963); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 126, §§ 1-A to -G (West Supp. 1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A -
J (Supp. 1964); N.C. GER. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1963); OR. REV. STAT. §§
138.510 - .680 (1963); WYO. STAT. §§ 7-408.1 to .8 (1963 Cum. Supp.). Six additional
states had adopted modem post-conviction procedures by rule of court. ALASKA SUP. CT.
R. 35(b); DEL. SUPER. CT. Cium. P. R. 35; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1; KY. R. CIlM. P. 11.42;
Mo. SUP. CT. R. 27.26; N.J. CPaM. PRAC. R. oF SuPER. AND COUNTY CTS. R. 3:10A-2;
see also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345-46 n.8 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(Clark, J., concurring) (writing that a Nebraska statute providing for hearings of claims
of due process violations was an adequate corrective process).
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remedy for collateral attack on Kentucky criminal judgments!' Since that
time, the Rule has been invoked by state prisoners in literally thousands of
unpublished decisions and over four hundred published ones. Now, RCr 11.42
has operated for more than thirty years to reduce federal intrusion into
Kentucky criminal justice system, to aid the inmate litigant and to generate
significant work for trial courts, appellate courts, and prosecutors.
Legal scholars categorize modem post-conviction remedies as "those
procedural vehicles by which persons convicted of crime can seek relief;
usually on federal constitutional grounds, alter trial and direct review in the
appellate courts." Current theories of post-conviction review generally
recognize the procedure as a challenge based upon matters outside of the
original trial court record and raising legal claims not reviewable on direct
appeal ' Post-conviction review is traditionally more limited in scope and
more tilted against the defendant than, for example, direct appeal. However,
a modem post-conviction relief petition or motion raising at least a prima
facie showing of the violation of a state or federal right activates a powerful
weapone In most states, the reviewing court is required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to allow the prisoner to develop facts outside of the
original record in support of his or her legal claims. Although the burden is
on the prisoner to prove the violation of law and prejudice, the ability to
compel witnesses to testify under oath to matters outside of the trial court
record is a significant protection. Furthermore, most states either require the
appointment of counsel to assist the indigent prisoner in the investigation and
presentation of the claims or at least have in place a strong presumption in
favor of such appointments.?6 The conclusion of the hearing process
normally results in written factual and legal findings by the reviewing court.
These, in turn, provide the basis for further review, either on direct appeal to
a state appellate court or on petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts, including the attendant appeals common in that forum. The essence
of the modem post-conviction relief proceeding is comprised of the various
mechanisms provided by the state to ventilate constitutional claims through
the development of a new record which tests the validity of a state conviction
or sentence under legal theories or facts not previously raised.
This Article examines the background and development of post-
conviction remedies in Kentucky. Included within this subject are the
unprecedented expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and the
' Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154, 154 (Ky. 1964).
2 LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICON REMES at vii (1981 & Supp. 1993).
U WHIKES, POSTCONVICrION RMEDIES, supra note 2, § 1-5.
" Id.
2 Id.
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simultaneous willingness of federal courts to throw out state convictions on
federal constitutional grounds. The main historical emphasis, however, is
upon state habeas corpus and coram nobis. The adoption of a specific post-
conviction rule in the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure opens a new
chapter. Thus, significant attention is paid to RCr 11.42 and its development
as a court-created tool for the administration of post-conviction criminal
justice in Kentucky. Finally, the Article suggests ways to render RCr 11.42
more efficient and responsive to the delicate balance which must exist
between the criminal defendant who seeks to vindicate his or her constitution-
al rights and the officers and judges of the Commonwealth of Kentucky who
seek to protect and serve its citizens.
I BACKGROUND: THE THEORY OF THE VOIDABLE
JUDGMENT AND MODERN POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
Although it is not readily apparent, a consistent analytic framework exists
and should be understood and applied to decisions resolving post-conviction
challenges. This framework divides criminal judgments, which are presump-
tively correct when entered, into four classes: valid, erroneous, void, and
voidable.27
Both valid and erroneous judgments rendered by courts of competent
jurisdiction may be enforced against the defendant. The entry of an error-free
judgment of conviction by the trial court, of course, guarantees that the
judgment is unassailable. However, even if error during the proceedings
occurred, an enforceable judgment may still result on direct appeal or post-
conviction review if the error was harmless under both state and federal
constitutions,28 was waived,' or was otherwise consistent with due pro-
cess.
30
' The author is indebted for this suggestion and parts of the subsequent analysis to
the Amicus Curiae Brief by Criminal Justice Legal Foundation at 3-4, Parke v. Raley, 113
S. Ct. 517 (1992) (No. 91-719).
' Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (holding that proper standard
for habeas review was whether trial-type en-or 'had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict"). Brecht rejected using the direct review
standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) (holding that federal
constitutional error committed by state court may be viewed as harmless on direct appeal
if non-prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt). Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22. Collateral
attacks on state convictions, therefore, are reviewed on federal habeas corpus with a less
rigorous standard. Brecht shifted the burden from the state proving non-prejudice "beyond
a reasonable doubt" to the petitioner proving "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury
verdict. Id.
29 WIxs, POSTcONVICTION REMEDIEs, supra note 2, § 1-4.
30 Id. § 1-5.
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A judgment which is challenged as void ab initio presents an entirely
different set of considerations. The only inquiry is whether the trial court
had jurisdiction to render judgment over the issue presented, with
jurisdiction referring to the court's legal authority to resolve a particular
type of question or case." A truly "void" judgment is one which can
never be enforced against the defendant because the court was without
jurisdiction to render it. An early example is found in Curtsinger v.
Commonwealth.2  Curtsinger had been convicted of possession of
burglary tools and initially was placed on probation for the statutory
maximum of five years. While probation was not revoked during this
period, the trial court attempted to extend its authority to revoke
probation beyond the statutory maximum and thus continued to monitor
the defendant.3 During this additional period, probation was revoked and
Curtsinger was returned to prison. He then filed an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate, which was overuled .' On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court
found the probation revocation order void because, by action of statute,
the trial court had lost jurisdiction prior to issuing the order.3
A similar situation was recently presented in Commonwealth v.
Marcum.' Marcum's sentence upon conviction for second-degree
burglary was incorrectly enhanced to five years, far less than the statutory
minimum of ten years required by his status as a first-degree persistent
felony offender (habitual criminal). Apparently recognizing its error, the
trial court entered an "amended" judgment enhancing Marcum's sentence
to the ten-year minimum; however, this "amended" judgment was entered
almost eight weeks later, far beyond the ten days allotted by CR 59.05
for a trial court to amend its judgment. Thus, at the end of the ten days,
31 See, e.g., Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970) ("The circuit court
had general jurisdiction of the subject matter. It had the power to try this kind of case.").
Contrast the clarity of this view with the
strong tendency in procedural law to treat various kinds of serious procedural
errors as defects in subject matter jurisdiction. This is because characterizing
a court's departure in exercising authority as "jurisdictional" permits an
objection to the departure to be taken belatedly. This, in turn, permits a serious
blunder to be remedied despite tardy objection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (1982) (footnote omitted). Although
the Restatement concerns only civil judgments, the same tendency is apparent in the
criminal law.
32 549 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1977).
'3 Id. at 516.
34Id.
3S Id.
- 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994) (explaining that KY. R. CIUM. P. 11.42 may be an
inadequate remedy where judgment is void ab initio).
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the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the judgment. By the time of the
appellate decision, Marcum had already served more than five years. The
Kentucky Supreme Court granted state habeas corpus relief. Both
majority and dissent agreed that the "amended" judgment was void ab
initio because the trial court was without jurisdiction to render it, and it
therefore could not be enforced against Marcum" In dissent, two
justices argued that the first judgment was also void, since the five-year
term initially imposed was outside of the trial court's statutory authori-
ty.38
As illustrated by Curtsinger and Marcum, a void judgment cannot be
enforced because, in a legal sense, it does not legitimately exist. The tre
void judgment can be challenged at any time, and the defect cannot be
waived by the parties. 39
However, even though a court may have general subject matter
jurisdiction over a particular kind of issue, a judgment may still be ruled
"voidable." For post-conviction purposes, the question involved "is one
of policy rather than power [and the] policy consideration is one of due
process."4 Therefore, a presumptively valid criminal judgment may be
set aside if the judgment is so fundamentally flawed that it may be deter-
mined to be "voidable" and then held "void" on due process grounds.
Such a judgment is not void merely because of error, but it is void
because the error is so great as to render the judgment voidable.4 '
'
7 Id. at 212; id. (Wintersheimer, L, dissenting).
"Id. (Wintersheiner, J., dissenting).
Duncan v. O'Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky. 1970); see also Schooley v.
Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (discussing jurisdiction and
waiver in the context of an appeal under KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42). The test for the proper
application of waiver has long been recognized in Kentucky, but it is subject to
interpretation as well. For example, in considering the constitutionality of a well-
established Kentucky practice which permitted lay judges who presided over certain
misdemeanor trials to be paid a percentage of the fine relating to a conviction, an
observer noted: "There has long been a split of authority as to whether the [financial]
interest of a judge renders the judgment void so that the objection may not be waived or
whether it is voidable so that the objection may be waived." Frank K. Wamock, Note,
Pecuniay Interest of a Justice of the Peace in Final Trial of a Misdemeanor in
Kentucky - lolation of the Due Process Clause of the Foweenth Amendment, 36 KY.
L.J. 422, 426 (1947-1948).
1 Schooley, 556 S.W.2d at 916; see Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70,
74-75 (Ky. 1971) (explaining that the validity of juvenile's waiver is a due process, not
ajurisdictional, question); Clay v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 109, 109 (Ky.) (analyzing
a fact situation to determine if it presented "a failure of due process sufficient to void a
conviction"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
41 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACIICE AND
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However, because a due process error is the focus of the attack on the
judgment, the defect may be waived. 42
The rhetoric of the "void" or "voidable" judgment is most often
associated with collateral attack, since, according to black letter law, a
collateral attack would be successful only against a void judgment. 43
The position of RCr 11.42 in this scheme-was muddled quite early, since
the Kentucky high court considered the filing of an 11.42 motion to be
a direct attack.' While this approach would theoretically expand the
scope of review, the Kentucky high court did not wish such a result and
therefore adopted the confusing position that RCr 11.42 provided for
direct attack on any issue that, under common law, would render the
judgment subject to collateral attack4 The same approach was adopted
for CR 60.02, when the high court held that CR 60.02 permitted a "direct
attack by motion where the judgment is voidable - as distinguished from
a void judgment."' Although the older cases frequently held the
PROCEDURE § 2862, at 198, 200 (1973 & Supp. 1994) (explaining that a judgment is void
only if the court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction or if the decision was
inconsistent with due process).
42 Schooley, 556 S.W.2d at 917.
Hobbs v. Stivers, 385 S.W.2d 76,77 (Ky. 1964) ("RCr 11.42 provides relief only
when the judgment is subject to collateral attack - that is, void"); Bircham v. Buchanan,
245 S.W.2d 934, 935 (Ky.) (holding that habeas corpus does not lie to correct errors
occurring in the trial but is available only when the judgment is void), cert. dismissed,
342 U.S. 951 (1952); Hampton v. Whaley, 233 S.W.2d 273, 273 (Ky. 1950) (holding that
judgments that ame not void may not be collaterally attacked).
"Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ky. 1964) (holding that the new post-
conviction review procedure of KY. R. CIM. P. 11.42 provides for a direct attack upon
any conviction otherwise subject to collateral attack).
" KY. R. CPJ. P. 11.42(1); see, e.g., Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305, 307 n.1
(Ky. 1964) (pointing out that a statement in an earlier case was not meant to imply that
an 11.42 motion was a collateral attack); Tipton v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 290, 292
(Ky. 1964) (Moremen, J., concurring) (expressing frustration with the court's approach to
11.42 motions). In Tpton, the concurrence stated.
The new rule apparently permits the use of the writ where "extreme
irregularities" occur and they am such as to render the judgment void. But the
limitation that the judgment be void is still present and apparently to satisfy the
old requirement that a collateral attack may only be made successfully on a
void judgment.
I reiterate that in cases of a direct attack it is not required that the judgment
be void, and I believe RCr 11.42 under the conditions specified permits a
frontal attack.
Id.
4'Howard v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. 1963); cf Robinson v.
Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Ky. 1985). In Robinson, the court explained.
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judgment void in a successful RCr 11.42 case, this rhetoric lost meaning
over the years. In fact, it may be argued that RCr 11.42 inadvertently
evolved into a new remedy in which all that is required is something
which might be called "due process error."
This development is illustrated by the 1994 decision in Common-
wealth v. Marcum, in which the Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished
between state habeas corpus and RCr 11.42. 47 In part of the opinion, the
court noted that RCr 11.42, like habeas corpus,
provides a procedure for "collateral attack?' but it uses the term in a
much broader sense than applies when using habeas corpus to attack a
void judgment. RCr 11.42 encompasses every issue that suffices as
reason to vacate a judgment which could not have been addressed by
direct appeal. Such reasons need not be jurisdictional in nature, nor
necessarily such as to render the judgment void or even voidable."
Even though this statement is clearly dicta, it is still troublesome in some
aspects. No one need mourn the dropping of the ritualistic "voiding the
judgment" language from the typical RCr 11.42 appellate decision.
However, the underlying importance of the notion that the error must be
of such proportions as to void the judgment served to stress that only the
most fundamental flaws should produce so drastic a result. In this regard,
the court may be moving away from the well-established principle in both
Kentucky and federal case law that a successful collateral attack requires
the movant to meet a higher standard than in a direct attack.49 Thus, it
has frequently been held that RCr 11.42 will not provide relief in
situations where the claim of error, if raised on direct appeal, would
admittedly be successful at that level. Presumably, this position is still the
law. If it is not, the Kentucky Supreme Court has added a fifth class of
The distinction drawn is between a void election, and one merely voidable;
between preconditions to a valid election, and an election with some latent
insufficiency. An election is void where the conditions precedent to the holding
of a valid election have not been met. In such case the election is not
authorized by law.
Id. at 204.
4' 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994).
Id. at 210-11 (emphasis added).
4' See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21 (1982) (finding that mere error
in applying state law is not sufficient for collateral attack of state court conviction);
Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968) (noting that KY. R. CRM.
P. 11.42 is extraordinary remedy).
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judgment, previously unknown, to the four types ofjudgments commonly
recognized.'
]L THE FEDERAL COURTS INCREASE THEIR
INVOLVEMENT IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In the last sixty years, three interrelated federal law developments
forced the states to confront the adequacy of their traditional post-
conviction remedies. First, the U.S. Supreme Court became increasingly
willing to apply federal constitutional norms ("rights") to state criminal
prosecutions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.5' Over time, this development dramatically increased the complex-
ity and "federalization" of the average state criminal case. Second, the
Court seized upon federal habeas corpus as the means to enforce those
norms upon recalcitrant state courts.' Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court
'0 See supra text accompanying note 27.
" WILKES, POSTCONVlCnON REBMIES, supra note 2, § 3-4.
52 Unless the Supreme Court is to become an error-correcting court, instead of a
policy-making court (which, given the volume of state cases, has always been an
impossible task), enforcement must be accomplished by the lower federal courts.
However, federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions may also create
unusual situations because of the historical limitations of American federalism. Thus,
while the Kentucky Supreme Court is obliged to follow the holdings of the U.S. Supreme
Court, it is not obliged to follow the holdings of the lesser federal courts, including the
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 846 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] state trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less
authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is
located."); Perkins v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 873, 874 n.1 (Ky. 1974) ('The Public
Defender is, of course, in error in his claim that the Sixth Circuit opinions constitute
controlling higher authority in the sense of establishing precedents binding on this
court."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975).
This anomaly of the federal system of government may result in divergent standards
of review of federal constitutional violations, each of which is binding on the trial courts
within each appellate jurisdiction. This situation occurred in Kentucky only recently. In
1985, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided the procedure to be followed in Kentucky's
trial courts in determining the constitutionality of prior convictions which the prosecution
needs to prove in order to establish habitual criminal or persistent felony offender status.
Dunn v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 832
(1986). In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
procedure set out in Dunn was constitutionally flawed. Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275,
1278 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court of Kentucky subsequently declined to adopt the
new standard established by the Sixth Circuit, which, of course, remained binding on the
U.S. District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. Conklin v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Ky. 1990). It was only a matter of time before
state prisoners began to be released on federal habeas corpus as a result of the failure of
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strongly implied that a state prisoner has a federal constitutional right of
access to a constitutionally adequate state post-conviction remedy.53
A. Federal Habeas Corpus from Its Origins to 1938
Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the emergence
of the "Great Wrif' as a protector of individual liberty in medieval
England.' As early as the twelfi century, the writ or order of habeas
corpus could be used by a judge to compel the physical attendance in
court of a person necessary to the adjudication of a matter.55 Scattered
judicial and legislative developments culminated in the Habeas Corpus
Kentucky trial courts to follow a procedure that the state's highest court had forbidden
them to utilize. This impasse was resolved when the Sixth Circuit decided a follow-up
case, Raley v. Parke, 945 F.2d 137, 140-41 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that when trial record
is silent as to whether defendant waived his rights to jury trial, to confront his accusers,
and to remain silent, the burden of proof to uphold conviction shifts to the Common-
wealth). Certiorari was granted and a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court upheld the state
approach, thereby reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Parke v. Raley, 113 S.
Ct. 517, 522 (1992) (holding that when trial record is silent as to whether defendant was
advised of his or her constitutional rights, the shift of some burden to the defendant is
constitutional).
' See infra note 101.
'4 See, e.g., WILUAM F. DUKM , A CONSTITUTIONAL HISToRY Op HABEAS CORPUS
(1980); ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEvELOPMENT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS THE Wurr OF LIBERTY (1960); William F. Duker, 27te English
Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 983
(1978); George F. Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus A Protean Writ and Remedty, 8 F.R.D. 179
(1948).
" This power is evident from the words "habeas corpus," which are translated from
Latin as "you have the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990); see also
Ex parte Bolman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95-97 (1807) (discussing the writ in general).
The writ has always been held up as the great protector of the individual and the
cornerstone upon which all other rights are ultimately based. In 1811, for example, a
well-known legal dictionary had this to say about the right of an individual to petition the
courts: "Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for
if once it were left in the power of any... magistrate, to imprison arbitrarily, whenever
he or his officers thought proper, there would soon be an end of all other rights and
immunities." 3 T.E. TOMLINS, LAW DICTIONARY 222 (lst Am. ed. 1811).
The precipitative evolutionary event for the use of habeas corpus in criminal
procedure was the 1627 attempt by King Charles II t6 force several English nobles to loan
the crown large sums of money; those who refused were imprisoned. Although habeas
petitions of the five who refused to pay were denied, Parliament, in the next year, wrote
into the Petition of Right the "critical principle that no person shall be imprisoned except
on good cause shown in a return to the writ of habeas corpus." YACKLE, supra note 23,
at 11.
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Act of 1679. By codifying common law protections and ensuring a speedy
response to an order of the court, the Act forced the government to explain
the legal basis for a challenged imprisonment. While the Act was certainly
reformative, the purpose of Parliament was narrowly limited to providing "a
remedy for arbitrary, non-judicial commitment by the executive." By 1768,
William Blackstone had identified five variations of habeas corpus writs, each
with a specifically defined nomenclature and function. The writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum was the form of the writ used to test the legality of
imprisonment, and it is to this form of the writ that the words "habeas
corpus" typically refer.
The successful transplantation ofhabeas corpus to the American colonies
and into the Constitution of the United States was uneventful. The constitu-
tional provision reflected colonial concerns that the writ of habeas corpus
should not be "suspended" except when the nation itself was in danger. The
delegates to the constitutional convention did not define habeas corpus or
seek to insure that it would be applied in a specific manner because they were
well aware of its meaning and use under English law." The delegates saw
habeas corpus not as a post-conviction remedy but as a protection against
imprisonment by order of government officers outside of the process normally
accorded by law - exactly the kind of broad executive power which could be
justified "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."0 The delegates also did not view the constitutional provision as
' YACKLB, supra note 23, at 12. The history of habeas corpus in Kentucky is more
dependent upon this Act of Parliament than one might suspect. In 1960, the Kentucky
high court pointed to the fact that a pertinent part of the language of Parliament from
1679 had survived virtually intact in section 422 of the Kentucky Code of Criminal
Practice, and this section was used to resolve the case at hand. Young v. Russell, 332
S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1960).
Neil D. McFeeley, The Historical Development of Habeas Corpus, 30 Sw. LJ.
585, 589 (1976) (discussing the writ of habeas corpus after the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679).
" 1 WMILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131; see also Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) at 95 (holding that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus).
", McFeeley, supra note 57, at 594 (discussing the writ of habeas corpus in relation
to the U.S. Constitution).
'0 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Blackstone argued that such powers, conferred by
the legislature, were acceptable "when the state is in real danger." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 58, at *136. In his view, it is the "legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper,
can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited
time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing .... [Ifhis
experiment ought only to be tried in cases of extreme emergency; and in these the nation
parts with its liberty for awhile, in order to preserve it for ever." Id.
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a guarantee of the ability of federal courts to apply habeas corpus against the
states, since the clause relating to the suspension of habeas corpus was placed
in the Constitution along with other limitations on the federal government.6 '
This view is further confirmed by the actions of the first Congress under
the new Constitution. The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the lower
federal courts, granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and the district courts the
power to grant the writ to inquire into the causes of confinement.62 Prisoners
held under color of state law, however, were explicitly excluded from the
provisions of the Act.63 Again, the writ itself was not defined nor was any
direction on its proper use thought necessary.' In addition, it was assumed
and uncontroverted that the federal courts would apply federal habeas to
federal prisoners while state courts would apply state habeas to state
prisoners. The exclusive nature of federal habeas corpus was later confirmed
by cases such as Ex parte Dorr, in Which the U.S. Supreme Court refused
habeas relief to a state prisoner, stating: "Neither this nor any other court of
the United States, or judge thereof; can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a
prisoner, who is in custody under a sentence or execution of a State court, for
any other purpose than to be used as a witness."65
The statutory limitation on federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners
was narrowly expanded by Congress on only two occasions prior to the Civil
War.6 After the war, the inherent difficulties of Reconstruction and the
61 Section 10 of Article I restricts the powers of the states. It was assumed during the
debates at the constitutional convention that individual states would retain the power to
suspend state habeas corpus within their own borders regardless of the federal constitu-
tional provision. U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTICE, FEDERAL HADEAS CoRPus REVIEW OF STATE
JUDGMENTs 5 (1988).
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789).
"Habeas corpus "shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol [jail], unless where
they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are
committed to trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into
court to testify" Id.
"See Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876). According to the Supreme Court:
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is issued in
England were well settled by usage and statutes long before the period of our
national independence, and must have been in the mind of Congress when the
power to issue the writ was given to the courts and judges of the United States.
Id.
6' 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845).
"The first time was in 1833, when Congress, reacting to the nullification crisis in
South Carolina, gave federal courts habeas jurisdiction over federal officers who, in
attempting to enforce federal law in the states, had been placed in state custody. Act of
Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634 (1833); see Parky, 93 U.S. at 22. It took a
major diplomatic incident to legislatively expand the writ further. In 1842, Congress gave
federal courts jurisdiction over subjects or citizens of foreign governments held as state
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plight of newly liberated slaves led Congress to place state prisoners under
the federal writ in 1867. With one stroke, Congress gave federal courts the
"power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty
or law of the United States!' Only one year later, however, Congress
removed jurisdiction from the U.S. Supreme Court to hear state habeas cases
on direct appeal from federal circuit courts.O This limitation on the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction had the unfortunate result of ensuring that the
Supreme Court would not issue opinions decided under the 1867 Act,
although it continued to determine federal habeas cases under the Judiciary
Act of 1789. This situation left the lower federal courts without unifring
guidance in applying the writ to state prisoners and became a source of state
frustration with federal review.' Appellate jurisdiction over cases arising
from the claims of state prisoners was finally restored in 1885.70
From this brief history it is apparent that the early statutory expansion of
habeas corpus was largely a matter of congressional action in response to
specific political problems. In the courts, the situation was different. The early
American common law protection of the writ of habeas corpus was initially
limited, as in England, to cases in which no final criminal judgment had been
prisoners for official acts committed under the laws of the foreign government. Act of
Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842); see Seymour D. Thompson, Abuses of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, 18 AM. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1884) (discussing how Congress
reacted to certain instances involving foreign prisoners in New York Superior Court).
67 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867). The petitioner could answer
the government's claim of justification for confinement, and the court was authorized to
conduct hearings, gather evidence, and make factual findings. Id. at 386. Thus, for the
first time, the federal courts were empowered to look beyond the state court record. Paul
M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for &ate Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 487 n.120 (1963) (discussing the expansive scope ascribed to federal
habeas corpus). The clear purpose of the 1867 Act was to protect newly emancipated
slaves in the southern states. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 7-9, 25.
a Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1869) (holding that the 1867
Act had removed the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction of state habeas corpus).
6 See id. at 514; STANLEY KUTLER, JuDiciAL PowER AND RECONSTRUCTION
PoLIcs 111-13 (1968). The states were helpless to obtain fIrther review. As one critic
wrote in 1884: "In this way the inferior Federal courts have unlocked the penitentiaries
of the States, exercised the power and authority of passing finally and conclusively upon
the validity of State laws, and even of the ordinances of State constitutions." Thompson,
supra note 66, at 21-22.
70 Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437 (1885); see Thompson, supra note 66,
at 16. The Supreme Court immediately decided Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53
(1886), holding that federal courts should review the habeas petitions of a state prisoner
only after process to correct the alleged infirmity had been attempted in the state courts
(in other words, after state court remedies had been "exhausted").
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entered." Because the writ was viewed as a protection against arbitrary
detention by the executive, a demonstration by the government that the
prisoner was detained under the final judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction ended the inquiry. Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court John
Marshall explained this reasoning in 1830:
Ajudgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is rendered,
and pronounces the law of the case .... It puts an end to inquiry concerning
the fact by deciding it.... [I]t would be strange if, under colour of a writ
to liberate an individual fromunlawfulimprisonment we couldsubstantially
reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond our control. An
imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment
be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general
jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous. 72
Thus, the very core of modem-day habeas corpus - the search for constitu-
tional error in a federal or state court criminal proceeding - was entirely
missing.
Even the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 did not immediately alter this
narrow inquiry into the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction which would
render a criminal judgment void?.7 For the remainder of the century, federal
habeas claims were analyzed from the perspective, or at least the rhetoric, of
the void or voidable judgment, and such claims suffered from the fact that
until 1885 no general right of appeal to the Supreme Court in federal habeas
cases existed.74 Toward the turn of the century, the cases in the federal
courts increasingly showed the inherent strains of trying to limit habeas
consideration to narrow jurisdictional questions when the facts of the cases
demonstrated that the enforcement of fundamental rights was at stake. Two
such cases were decided in the 1870s, each opening a new avenue of inquiry
on habeas for state prisoners. In Exparte Lange, the Supreme Court held that
the imposition and service of a sentence for a crime ended the original
jurisdiction of a trial court to impose punishment.75 Therefore, a second
7 Bator, supra note 67, at 444-53 (discussing whether state conviction could ever be
final if subject to federal habeas review).
7 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830) (refusing to grant writ of
habeas corpus to determine whether petitioner had committed any offense punishable by
the original court).
'Bator, supra note 67, at 474-83 (discussing limited availability of federal habeas
corpus remedy for state convicts for the period of 1867-1915).
74 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1244 (1953) (discussing history of right to appeal in federal cases).
" 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1874) (holding that completion of sentence of one
of two alternative penalties ended the original court's jurisdiction).
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judgment imposing additional punishment was void as being without
jurisdiction, and habeas would lie!6 A similar expansion occurred in Ex
parte Sieboki, which held that a prosecution predicated upon an unconstitu-
tional law was itself a nullity.' Since an unconstitutional law was the same
as no law at all, the trial court was considered as having acted without
jurisdiction. Thus, the constitutionality of a statute became cognizable in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding.7
Although both cases were flamed in terms of jurisdiction, it has been
argued that the Supreme Court was intentionally subverting the jurisdictional
limitation required by common law.79 The general confusion in the cases of
this era may be explained, at least in part, by the lack of a general right of
appeal throughout most of this period, which increased pressure on the
Supreme Court to use federal habeas corpus to accomplish institutional
objectives8 ' The eventual granting of appeal or writ of error rights reduced
this pressure in the short run!' but failed overall to confine habeas corpus
to the traditional jurisdictional inquiry.
By 1915, in Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme Court had come to
recognize that the 1867 Act authorized "a more searching investigation" of
the jurisdiction of the state trial court and that state court fact-finding would
also be subject to dispute.Y Leo M. Frank claimed that domination of his
state court trial by an angry mob had deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction
over the verdict and sentence. 3 This argument, although stretched, was still
76Id.
- 100 U.S. 373 (1880) (holding that habeas corpus review will lie in cases where
indictment was predicated on an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional).
7 Id. at 376-77.
" Under this view, the use of habeas corpus as an all-purpose remedy actually began
in the 1880s, and framing the issue of an unconstitutional state statute or an illegal
sentence in terms of a court's jurisdiction was mere window-dressing to achieve a desired
result. Professor Paul M. Bator has counseled against uncritically viewing Lange, S'ebold,
and other cases of this era as examples of an assumed effort to stretch federal habeas
corpus beyond the basic jurisdictional inquiry. "The fact is that the nineteenth century
judges plainly did not feel that their distinctions were verbal fictions under cover of which
they could produce such an expansion, and we should not regard their cases as
authorizing us to do so." Bator, supra note 67, at 472.
'o Id. at 473-74.
" Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924) ("When a right to a comprehensive
review in criminal cases was given, the scope of inquiry deemed admissible on habeas
corpus came to be relatively narrowed."); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 185-86
(1899) ("We have frequently pronounced against the review by habeas corpus of the
judgments of the state courts in criminal cases, because some right under the Constitution
of the United States was alleged to have been denied the person convicted, and have
repeatedly decided the proper remedy was by writ of error.").
= 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915).
'3 Id. at 324-25.
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framed in the traditional manner. Despite the ultimate denial of habeas relief;
the Supreme Court recognized that habeas jurisdiction extended to those
cases where the state had not provided an adequate opportunity to be
heard." Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes took this occasion to write a
justly celebrated dissent which argued that habeas was available wherever
the "processes of justice are actually subverted."' His reasoning was
quickly adopted. By 1923 the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Holmes, decided that a state judgment flowing from a trial dominated by
an angry mob was subject to review and determination on federal habeas
corpus if the federal court should find that the process afforded by the
state was but a hollow mask covering a violation of due process."
Within a short period of time, federal trial courts began throwing out
state convictions with increasing frequency, thus, to some observers,
occupying the same relative position as state appellate courts.' The
states were generally resentful and critical of this process, in particular
because federal judges were not perceived as holding a monopoly on legal
wisdom and they decided cases alone, without benefit of the multi-judge
panel typical of appellate review." Even the Supreme Court recognized that
the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction is "more delicate, [and] the reason
against its exercise stronger, when a single judge is invoked to reverse the
decision of the highest court of a state." Nonetheless, the active interven-
tion of the federal judiciary in state criminal justice systems became an
established fact.
4 Id. at 326, 345.
85 Id. at 347 (Holmes, 3., dissenting).
86 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
WnLES, REMEDIES AND RELIEF, supra note 14, § 3-4.
"Id.
86 Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187 (1899) (holding that proper post-
conviction remedy for state conviction is a writ of error).
An example of the confusion that resulted may be seen in a pair of federal cases in
Kentucky deciding an identical issue. In 1927 the Supreme Court decided Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927), striking down an Ohio statute which permitted the mayor of
a city to try certain misdemeanor cases and, If a conviction were imposed, to recover a
fee for services, which gave the mayor a constitutionally impermissible interest in the
outcome. Id. at 518-19. A similar fee payment was authorized at this time for Kentucky's
county judges. Within a 10-day period, two published opinions deciding federal habeas
corpus challenges to the Kentucky practice were issued, and they reached opposite
conclusions. Ex parte Baer, 20 F.2d 912 (E.D. Ky. 1927) (holding conviction by state
judge with financial interest in conviction violated due process, and, consequently, federal
habeas corpus remedy was available); Ex parte Meeks, 20 F.2d 543 (W.D. Ky. 1927)
(holding state judge's financial interest in conviction did not violate due process because
convict had not availed himself of all other remedies afforded by the state); see Warnock,
supra note 39, at 422-27.
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B. Federal Habeas Corpus from 1938 to 1963
When the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938,9 the
jurisdictional requirement still limited federal habeas corpus review of
state convictions. In Johnson, the Supreme Court theorized a loss of state
trial court jurisdiction from a violation of the defendant's right to counsel
and made clear that the line of cases limiting the writ to "jurisdictional"
inquiries was no longer meaningful.9' By 1942, the Supreme Court
approved the use of habeas corpus by federal prisoners to challenge all
manner of constitutional deprivations in those "exceptional cases where
the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the
accused."'  For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus for all constitution-
al issues was shortly made available in instances where state court
remedies failed to provide "full and fair" adjudication of the issues, where
no state remedy existed, or where the remedy existed but was unavailable
or impracticable."
The states, however, continued to be displeased with these develop-
ments. In response to criticism, Congress enacted amendments to the
Habeas Corpus Act in 1948 in an unsuccessful effort to curb habeas
"abuses."' Shortly thereafter, the attorney generals of forty-one states
joined in an unsuccessful effort to get the Habeas Corpus Act declared
- 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
91 Id. at 468.
92 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942).
93 Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (collecting cases).
Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 964-68 (1948). The 1948 statutory measures had
been proposed by a committee of the Judicial Conference chaired by Judge John J. Parker.
In 1948, Parker wrote that the passage of the amendments ensured, "in the case of state
prisoners, [that] resort to the lower federal courts is practically eliminated where adequate
remedy is provided by state law." John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus,
8 F.R.D. 171, 174 (1948) (arguing that the provisions of the revised code were necessary
to stop the abuse of the habeas corpus doctrine). This assessment proved to be quite
incorrect although certain procedural reforms were accomplished. At a minimum, state
trial judges could no longer be compelled to testify in front of federal trial judges on the
conduct of a state court proceeding. Frank W. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the
State Cowl Criminal Defendant, 19 VAND. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (1966) (suggesting
remedies to stop the increase in federal habeas corpus actions). For interesting sidelights
on the issues surrounding the expansion of federal habeas corpus during this era, see John
W. Winkle, III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in the 1940's, 68
JUDICATURE 262 (1985) (concentrating on events leading up to congressional passage of
habeas corpus legislation in 1948); Louis E. Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1947) (suggesting that reliance on the fundamental
doctrine of judicial discretion was the best method for dealing with problems of habeas
corpus abuse).
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unconstitutional as applied to state prisoners.95 The Supreme Court was
not swayed, having in 1953 decided Brown v. Allen, which confirmed
federal power to review state court convictions on federal habeas
corpus.9' Then, in 1963, the Court decided two additional cases of
tremendous significance to federal habeas corpus jurisprudence. Fay v.
Noia9 represented a comprehensive revision of the power of federal
district courts to issue habeas relief to state prisoners. It created a rule
that would enforce state procedural defaults, such as a failure to object at
trial, only if the state could show the defendant had made a purposeful
choice to default by "deliberately by-passing" orderly state court proce-
dures.98 The companion case of Townsend v. Sain expanded the discre-
tion of district judges to reject state court factual findings and to hold
federal evidentiary hearings on disputed factual matters."
At the same time as the ability of federal courts to review state
criminal convictions was growing, the substantive federal constitutional
rights of the state prisoner were expanding."r The 1963 Supreme Court
United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 924 (3d Cir.) (holding that
proceeding by an inferior federal court in habeas corpus was not unconstitutional), cert.
denied, 48 U.S. 851 (1954).
344 U.S. 443 (1953). Although habeas relief was denied in this proceeding, the
right of state prisoners to bring general claims concerning all manner of constitutional
violations was assumed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 473-75, 485.
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that state prisoner's failure to appeal his murder
conviction did not justify withholding of federal habeas corpus).
Id. at 438-39. This standard was an almost impossible one for a state to meet.
372 U.S. 293, 293 (1963) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was required in
federal court if the district court could not determine what findings had been made by the
state trial judge).
"0 Coextensive with the expansion of federal habeas corpus was the Supreme Court's
use of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply numerous federal
rights contained in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to state prisoners. Only a few
of the important cases decided in the 1960s can be mentioned here. See, e.g., Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (involving double jeopardy); Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969) (requiring the guilty plea record to indicate valid waiver of constitutional
rights); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing the famous "Miranda
warnings" necessary for constitutional custodial police interrogation); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (involving the Confrontation Clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (involving the privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (involving the right to trial counsel in felony cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (establishing that the exclusionary rule applies to the states).
Since review of state criminal convictions has always depended upon a state
prisoner's invocation of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States,
"this proliferation of possible federal questions meant that a greatly increased percentage
of state criminal convictions could be subjected to Supreme Court review." Daniel .
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cases had brought federal habeas corpus review of state convictions to its
high-water mark. It is no coincidence that 1963 was the year in which
Kentucky RCr 11.42 came into effect. The Supreme Court's "new look"
in constitutional law and the threat that the states would soon be
constitutionally required to provide such relief101 had made such a rule
imperative.
C. Federal Habeas Corpus After 1963
Shortly after 1963, the appointment of more conservative justices to
the Supreme Court" and the changes in the governing statutes by
Meador, Straightening Out Federal Review of State Criminal Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
273, 274 (1983) (proposing a structure and procedure to provide a better way to review
state convictions). Since the Supreme Court could not hope to provide effective review
for large numbers of cases through the writ of certiorari, the pressure to open up habeas
corpus in the federal trial courts was that much greater. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHL L. REv. 142, 155 (1970)
[hereinafter Friendly, Collateral Attack].
101 In Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949), the Supreme Court explained
that the federal habeas corpus doctrine requiring exhaustion of state remedies 'presuppos-
es that some adequate state remedy exists" and that states provide some "clearly defined
method" through which state prisoners may claim a denial of federal rights in a state
forum. The Court emphasized this position again in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441
(1963): "If the States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have the power and
duty to provide it."
In 1964 the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment required the states to adopt an adequate post-conviction review
process to resolve federal constitutional claims. Case v. Nebraska 381 U.S. 336, 337
(1965). Although Nebraska's adoption of a post-conviction relief statute mooted the
question, most observers believed that the Supreme Court was prepared to hold that the
Constitution mandated an adequate state corrective process for post-conviction claims. For
example, in 1971 the Kentucky high court stated flatly: "It is the duty of the states to
provide post-conviction remedies to give prisoners the opportunity to demand that a court
vacate a judgment when constitutional rights have been abridged or fimdamental
procedural fairness has not [been] obtained." Case v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 367,
368 (Ky. 1971).
However, in 1987 the Supreme Court revisited this question and, in Pennsylvania v.
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987), held that the states are not constitutionally required to
provide post-conviction remedies. However, the existence of state post-conviction
remedies keeps the primary fact-finding and the initial determination of federal rights
violations where the Supreme Court majority clearly wants them - in the states.
1" See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Burger Court (1969-1986), 27 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 31, 32-37 (1987) (discussing the move toward conservatism under the Burger
Court); Max Rosenn, The Great Writ - A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
337, 355 (1983) (discussing the Nixon appointees' opposition to the expansion of federal
1994-95] 289
290 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 83
Congress spurred the inevitable readjustment. Congestion caused by state
prisoner litigation in federal courts became a constant theme.' Within
a few short years, the Supreme Court began a re-examination of habeas
corpus."° During 1976, the Supreme Court issued no fewer than three
decisions significantly restricting the application of federal habeas corpus
to state prisoners' °5 and, in 1977, issued Wainwright v. Sykes which
habeas corpus).
13 See John L. Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Survive the Flood? 6
CuMa. L. REV. 363, 372-75 (1975) (discussing problems generated by federal habeas
corpus in its application to state prisoners); George C. Doub, The Case Against Modem
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 A.BA. J. 323, 324 (1971) (noting a "tidal wave" of
petitions); Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CoRNELL L.
REV. 634 (1974) [hereinafter Friendly, Averting the Flood] (discussing how to divert the
increasing flow of habeas corpus). In 1963, Professor Paul M. Bator challenged the notion
of expansive federal habeas corpus review of state convictions in an important and often-
cited article. Bator, supra note 67. This effort was followed up by an essay evocatively
entitled "Is Innocence Irrelevant?" and authored by U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Henry
J. Friendly in 1970. Friendly, Collateral Attack supra note 100. The pervasive thread in
this piece, as the title suggests, is that actual innocence of the crime for which a
defendant was tried should be at least a factor in determining whether a petitioner is
entitled to habeas corpus relief from a state conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court appears
to be moving in this direction, and the influence of Judge Friendly's article is both
acknowledged and apparent. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993)
(explaining that while clain of innocence based on newly discovered evidence was not
ground for federal habeas relief, "this is not to say that our habeas jurisprudence casts a
blind eye towards innocence"); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19, 2523 (1992)
(analyzing "actual innocence" jurisprudence and applying it to sentence of death); Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-39 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)
(noting that actual innocence may justify granting writ of habeas corpus despite
procedural default); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that ends ofjustice required consideration of successive petition when petitioner
raised a colorable showing of factual innocence).
104 Sandra D. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 802-
06 (1981) (expressing concern over the extent of federal review of state criminal
proceedings); Richard A. Powers, III, State Prisoners' Access to Federal Habeas Corpus:
Restrictions Increase, 25 CsiM. L. BuLL. 444 (1989) (discussing the restrictions mounting
against criminals' use of habeas corpus); Albert T. Quick, Kentucky Law Survey -
Criminal Procedure, 66 KY. L.J. 605, 620-24 (1977-1978) (commenting on the Kentucky
Supreme Court's direction and philosophy); Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the
Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great Writ, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 167,
180-82 (1988) (suggesting that future developments concerning federal habeas corpus
review should be left up to the U.S. Supreme Court).
'0' Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that full and fair adjudication of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure claims at state level barred raising the issue on federal habeas
corpus); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (holding that failure to object was waiver
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adopted the "cause" and "prejudice" test for state prisoners to overcome
procedural default."'6 The Supreme Court's critical view of extensive
federal supervision of state court convictions has continued." 7 This
process of significantly restricting the application of federal habeas corpus
to state prisoners, or at least its goal, has been both praised" and
challenged,"9 but the majority of commentators have continued to
argue for an expansive view of the writ."' Some of the difficulties are
systemic,"' for in a federal form of government tension between
and barred federal habeas corpus review unless petitioner could demonstrate cause and
prejudice); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (discussing "failure to objec').
'06 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (rejecting the Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass standard and
adopting the Francis v. Henderson "cause" and "prejudice" test).
" See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (applying more
lenient standard of harmless error review on collateral attack); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 306-09 (1989) (advancing restrictive view of habeas corpus and limiting retroactive
application of new rulings); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (restricting the
"cause" necessary under the cause and prejudice analysis to permit habeas review); Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiting state prisoners to exhaust all claims before a
petition for habeas corpus can be considered); Powers, stpra note 104, at 444-47; see also
Richard A. Michael, The 'Wew" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the
States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA L. REV. 233 (1979) (suggesting that the
Burger Court's increasing reliance on state courts to protect constitutional rights of
individuals was a positive development).
'0a Charles Graddick, Debunking the Ancient Writ: A Critical Analysis of the Law of
Habeas Corpus, 14 CuME. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1984) (arguing that Congress should take
immediate action to restrict frivolous litigation caused by overextension of federal habeas
corpus statute); C.C. Torbert, Jr., The Overly-Broad Application of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 43 ALA. LAW. 22,24-27 (1982) (suggesting that federal habeas corpus statute has
caused a flood of litigation); Paul C. Weick, Apportonment of the Judicial Resources in
Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated?, 21 DEPAuL L. REV. 740, 746-47
(1972) (proposing change in post-conviction procedure to eliminate long delays).
1'9 1 JAMES S. LmBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORpUS PRACnTCE ANiD PROCEmDRE § 2.2
(1988) YACKLE, supra note 23, at 18-21; Theodore McMillian, Habeas Corpus andthe Burger
Court, 28 ST. Lois U. LJ. 11, 15-16 (1984) (suggesting that then-contemporary opinions
would severely restrict state prisoners' access to habeas corpus); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Pari0, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977) (tcing federalism arguments made during past two
centuries by litigants seeking federal court adjudication of their constitutional claims); David M.
Snyder, Habeas Corpus: StonedButNotDead, 19 CM L. BULL. 197,198 (1983) (examining
term 'ull and fair opportunity" as interpreted by state courts).
"' See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve For Innocence,
N.Y.U. REv. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 415 (1990-91); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus:
The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DicK. L. REV. 557, 622-26 (1994).
"'. Although many authors have expressed opinions regarding the proper scope of
habeas corpus review, relatively few have deeply probed the findamental issues involved.
The expectations of the states under traditional notions of federalism, comity, and finality
are difficult to balance with federal habeas corpus as currently applied to state prisoners.
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parallel court systems will always exist. Those who favor restricting the
use of federal habeas corpus articulate other problems which flow from
the unique nature of habeas corpus itself." Legitimate concerns exist
which involve the erosion of long-established doctrines such as comity,
finality of criminal judgments, and the traditional primary role of the state
court in enforcing state criminal law. An additional issue concerns the
limited success of the habeas petitioner in the modem era. For example,
even under expanded habeas review, petitioners were successful in only
1.4% of cases in the twelve-year period from 1946 to 1957."' A survey
of state habeas actions in six federal districts from 1975 to 1977 showed
similar results: the success rate of all forms of relief was only 3.2%.1
For a stimulating debate on the conceptual bases of the Great Writ, see generally Bator,
supra note 67; Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CAME W. RES.
L. REv. 748 (1987) (discussing the various habeas corpus issues: federalism, separation
of powers, criminal justice system, and nature of litigation involved); Friendly, Collateral
Attack supra note 100; Neubome, supra note 109, at 1114-30 (opining that since state
courts are not as zealous in upholding federal constitutional rights, federal habeas review
is necessary); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 998-
1010 (1985) (arguing that habeas review is the trade-off for allowing the states primary
responsibility for the enforcement of criminal laws). For the view that parity has been
substantially achieved, see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court
Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HAlv. IL. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 127-30
(1989).
In the author's judgment, the basic iss is relatively simple, resting entirely upo
the ability and willingness of state court judges to enforce federal rights in state courts.
In our federal system, the states are clearly charged with "primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). This authority
by definition includes responsibility for vigorously enforcing both state and federal
constitutions. The 1867 expansion of habeas corpus by Congress was a tool to fix a
specific problem. Habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions should be viewed
this way today. If state courts could perfectly adjudicate all federally based claims in state
court, then habeas corpus for state prisoners would be redundant. And, if no state court
could adjudicate correctly any federal constitutional claim, then federal, habeas would be
a necessity in every case where such a claim was raised. The real issu concerns the job
the state courts are doing and whether the costs of federal habeas corpus are justified by
the results. But see Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas Vfter the Revolution,
1993 SUP. CT. REv. 65 (1994) (arguing that parity is irrelevant because both sides of the
traditional habeas debate have missed the point through their failure to simply examine
how federal habeas corpus can best be used to further the goals of criminal justice
systems).
" See, e.g., Graddick, supra note 108, at 16-29 (criticizing the use of habeas corpus).
13 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 n.l (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
114 Karen M. Allen et aL, Federal Habeas Corpus and Its Reform: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 RUTERS L.J. 675, 699 (1982) (analyzing how well current proposals for
reform of habeas corpus review would accommodate the competing societal interests). A
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Even this limited result may be illusory. As Professor Paul M. Bator,"5
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Henry J. Friendly,' and others have ar-
gued,"' a federal habeas court "reversal" does not necessarily translate
into justice served but may merely indicate the rewards of forun-
shopping and luck."8
In contrast, proponents of expansive federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoner petitions argue that the availability of federal habeas
corpus is a necessary price to pay for effective enforcement of federal
constitutional rights." To these commentators, fears of a flood of state
clear exception exists in state death penalty cases, where a higher rate of federal
court reversal is obtained. However, the rate of federal habeas corpus success for
death row inmates often has been overstated. VicroR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CoPPUS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs 88 (1994). This source, comparing 1990 and 1992 data,
concludes that
habeas petitions were granted more Jrequently in death penalty cases than in
other cases In federal courts, but granted less frequently than other cases in
state courts. In either event, petitioners' success rate in death penalty cases are
[sic] vastly overstated These data lend support to the argument that state courts
can be trusted to guarantee constitutional rights, or conversely, weakens [sic]
the argument that state courts are making so many erors that federal oversight
is essential
115 Bator, supra note 67, at 487.
116 Friendly, Collateral Attack, supra note 100, at 165 n.125.
117 See, e.g., Meador, supra note 100, at 274.
"' One functional problem with federal habeas corpus, viewed from the perspective
of the states, is that it returns the basic decision to a single federal trial judge. As an
appellate prosecutor with many years of experience in federal habeas corpus litigation, the
author can unequivocally state that many dose cases are significantly influenced by
chance based upon the random assignment of the case to a particular district judge (and
the same could be said of state trial judges as well). In contrast, all true appellate
courts are composed of more than one judge or justice for good reason. A single judge
does not have the benefit of co-equal (and voting) colleagues to refine and alter a point
of view.
This observation is relevant to the small number of habeas petitions that are
successful Since claims presented in a habeas petition must be exhausted (that is,
previously presented in state court on appeal or post-conviction review), they have, by
definition, been presented to at least one multi-judge appellate court. A majority of the
state appellate court, also by definition, must have found no federal law violation. The
fact that a federal district judge decides to grant habeas relief does not necessarily mean
that the state appellate judges were "wrong" and the single federal trial judge is 'ight."
Friendly, Collateral Attack, supra note 100, at 165 n.125 ('In the vast majority of cases
we agree with the state courts, after a large expenditure of judges' and lawyers' time. In
the few cases where we disagree, I feel no assurance that the federal determination is
superior.').
.. See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 109, at 1115-18 (arguing that federal courts are
better suited to handle federal constitutional problems).
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prisoner petitions engulfing the federal courts are exaggerated, the states'
desire for finality is not endangered where few petitions are actually
granted, and the Supreme Court's virtual presumption of parity between
the state and federal judiciary in dealing with federal constitutional rights
is open to serious question."'
The Supreme Court, of course, is not immune to such shifting winds.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, Justice William Rehnquist noted that the Court
had exhibited a "willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the
scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial
action has remained unchanged.'.' This battle over the scope of federal
habeas corpus review has been waged on historical fronts" and in
Congress.' It cannot be resolved here. However, RCr 11.42 will be
affected by these events, because as the scope of federal habeas corpus
review further contracts, the necessity for comprehensive post-conviction
review in Kentucky theoretically increases proportionally.
1 Id.
1 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977); see Jack A. Guttenber, Federal Habeas Corpus,
Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfeitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HoFsTRA
L. REv. 617, 619 (1984) (commenting on the manipulation of federal habeas corpus by
both conservative and liberal majorities of the Supreme Court); see also Rosenn, supra
note 102, at 359 (discussing the recent trend of the Supreme Court "to further curb the
availability of habeas relief in the federal courts").
m Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts - Constitutional Right or
Legislative Grace? 40 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1952) (discussing historical background of
habeas corpus review); Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHm. L. REv. 31 (1965) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court's claim of merely fulfilling intentions of 1867 Congress was without historical
foundation); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court -Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 451 (1966) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's use of historical background of
habeas corpus to support its current use was wrong).
" For analysis of congressional actions influencing habeas corpus, including both
failed and successful attempts to limit its use by state prisoners, see generally Frank J.
Remington, Change in the Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Significance for
State Prisoners and State Correctional Programs, 85 Mica. L. REv. 570, 575-79 (1986)
(discussing current dissatisfaction with broad access to habeas corpus by state prisoners);
Jonathan B. Sallet & Saul B. Goodman, Closing the Door to Federal Habeas Corpus: A
Comment on Legislative Proposals to Restrict Access in State Procedural Default Cases,
20 AM. CRlM. L. REV. 465 (1983) (suggesting that current congressional proposal would
unduly restrict availability of federal habeas corpus relief); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas
Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHio ST. L.J. 367 (1983) (suggesting
that Congress, not the Supreme Court, is proper forum for debating use of collateral
review); Larry W. Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68
IOWA L. REv. 609 (1983).
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Ill VOIDABLE ADGMENTS: KENTUCKY'S
FIRST POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES EMERGE
FROM COMMON LAW WRrrs
The dramatic expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over
state prisoners strengthened the conclusion that modem post-conviction
procedures were necessary to the proper administration of criminal justice
in the states. Each state, however, was left to redefine the scope and
purpose of its own statutory and common law in accomplishing this goal,
with few available sources of guidance. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did not approve its model Post-
Conviction Procedure Act until 1955,'n and American Bar Association
standards for post-conviction relief were not released in draft form until
1967.' One model that was eventually available was the federal post-
conviction relief statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255Y However, Kentucky
initially was not interested in a statutory or rule-based remedy, preferring
to place its reliance in the common law writs of habeas corpus and coram
nobis.
Both habeas corpus and coram nobis (or coram vobis) were found in
some form in all common law states and in federal jurisprudence. During
the first half of the nineteenth century, these writs were gradually
modified by local practice, by statute, and eventually by comprehensive
codes of procedure springing from the reformist codification movement
which swept the United States between 1840 and 1860. The Kentucky
General Assembly's enactment of civil and criminal practice codes
marked the first step in the modem development of the writs of habeas
corpus and coram nobis.127 In time it would be amply demonstrated that
mere expansion of these writs, either alone or in combination, would not
m UNI. POST-CoNvIC1IoN PROCEDURE AcT, 11 U.L . 477 (Historical Note) (1974
& Supp. 1993).
AmEICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POsTcoNvIcTnoN
REMEDIES, INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1978) (noting that original edition was published in
1967).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948).
12 The Code of Practice in civil cases was enacted into law in 1851. 1850 Ky. Acts
106-212; see M.C. JOHNSON ET AL., CODE OF PRACTICE IN CINI CASES FOR THE STATE
OF KENTUCKY (1851). The Code of Criminal Practice eventually followed. 1853 Ky. Acts
92-144; see M.C. JOHNSON ET AL., CODE OF PACTICE IN CIVIL AND CRUMIAL CASES
FOR THE STATE OF KENTUCKY (1854). The political and social importance of the
codification movement is reflected by the fact that the legislature was mandated to create
and adopt civil and criminal codes by the new constitution. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII,
§ 22.
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be enough to adequately cover the breadth of federal constitutional
challenges presented by state prisoners. The common law lacked a
unified, simply administered system which could provide state prisoners
with an adequate forum to ventilate their federal due process claims.
What resulted from the patchwork use of the common law was a period
of difficulty, naturally occurring through the Kentucky high court's
attempt to fit square pegs into round holes. The result was a less than
adequate remedy and confusion on all sides. Not without justification did
one Kentucky appellate judge write in 1943 that the Kentucky high
court's published decisions were "in such confusion on the writ of coram
nobis that no one can tell where we stand. In writing on the subject we
have wobbled and bobbled like a lost raft at sea."'
The legal and historical heritage of the common law writs simply
could not be overcome easily. Nonetheless, until the promulgation of
Kentucky RCr 11.42 in 1963, these common law writs, with their long
histories and peculiar limitations, served as the law on Kentucky post-
conviction relief. The attempted use of these writs to broadly test the
legality of detention had important ramifications in the development of
RCr 11.42 as a modem post-conviction remedy.
A. Habeas Corpus in Kentucky
As Kentucky's high court explained in Day v. Caudill: "The purpose
of the habeas corpus proceeding is to regain the liberty of a person who
is being illegally restrained. As such, it has been used to regain the
custody of a child, to attack a void criminal judgment, and to obtain
bail. 912
1. 1792 to the Early Twentieth Century
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, usually simply called
"habeas corpus," was intended to provide swift and summary resolution
of claims of illegal confinement."' As early as 1796 the Kentucky
1 Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Ky. 1943) (Sims, ., dissenting). This
opinion was not uncommon. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 176 So. 743, 747 (Miss. 1937)
(Smith, C.J., concurring) (stating that state courts attempting to modernize post-conviction
remedies through revitalization of writ of coram nobis found it easy to "become lost in
the mist and fog of the ancient common law").
9 300 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. 1957).
no Ex parte Alexander, 2 Am. L. Reg., O.S., 44, 48 (Louisville, Ky., Ci. Ct., 1853)
(holding that a commitment for contempt "until the further order of the Courf' was void).
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General Assembly had passed an act "directing the mode of suing out and
prosecuting writs of Habeas Corpus."13' As with the enactment of the
original Habeas Corpus Act in England in 1679,11 the evil sought to
be remedied was the deliberate and illegal imprisonment by government
officials of individuals who had a right, at that particular moment in time,
to immediate freedom. The single great purpose was to bring the prisoner
before a court which had the power to vindicate, a hundred times if
necessary, the prisoner's right to liberty.'.
The filing of a pleading, usually called a petition, which named the
warden, jailer, or other official with custody of the prisoner, initiated the
proceeding.' 3 Its purpose was not to resolve the legal status of the
petitioner, nor to determine, for example, whether the petitioner was
legally a slave, was guilty of a crime, or had received a fair tria. s The
13 1 LnTEL, STATIrM LAW 1809, sipra note 9, at 600-03. The Kentucky act was
"a mere re-enactment of the common law." Alexander, 2 Am. L. Reg., O.S., at 48.
132 See 1 JOSEPH CHr, A PRACICAL TREATiS ON THE CRImNAL LAw 97-109
(Riley's Am. ed. 1819). This reference work provides an extensive discussion of all
aspects of habeas corpus practice in England, with footnote references to American
statutes and important case law. This treatise was owned by Benjamin Franklin Bennett,
great-great-grandfather of the author, and is presently in the author's collection. Born in
1829, B.F. Bennett moved from southern Ohio to Greenup County, Kentucky, in 1855,
and became a member of the Kentucky bar in 1866. NELSON W. EVANs, A HISTORY OF
SCIOTO COUNTY, OHIO 901-02 (1903). In 1890, he served as a delegate to the convention
which framed Kentucky's present constitution, and he was still practicing law in 1891, as
evidenced by Bennett v. Greenup County, 17 S.W. 167 (Ky. 1891).
A hornbook such as Chitty's treatise would have been more than a mere collector's
item to a Kentucky lawyer in 1866. The use of English precedents was so widespread that
in 1807 the Kentucky General Assembly prohibited the use of English decisions rendered
after July 4, 1776. See CHTY, supra, at 97-109. Nonetheless, in Leigh v. Evehart's
Executor, 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 379, 381 (1827), the court recognized that insofar "as the
reasoning and illustrations of principles, contained inthose [English] reports can enlighten
the understanding and persuade the judgment, they are useful, and have been used out of
court." The necessity to refer to English precedent was particularly compelling in cases
involving habeas corpus, since the number of Kentucky decisions available for
consultation was very limited.
For an example of a later use of the English law in deciding a child custody habeas
corpus case, see Ellis v. Jessup, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 403, 413-15 (1875). In its opinion, the
court relied almost exclusively upon Kent's Commentaries, Blaclatone's Commentaries,
and English case law. Id. at 413-14.
' CHnrr, supra note 132, at 97.
L1 CA. WICKLxmm ET AL., THE REviS STATUTES OF KENTUCKY 379 (1852).
-s Weddington v. Sloan, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 147, 154-55 (1854). This decision was
consistent with Maria v. Kirby, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 542, 551 (1851), in which the
Kentucky high court refused to give effect to a writ of habeas corpus, issued in
Pennsylvania, freeing a female slave.
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proceeding focused on bringing before the court an imprisoned individual
who claimed to be illegally detained.'" By the 1850s, Kentucky's
criminal code stated that the writ of habeas corpus "shall be granted
forthwith" to any person in custody of the state whose petition showed,
"by affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe [the petitioner]
is detained without lawful authority, or is imprisoned when, by law, he
is entitled to bail."'37 The issuance of habeas corpus - bringing the
16 See RicHARD H. STANTON, A TREATSE ON THE LAW RElATNG TO THE Powms
AND DUTIES oF JuSTICEs oF Tm PEACE AND CONSTABIM, IN TEE STATE or KENhcKY
(1863). This source, in the author's collection, provides suggested forms for the writ and
the return by using what is apparently an actual example from the pleadings filed in the
murder case of one Henry Hawkins. The petition is not included, but the writ and the
return are reproduced below. Some of the alternative language suggested by Stanton on
this form pleading has been removed.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, to Win. B. Parker, jailor, of the
county of Mason:
We command you, that you have the body of Henry Hawkins, detained in
your custody, as it is said, together with the day and cause of his being taken,
before our judge of the Mason circuit court, at the court house thereof, in the
city of Maysville, on Thursday the 8th day of November 1860, at the hour of
nine o'clock, of the forenoon of said day; and that you then and there state in
writing, the cause of detaining the said Henry Hawkins, and produce your
authority for so doing; and hereof you are not to fail under the heavy penalties
denounced by law against those who disobey this writ, and to submit to and
receive all those things which shall then and there be adjudged in his behalf.
Given under my hand, this 5th day of November 1860.
LEWIS JEFFERSON, [Justice
of the Peace, Mason County].
Id at 365 (alteration in original). This form could be used before the judge of the circuit,
chancery, or county court, and certain other officials as provided by statute.
The return on the writ was to be substantially as follows:
William B. Parker, jailor of Mason county, on this 8th day of [November]
1860, produces the within-named Henry Hawkins, before Lewis Jefferson and
Win. P. Ray, two justices of the peace for Mason county, as he is by the within
writ commanded, and says, that the said Henry Hawkins, was, on the 26th day
of October 1860, committed to the jail of Mason county, and to his custody as
jailor thereof, on a charge of murder, by the warrant of Daniel S. Bradley and
Alexander K. Marshall, two justices of the peace for said county, sitting as an
examining court, and that he has been, and is now detained by him, as jailor
aforesaid, by virtue of said warrant of commitment, and for no other cause. The
said warrant of commitment is here produced.
WILLIAM B. PARKER, Jailor of Mason County.
Id. at 367 (alteration in original).
3 KY. CODE CRM. P. § 395(3) (1854). Almost identical language is used in the
present codification of this provision. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 419.020 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1992).
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petitioner physically before the court - clearly was discretionary and
arguably only reluctantly granted."U If the petition sufficiently drew the
legality of detention into question, the writ would issue. Substantial
penalties were provided for the judicial officer who improperly failed to
issue the writ and for the jailer or other governmental official who failed
to produce the prisoner at the time and place specified.139
" Habeas corpus is "a discretionary writ, to be issued only upon probable cause
being shown, and if upon the face of a petition therefor it appears that there is no
sufficient ground for the release of the prisoner the writ will be denied." Bethuram v.
Black, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 628, 632 (1876) (holding that a person in prison is not, as a
matter of course, entitled to habeas corpus); accord Jones v. Murphy, 314 S.W.2d 545,
547 (Ky. 1958) (holding that whenever a court has acquired jurisdiction of a case, no
other court may, by habeas corpus, interfere with its action); Sprinkles v. Downey, 195
S.W.2d 760, 761 (Ky. 1946) (holding that habeas corpus proceeding for discharge from
custody lies only where judgment is void or has been satisfied); Commonwealth ex rel.
Meredith v. Smith, 118 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Ky. 1938) (holding that petition asking for
habeas corpus did not state facts sufficient to authorize its issuance); Corneilison v.
Toney, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 746, 746-47 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1891) (holding that statutory penalty
for refusing to issue habeas corpus can only be imposed when applicant demonstrates
probable cause that he is being detained without authority).
' The Kentucky Habeas Corpus Act of 1796 specified that if the person upon whom
the writ was served, usually the jailer, failed to produce the prisoner and a return (answer)
showing the legal basis for detention at the time and place specified, the officer would
be liable to the prisoner for the sum of "one hundred pounds." 1 LnTEL, STATUTE LAW
1809, st ra note 9, at 602. Such personal liability provisions were commonly found in
habeas corpus statutes throughout the states. See LEWIS N. DmeMrrz KENrUCKY
JURISPRUDENCE 149 (1890). In 1876, the Kentucky high court interpreted this provision
based upon a claim for judgment (by this time the penalty had been amended to $1,000)
against the jailer of Rockcastle County:
This statute is plain and peremptory, and if the writ be issued by an officer
having jurisdiction, the one to whom it is directed and upon whom it has been
served has no discretion, but must obey it by producing the body of the prisoner
at the time and place named in said writ, f it is in his power to do so, or he
will be liable for the penalty.
Bethuram, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) at 630.
The universal practice of requiring the officer (usually a jailer or warden) with
physical custody of the petitioner to answer to the petition emphasizes that traditional
habeas corpus was not generally concerned with what might be termed "due process"
arguments. This practice was acceptable because the officer would be swearing only to
the existence of a facially valid judgment or warrant, leaving the reviewing court with the
question of law as to whether the court issuing such warrant or judgment had jurisdiction
to do so. See, e.g., Ex parte Knowles, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 263, 264-65 (Warren Cir. CL
1894).
A considerable sum could also be levied against the judge. Section 401 of the
Kentucky Code of Criminal Practice stated that "[i]f any officer authorized to grant the
writ shall, when legally applied to, refuse to issue it, he shall forfeit and pay, to the
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In keeping with its summary nature, a habeas corpus proceeding
could "be exparte, and carried on without the knowledge of the persons
directly interested in the decision."'" Once the prisoner was before the
court, possible outcomes included a discharge of the prisoner from
custody 4' or a remand of the petitioner for further imprisonment. Since
habeas corpus was concerned with the legality of imprisonment at a
particular moment in time, if the fast petition was unsuccessful and the
prisoner remanded, no general limitation existed on filing a subsequent
petition, either in the same or another court.4 ' No appeal was permitted
from an adverse ruling for two reasons. First, action on the petition was
not considered a final, appealable order of the court which had tendered
it. 43 Second, to allow an appeal would interfere with the very purpose
person in whose behalf it was applied for, five hundred dollars." JOSHfUA F. BUI1Tr,
Civm AND CRIMINAL CODES OF PRACTICE OP KENTUCKY 127 (3d ed. 1902). This stiff
penalty applied to improper or illegal acts, not simply erroneous ones, and the statute was
not intended to restrain or control official discretion. Corneilson, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. at 747.
As this requirement was highly penal in nature, it was strictly construed. Stewart v.
Fuson, 153 S.W. 247, 249 (Ky. 1913) (holding that a person advising marshal not to obey
writ of habeas corpus was not liable for the penalty proscribed by the Criminal Code of
Practice).
'0 Weddington v. Sloan, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 147, 155 (1854). For this obvious
reason, habeas corpus was inappropriate to resolve issues of conflicting legal rights
between parties.
141 American law generally considered the discharge a "conclusive determination7' that
the prisoner had been improperly detained and provided that the former prisoner could
not be rearrested "without some new circumstance to authorize the arrest which did not
exist when the discharge was granted." 21 CYCLOPEDIA oF LAW AND PRACTICE 349
(William Mack ed., 1906). Kentucky followed this rule of law. The discharge was
conclusive if the court or officer discharging the prisoner had proper jurisdiction to do so.
Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Ky. 1960).
142 Exparte Alexander, 2 Am. L. Reg., O.S., 44, 46 (Louisville, Ky., Ch. Ct., 1853)
(holding that refusal to grant habeas corpus by Kentucky circuit court was no bar to
consideration of the same writ in chancery court); Maria v. Kirby, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.)
542, 550 (1851). This rule of law apparently lasted until Baker v. Davis, 383 S.W.2d 125,
126 (Ky. 1964), when the federal standard for denying a federal habeas corpus hearing
on a subsequent application, set out in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), was
adopted in Kentucky. But see Yost v. Smith, 862 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Ky. 1993) (holding
that successive petitions may be filed on same claim).
14 Mann v. Russell, 60 S.W. 522, 522 (Ky. 1901) (holding that the court had no
jurisdiction over an appeal from the judgment of a judge of the circuit court who refused
to discharge someone on a writ of habeas corpus); Broadwell v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.
141, 142 (Ky. 1895) (holding that an order of ajudge dismissing a writ of habeas corpus,
although made during a term of court, was not appealable); In re Gill, 17 S.W. 166, 166
(Ky. 1891) (holding that no appeal lies from the refusal of a police judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus); Weddington, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) at 153 (holding that since decisions
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of the writ, which was to provide a speedy release from improper
confinement. This latter reason was aptly stated in 1854 by the court in
Weddington v. Sloan:
The writ of habeas corpus is intended to furnish a speedy and
summary remedy for illegal confinement, and a suspension of the order
of the judge who hears and determines the matter, by an appeal to this
court, might in a great degree fiustrate the whole object and design of
the proceeding.'"
From the very beginning, an important function of the habeas corpus
petition was resolving questions of bail.141 In 1839, it was held that
habeas corpus in bail cases provided a source of "compulsory process"
to bring a prisoner before the court so that bail could be considered.'
Habeas corpus was also used by a chancery court in 1853 to free an
individual from indefinite imprisonment imposed for contempt of
court.
147
Since few cases were reported, very little remains of the earliest
history of habeas corpus in Kentucky." However in 1881, a significant
upon writs of habeas corpus are not required to take place in court, they cannot be
appealed).
'44 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) at 153; see WnKcES, REMEDmS AND RELIEF, supra note 14,
at 15 (noting that habeas corpus is swift and summary in nature). Appeals were only
grudgingly allowed in any event. The Kentucky Constitution of 1850 was the first to
permit the legislature to preserve an appeal from the judgment of a trial court KY.
CONST. of 1850, art IV, § 18. This progressive step was undertaken "not on the ground
of preserving justice for the defendant, as he was seen already to have too many
advantages, but for the purpose of enforcing and making uniform the rules of practice."
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, RESEARCH PUBLICATION No. 68, CRMINAL
PROCEDURE: PRACTICE PRIOR TO ADOPTION Op THE CODE 9 (1959). Only by the process
of appeal and the issuance of appellate opinions could the lower courts be instructed by
the appellate courts in their duties and the holdings of the appellate court be enforced.
143 Ready v. Commonwealth, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 38, 39 (1839) (holding that the court
had power to release murder suspect on bail if evidence did not create strong presumption
of guilt).
144 Id.
'4' Eparte Alexander, 2 Am. L. Reg., O.S., 44, 50-51, 56 (Louisville, Ky., Ch. Ct,
1853) (explaining that habeas corpus lies where committing court has imposed a sentence
unknown to the law or in excess of its authority).
' This limitation concerned the trial bench. As the Warren County, Kentucky, Circuit
Court lamented in 1894:
It is to be regretted that there is no right of appeal in habeas corpus cases
in Kentucky, as by reason thereof we are left without positive authority from
our Court of Appeals upon questions arising in such cases, and must, therefore,
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reported case, Haggard v. Commonwealth, documented the use of the writ
of habeas corpus in Kentucky, following the federal example, to present
a constitutional challenge.49 Haggard, who was black, was convicted
of malicious stabbing by an all-white jury in Cumberland Circuit Court
He had begun the process of appeal when, instead, he "sued out a writ of
habeas corpus" and was subsequently released by the police judge of
Burksville, who vacated the judgment of conviction."5  Under the
statute in existence at time of trial, only white males who met certain
qualifications could serve on grand or petit juries." All four of Hag-
gard's attorneys argued that the statute as it existed at time of trial was
illegal and in conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Kentucky high
court, however, after briefly mentioning its decision the preceding year
which declared the statute unconstitutional, held that the issue was not
one that could be raised on habeas corpus." The court was not pre-
pared to expand the scope of the habeas corpus inquiry to violations of
constitutional rights, even where these were apparent on the record, at
least where the defendant had waived other methods of challenging the
conviction."
Over time, Kentucky prisoners and their counsel continued to seek
out new uses for the writ. Around the turn of the century, habeas corpus
was used to challenge revocation of parole; however, this issue eventually
was held to be outside of the purpose of the writ, thus insulating parole
board actions from summary habeas corpus proceedings." Habeas
corpus was also used to challenge judicial overreaching. For example,
be guided in the main by the decisions of courts of last resort other than our
own, which upon investigation will be found to be, in many respects,
inharmonious and conflicting.
Exparte Knowles, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 263, 265 (Warren Cir. Ct. 1894).
'o 79 Ky. 366 (1881).
"0 Id. at 367.
. JOSRUA F. BuuIr & JOHN FELAND, THE GENERAL STATUTE OF KENTUCKY
570-71 (3d ed. 1881). On January 26, 1882, the Kentucky General Assembly amended
the racially discriminatory and clearly unconstitutional provision by striking out the word
"white" from both sections. 1881 Ky. Acts 15. This portion of the law had already been
hold unconstitutional by Kentucky's high court in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509,
511 (Ky. 1880), a decision compelled by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See John R. Gillespie, The Constitution and the
All-White Jwy, 39 KY. L.J. 65 (1950-1951) (describing the figt to end discrimination in
jury selection).
'n Haggard, 79 Ky. at 364-70.
1 Id. at 369-70.
" Commonwealth v. Crumbaugh, 197 S.W. 401, 402 (Ky. 1917); Board of Prison
Comm'rsv. Crumbaugh, 170 S.W. 1187, 1188 (Ky. 1914).
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during the era of Prohibition, at least two judges in eastern Kentucky
attempted to reduce lawlessness by requiring numerous "peace bonds"
(also nicknamed "liberty bonds") and quickly imprisoned violators for all
manner of transgressions. 55 The novelty of this approach to law and
order could not escape the reach of the writ of habeas corpus, leading one
of the judges to complain publicly that
[b]ootleggers, feudists and other dangerous characters now besiege
the court with writs of habeas corpus and petitions for writs of
prohibition in their efforts to escape the required "'berty Bond," and
the trial judge may now be required to assume the additional burden of
becoming a party litigant with the criminal he tries before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals .... m
A habeas corpus petition was also successfully used to obtain a jury trial
on the issue of the petitioner's insanity after the individual had been
illegally committed to a state metal institution." The trial court granted
reliet reasoning that "the Lawrence Circuit Court had jurisdiction to
determine the sanity of Ferguson, but in order to do so it acted beyond
its jurisdiction when it undertook to try him without notice to him
personally and without giving him the right of trial by jury."' 5
In 1933, the Kentucky high court, in Department of Public Welfare
v. Polsgrove, collected numerous authorities to summarize the scope of
habeas corpus in Kentucky and in other jurisdictions.'59 The court's
unstated purpose was to rebut the continued attempts to take habeas
corpus beyond its traditional uses and to keep Kentucky law apart from
the liberalization of habeas corpus which was increasingly evident in the
federal courts.'6 After comprehensive examination, the court concluded
that the "sole inquiry when determining the right of one confined under
a judgment of conviction, on considering a writ of habeas corpus, is
.. A.T.W. Manning, Law in the Mountains, 11 Ky. L.J. 75, 79 (1922-1923)
(describing the state of law in rural Kentucky).
"' Id. at 80. A writ of prohibition was issued against Judge Manning on one such
peace bond after the county judge refused to release the prisoner on habeas corpus.
Bowles v. Manning, 245 S.W. 506, 507 (Ky. 1922).
" 'Richard C. Stoll, Writ of Habeas Corpus Where Person is Confined in Asylum
Without Verdict By a Jury, 22 KY. L.J. 99, 99 (1933-1934) (providing a reprint of the
undated opinion of Fayette County Circuit Court Judge Richard C. Stall).
"I Id. The analysis of the court stressed the loss of jurisdiction, the traditional
predicate to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 106.
19 63 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1933).
Id. at 604.
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whether the indictment describes an offense of the class which the law
recognizes and of which the court had jurisdiction.''
2. 1937 to 1963
The "modem era" of habeas corpus in Kentucky lies between 1937
and 1963.62 In this crucial period, the state judiciary began to realize
that the common law remedies could not remain stagnant and that
Kentucky courts would need to achieve the more searching inquiry found
in the federal system. During these years, hundreds of Kentucky habeas
corpus cases were decided, and an entire body of jurisprudence, which
would become the foundation for RCr 11.42, was erected.6"
As federal habeas corpus activity increased, the number of state
habeas petitions also began to rise.' In common with other state
appellate courts of that day, Kentucky's high court sharply criticized this
trend. At this time, few, if any, of the prisoners applying for review under
state habeas corpus employed counsel. In 1949 the Kentucky high court,
perhaps in an effort to stem the tide of inmate petitions, noted, "Although
this court has been more or less besieged with such self prosecuted
proceedings, it has never sustained any of them.""1 5 Additionally, the
court was irritated by the fact that a habeas corpus petitioner could file
successive petitions, even in the same case and upon the same facts, and
was allowed, in keeping with common law provisions going back
hundreds of years, to have a friend, relative, or other interested person
make application for the writ on the prisoner's behalf.'" On the other
hand, no provision existed to develop a record outside of that which
" Id. (collecting cases).
162 These dates, of course, are somewhat arbitrary. In 1937, the Kentucky high court
first recognized that cormn nobis was an available remedy in Kentucky. Jones v.
Commonwealth, 108 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1937), overruled on other grounds by Smith
v. Buchanan, 163 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1942). This holding had an obvious effect on state
habeas corpus. In 1963, RCr 11.42 became effective, and the important case of Rice v.
Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963), which held Kentucky habeas corpus to be coextensive
with the modem federal theory of habeas corpus relief, was decided.
" It is not the purpose of this section to chronicle the development of this case law
in detail or to comprehensively illustrate how each legal issue was resolved. Certain
important cases and general trends, however, are illustrated.
14 See Keeton v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1970) ("Federal habeas
corpus petitions increased from 89 in 1940 to over 12,000 in 1970. State court
postconviction proceedings followed the same pattern.").
165 Wooten v. Buchanan, 223 S.W.2d 976, 976 (Ky. 1949).
t" Day v. Skinner, 300 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky. 1957).
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already existed, so the scope of inquiry was severely limited." An
additional jurisdictional hook during this era required that the petitioner
be in "actual or physical restraint" thereby excluding, for example, one
who was out on bail ls The petitioner was also subject to additional
technical requirements.'69
The restrictive traditions of Kentucky habeas corpus initially made
analysis of cases relatively simple. First, the court would note that relief
was available only if the judgment was void. 7 ' The second prong of
the analysis was equally simple - the judgment could not be void, even
if a constitutional right had been denied, where "the court had jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant and of the offense charged.'.' By 1958,
"6 See Moss v. Jones, 342 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1961) ("Habeas corpus does not lie
to correct hidden errors which were unknown to the court and defendant at the time of
judgment."); Wolford v. Buchanan, 232 S.W.2d 1016, 1018 (Ky. 1950) (holding that
habeas corpus will lie only "when the judgment is void and when the invalidating effects
are shown in the record of the trial"); Smith v. Buchanan, 163 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Ky. 1942)
(holding that, since the court had jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the defendant,
habeas corpus was not the proper remedy because judgment was not void).
For a criticism of the restrictive rule of Wolford v. Buchanan, where failure to
appoint counsel in accordance with Kentucky law was alleged, see George R. Creedle,
Note, Right of Accused to Assigned Counsel in Non-Capital Felony Prosecutions -
Wolford v. Buchanan - Rue of Gholson Case Modified?, 40 Ky. L.J. 228 (1951-1952).
This restriction was eroded over time, and trial courts began to hold hearings in habeas
proceedings to resolve disputed questions of fact unimown to the trial court at time of
judgment. See, e.g., Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ky. 1963) (recognizing that
a hearing should be held to determine whether a petitioner was denied the effective
assistance of counsel and whether the entry of a guilty plea was done voluntarily and with
an understanding of what such a plea entailed); Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Ky.
1963) (holding that a defendant who apparently did not have the effective assistance of
counsel at trial was entitled to a hearing on his habeas corpus petition).
,6 EX parte Noel, 338 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Ky. 1960); Robinson v. Bax, 247 S.W.2d
38, 38 (Ky. 1952) (holding that habeas corpus is only appropriate in situations of actual
or physical restraint).
SFirst, the writ was properly dismissed where the petitioner failed to correctly name
the official allegedly detaining the petitioner without proper authority or filed the writ as
an original action in the appellate court. In re Winburn, 320 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Ky. 1959);
Nunn v. Buchanan, 223 S.W.2d 355, 355 (Ky. 1949); Fason v. Stewart, 126 S.W. 1097,
1098 (Ky. 1910). In addition, the state would not provide a free transcript to an indigent
petitioner, to be used to prepare a habeas corpus petition where the allegations regarding
the fairness of the underlying trial were not specific. Blevins v. Tartar, 306 S.W.2d 297,
298 (Ky. 1957) (noting unsuccessful use of mandamus to obtain transcript); Moy v.
Bradley, 306 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Ky. 1957); see GREGORY, supra note 11, at 903-12.
,7* Hoskis v. Buchanan, 223 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Ky. 1949) (collecting cases).
'm Owen v. Commonwealth, 280 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Ky. 1955); Brown v. Hoblitzell,
307 S.W.2d 739, 739 (Ky. 1956); id. at 750 (Sims, J., dissenting) ("It is the general rule,
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the second prong was recognized to be in some flux, with the Kentucky high
court indicating that a judgment "may possibly be subject to some modifica-
tion in a case where constitutional rights have been violated."' By 1961,
the courts position shifted again, and it held flatly, in Moss v. Jones, that
mere denial of a constitutional right did not void a criminal judgment.' A
year later, the Kentucky high court decided a case on the same principle
which it had rejected in Moss. That case, Thomas v. Morrow, concerned the
fate of a habeas petitioner with a long history of mental problems who had
pled guilty and had been sentenced but had been demonstrably incompetent
on both occasions. 4 Under these hacts, the Thomas court held that the
resulting judgment was void and indicated that habeas would lie to correct
such a wrong." Although it may be supposed that the issue was not a
"constitutional" one since no violation of constitutional rights was mentioned
in the opinion, the nature of the holding indicated constitutional issues
surrounded cases in which mental incompetents were imprisoned without the
requisite due process - for the trial court had jurisdiction over both the person
of the defendant and the offense." No attempt was made to square this
holding with numerous prior decisions limiting a habeas inquiry to the
jurisdictional question'"
During the period from the mid-1920s until the arrival of RCr 11.42 in
1963, state habeas corpus petitions were brought in a wide variety of cases.
For example, petitioners sought to obtain immediate release on grounds of
crel and unusual punishment,' erroneous sentencing,' error in consol-
observed particularly in the federal courts, that a judgment rendered against an accused
person without due process is void; but this court has intimated that habeas corpus does
not lie merely because due process has been denied.").
" Thomas v. Maggard, 313 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Ky. 1958); Beny v. Gray, 299 S.W.2d
124, 125 (Ky.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 986 (1957).
' 342 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1961) ("Even the denial of a constitutional right will
not render a judgment void if the court had jurisdiction of the person and of the
offense:). The Kentucky high court had a hard time making up its mind on this issue.
Other cases reached the same conclusion as Moss. See, e.g., Decker v. Russell, 357
S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ky. 1962) (explaining that a denial of a constitutional right does not
invalidate ajudgment if the court had jurisdiction of the case); Owen, 280 S.W.2d at 525;
Smith v. Buchanan, 163 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Ky. 1942).
1- 361 S.W.2d 105, 106-07 (Ky. 1962).
175 Id. at 106.
176 See id.
'7 Id.
1 Decker v. Russell, 357 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1962).
' Thomas v. Maggard, 313 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Ky. 1958); Commonwealth v.
Crawford, 147 S.W.2d 1019, 1020 (Ky. 1941) (holding that illegal sentence was outside
of statutory mandates); see also Debose v. Cowan, 490 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1973)
(holding that sentence imposed without the intervention of the jury did not render
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idating warrants or charges for trial,"'8 defective indictment,.. newly
discovered evidence," unreasonable or illegal denial of bail,"a and
irregularity in the formation of the jury." In some cases, the traditional
civil nature of a habeas corpus proceeding affected the outcome of legal
issues. 
1 8 5
Although most applications were denied, a few petitioners were
successful in obtaining the following: a judgment granting the prisoner
the right to reasonable bail; 8 a ruling that state jurisdiction over a
prisoner who had been given over to federal authorities to serve time in
judgment void and, in pleading guilty, the defendant waived right to jury involvement);
Lynch v. Jones, 342 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Ky. 1961) (holding that judgment was not rendered
void where a judge delivered a sentence without the intervention of the jury).
Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Ky. 1956).
is' Underwood v. Jones, 346 S.W.2d 46, 47-48 (Ky. 1961) (bolding that proper
manner of dealing with a defective indictment is by direct appeal rather than habeas
corpus).
"2 Adkins v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ky. 1959) (holding that habeas
corpus is not proper method for dealing with newly discovered evidence which should
have been previously discovered with due diligence).
" A leading "bail" case prior to the enactment of RCr 11.42 was Smith v. Henson,
182 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Ky. 1944) (holding that a habeas corpus petition to obtain bail
should come only after a motion for bail has been made, and in order for habeas corpus
to stand, it must be shown that denial of bail pursuant to the motion was illegal). See
generally Lycans v. Burke, 453 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1970) (holding that refusal of bail does
not constitute error in a capital offense case where the proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt great); Lewis v. Ball, 299 S.W.2d 810 (Ky. 1957) (holding that habeas corpus
petition must show that the court acted illegally in denying bail); Duke v. Smith, 253
S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1952) (recognizing that the standard that denial of bail must be
reasonable and lawful is met by a showing of proof of evidence giving rise to a great
presumption of guilt).
' Sexton v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Ky. 1943) (holding that alleged
irregularities in the formation of the jury only lead to having judgment declared
erroneous, not void, and, therefore, habeas corpus petition would not succeed).
... Haney v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. 1970) (holding that since habeas
corpus is a civil proceeding, appointment of counsel for indigent is not required); Crady
v. Cranfill, 371 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Ky. 1963) (holding that because habeas corpus is
essentially a civil proceeding, the bail provisions of the criminal procedure rules do not
apply); accord Ross v. Wingo, 433 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1968) (supporting the
proposition that, due to the civil nature of habeas corpus, appointment of counsel is not
required). However, the writ of habeas corpus may, for certain purposes at least, have a
criminal nature. Bragg v. Knauf, 275 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Ky. 1955) (holding that regardless
of whether habeas corpus proceeding is civil or criminal in nature, the time within which
appeal may be taken must be computed according to Criminal Code of Practice).
16 Damron v. Coleman, 270 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Ky. 1954) (granting habeas corpus
where prisoner's guilt or presumption of guilt is not so evident or great as to justify a
denial of bail).
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federal prison had been waived, releasing him from the remainder of his
Kentucky sentence;1 a hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel; and a new trial based on a void indictment."
As a modem post-conviction remedy, the common law writ of habeas
corpus had several distinct disadvantages. First, by logic and unbendable
common law tradition, the petition had to be brought in the court having
jurisdiction over the body of the petitioner - that is, the court in the
district where the prisoner was located. This requirement created
numerous difficulties as the volume and complexity of cases increased.
For instance, the potential workload was shifted to the few courts in areas
with prisons, and neither the trial record nor likely witnesses would
normally be found in the judicial circuit where the petition was being
examined. Second, the Kentucky high court correctly predicted problems
of "comity" between state trial courts which might overturn each other's
convictions."' 0 Third, at least initially, the trial court was only autho-
rized to release the petitioner from the illegal confinement - a situation
"1 Jones v. Raybom, 346 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Ky. 1961). This principle was reaffirmed
in Yost v. Smith, 862 S.W.2d 852, 854-55 (Ky. 1993) (holding writ of habeas corpus
should be granted because state forfeited right to hold petitioner for remainder of sentence
where transfer of prisoner did not comply with procedures).
" Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Ky. 1963).
1 Beach v. Lady, 262 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1953). Coram nobis was not available
to test this judgment of conviction because the defect in the void indictment, which
necessarily rendered the judgment void, was not based on a 'idden mistake of fact which
could not have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence by appellant in time to
have been presented to the court which tried him." Id. The defendant however, prevailed
on a writ of habeas corpus. Id.
' The Kentucky high court's insistence upon restricting the use of habeas corpus was
explained in Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.2d 993, 995 (Ky. 1942) (holding that in
the case of a valid judgment the appropriate application for a now trial was to the court
which rendered the judgment):
While it may be necessary and proper for the Federal Courts to extend the
scope of habeas corpus in order to give full effect to the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and this seems to be the
tendency, we deem it advisable to confine the scope of such proceedings within
rather narow limits. Under our system of procedure, it would be unseemly to
vest power in one circuit court to annul, or refuse to give effect to, the valid
judgment of another circuit court. Equally unseemly, it appears to us, would be
the vesting of power in one circuit court to grant a now trial of an action which
had been tried in another circuit court.
Another potential problem was that a prisoner being transferred around the state to
various institutions could leave a trail of habeas petitions in every jurisdiction. This
problem was solved quite early by the judicial rule that once one trial court acquired
jurisdiction of the legal issue, no other court could interfere. Jones v. Murphy, 314
S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ky. 1958).
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which amounted to returning the prisoner to immediate freedom, with all
its attendant disadvantages. Eventually, the Kentucky high court recog-
nized the use of the conditional writ, with which the court could find that
the petitioner was imprisoned on a void judgment but would not release
the petitioner immediately."' Instead, the Commonwealth would be
given a limited time to retry or recommit the prisoner on the same
charge. The prisoner, meanwhile, would remain in custody. If the state
took no action to base the imprisonment on a valid judgment, a final writ
would issue and the prisoner would go free."n Fourth and finally, the
error alleged by the habeas petition had to be evident from the trial
record,193 a serious limitation which artificially bound the reviewing
court to the transcript of record or the record of proceedings.
Due to these limitations, which could only slowly be overcome by
overruling legal doctrines which had been considered immutable for
generations, Kentucky's high court began to shift the emphasis away from
the use of state habeas corpus as the primary post-conviction remedy.
Increasingly, the court turned to the state law writ of coram nobis as a
more attractive means to supplement habeas corpus and to satisfy
Kentucky's need for a modem system of post-conviction relief.
3. After Enactment of RCr 11.42
The final break with the restrictive view of the scope of state habeas
corpus as a post-conviction remedy came in 1963, when it no longer
mattered, in Rice v. Davis." Although observing that Kentucky had
heretofore followed the traditional, limited view of state habeas corpus,
the court in Rice was faced with prima facie evidence that trial counsel
had committed numerous reversible errors, had worked a substantial
injustice on his client, and had failed to have a record available for
appeal, thus effectively closing that avenue of relief 9 However, by the
time this case was decided, RCr 11.42, which offered a post-conviction
relief process quite different from state habeas corpus, was already in
effect. In this posture, the Kentucky high court chose to adopt the
"newer" or "federal" view of habeas corpus that "ajudgment may be void
'9' The purpose of the conditional writ, of course, was to prevent the flight of the
prisoner pending retrial. Conditional writs were specifically suggested by the high court
in Beach, 262 S.W.2d at 839, and Robinson v. Kiere, 216 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Ky. 1949).
Beach, 262 S.W.2d at 839; Robinson, 216 S.W.2d at 928.
m See, e.g., Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Ky. 1963).
"L Id.
10 Id. at 157.
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and thereby subject to attack for certain extreme irregularities" unrelated
to jurisdiction over the person and the offense." 6 Rice thus became the
theoretical foundation from which RCr 11.42 was to evolve, since the
Rule was later held to contain no more by way of post-conviction relief
than the prisoner had already been granted in Rice.
The fact that habeas corpus was available only where the prisoner
could show the remedy provided by RCr 11.42 or direct appeal was
inadequate'" led to some interesting decisions concerning the adequacy,
or propriety, of relying on RCr 11.42 in certain situations. For example,
RCr 11.42, consistent with its role as Kentucky's primary post-conviction
remedy, normally is not considered inadequate merely because proceeding
under the Rule in the county of conviction may take longer than a habeas
petition in the county of incarceration."8 Although it may be more
time-consuming to dismiss the habeas petition and require the inmate to
refile under RCr 11.42, the court in the county of incarceration generally
cannot consider the habeas petition.!"
Additionally, a prisoner may not attempt to bypass the procedural
bars to successive RCr 11.42 motions by resorting to habeas corpus after
waiver or loss under the Rule; such use of a habeas petition is fore-
closed.2 °° Nor, apparently, may a petitioner in a state habeas proceeding
' Id. at 155, 157; see First Annual Kentucky Court of Appeals Review, 52 KY. L.J
631, 648-49 (1963-1964). This decision was important only to habeas petitions already
in the pipeline and did not apply to proceedings originating on or after January 1, 1963.
Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154, 154 (Ky. 1964).
L Lear v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky. 1994) ("Habeas corpus is an
extraordinary remedy which is only available when other relief is inadequate.'); Ayers,
377 S.W.2d at 154. For other cases holding that a habeas corpus petition should be
dismissed where there- was no showing that the remedy provided by RCr 11.42 was
inadequate, see Davis v. Wingo, 396 S.W.2d 53, 53 (Ky. 1965), and Harris v. Wingo, 396
S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1965).
As an exclusive remedy, RCr 11.42 was arguably unconstitutional as a suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus. This claim was specifically rejected in Ayers, 377 S.W.2d
at 154. The constitutionality of "suspending" federal habeas corpus by enacting an
exclusive federal statutory post-conviction remedy had already been upheld in United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1952).
1. Richardson v. Howard, 448 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Ky. 1969) (holding that unless
prisoner can show that the remedy provided by the Rule is inadequate, it constitutes the
exclusive remedy for attacking a judgment of conviction).
'" But see Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994) (holding
the expeditious relief provided by a habeas corpus petition may be used where a prisoner
can demonstrate that the judgment under which he is held is void ab initio).
0 Debose v. Cowan, 490 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1973); see Waddle v. Howard, 450
S.W.2d 233, 234 (Ky. 1970); Walker v. Wingo, 398 S.W.2d 885, 885 (Ky. 1966) ("Tha
fact that a prisoner has lost his remedy under RCr 11.42 by failing properly to invoke it
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have his or her claim reviewed on the basis that RCr 11.42 has become
an inadequate remedy because a previous court decision held that the
particular allegation the petitioner wishes to make is not a ground for RCr
11.42 relief.2 '
While the writ of habeas corpus was originally available only to one
who was actually imprisoned. Walters v. Smith expanded the scope of
state habeas corpus in 1980 by holding that the release of the petitioner
on parole did not moot his appeal of the trial court's dismissal of the
writ.2"z Later that same year, however, as if for clarification, the
Kentucky Supreme Court reaffirmed the position that a habeas petition
would be mooted where the sentence of incarceration had been complete-
ly served.0 3 Moreover, a habeas corpus claim is also subject to the
equitable defense of laches, so that if the Commonwealth is prejudiced by
the unreasonable delay of the petitioner in advancing a claim, the petition
will be dismissed.2
Several areas of significance are still subject to state habeas corpus.
With the exception of the first, judgment void ab initio, the specific
sections which follow represent legal challenges for which habeas corpus
is available as a potential remedy because these attacks are not based
upon the alleged invalidity of the underlying judgments of conviction.
a. Judgment Void Ab Initio
In a significant expansion of the rights of state prisoners to utilize
state habeas corpus for relief; the Kentucky Supreme Court in 1994
decided Commonwealth v. Marcum.2 5 At least six of the justices in
Marcum agreed that the "amended" judgment which was the basis for
Marcum's confinement was void ab initio because the circuit court was
without jurisdiction to enter it.2" Marcum had filed for relief under the
habeas statute and clearly was entitled to relief According great weight
does not mean that the rule does not provide an adequate remedy ... 1.
2"' Brown v. Wingo, 396 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Ky. 1965).
2 599 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Ky. 1980). This holding brought Kentucky law into
conformity with federal law. See Jones v. Omninghar, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963).
= Griffith v. Schultz, 609 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Ky. 1980) (citing Hinton v. Byerly, 483
S.W.2d 138, 144 (Ky. 1972), which hld that a child custody 'habeas corpus proceeding
became moot when its objective had been accomplished by other means").
' Brunfley v. Seahold, 885 S.W.2d 954, 956-57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
habeas petition was dismissed properly where petitioner waited until administrative
records were destroyed to bring his claim).
873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994).
2 Id. at 211.
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to the summary and expedited nature of a habeas corpus proceeding, the
opinion framed the issue as involving "the balance between the Common-
wealths need for an orderly procedure as provided for by RCr 11.42 and the
prisoner right to an expeditious release through habeas corpus when it is
patently obvious he is being unlawfully detaine." 207 Obviously believing
in the need to act as rapidly as possible, the court redefined the showing of
inadequacy of the remedy provided by RCr 11.42.:' 21s This will only make
it more difficult if the petitioner is unsuccessiul, to bar subsequent attempts
to raise the same issue. If the court is concerned that the normal RCr 11.42
procedure is too slow in certain situations, the court can and should amend
RCr 11.42 to provide for expedited review in such a case.
Prior to Marcum, the law was reasonably clear that RCr 11.42 was used
to attack judgments and habeas corpus was used where the right to immediate
release was based on claims outside of the judgment Opening up state
habeas, even in admittedly narrow circumstances, only encourages multiple
attacks in different forums, with no penalty to the prisoner, since a Marcum
claim raised and decided adversely to the petitioner on state habeas presum-
ably may be presented again on RCr 11.42. Because they are two different
procedures, it may be that identical claims can be raised in each. And if not
how will the RCr 11.42 couit, the court ofconviction, enforce the bar without
knowing whether a state habeas claim, in the court of imprisonment already
has been raised and decided? One thing that is clear is that Marcum will not
be the last.case decided on this issue.
b. Pretrial Detention
An important remaining use of state habeas corpus, staying true to the
tradition of the writ, is to challenge pretrial detenftion 210 While this chal-
2 Id. at 210.
Id. at 210-11; Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154, 154 (Ky. 1964). In the past, the
high court has gone ahead and decided the merits of a habeas petition which raises claims
that should have been brought by RCr 11.42. This approach is designed to avoid "circuity
of motion" and is utilized when the petitioner has a clear right to have the judgment
voided. Hardy v. Howard, 458 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky. 1970) (holding that habeas corpus
petition will be sustained when petitioner has already served his entire sentence and so
is entitled to immediate release); Howard v. Ingramn, 452 S.W.2d 410, 411-12 (Ky. 1970)
(holding that where one is no longer a prisoner under an illegal sentence and is thus
unable to invoke 11.42, the judge's release of the prisoner on habeas corpus will be
sustained). But see Langdon v. Thomas, 384 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Ky. 1965).
20 See, e.g., Ingramn, 452 S.W.2d at 411. Even though the judgment inMarcum was
held to be "void ab initio," meaning it was, from the beginning, a nulfity, Marcun's
challenge was still an attack on the judgment Marcum, 873 S.W.2d at 211.
210 See, e.g., Thacker v. Asher, 394 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1965).
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lenge could obviously apply to any type of illegal pretrial detention, its
use is most often premised upon improper denial of bail or unreasonable
setting of bail while the petitioner awaits trial for a criminal offense.2
This traditional use was dramatically altered in 1981, when RCr 4.43 was
adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court as a codification of Abraham v.
Commonwealth.! That case held that trial court decisions regarding
motions for alteration of bail in felony cases were appealable"
Although the petition for habeas corpus was acknowledged to have been
traditionally used to challenge bail determinations, counsel for Abraham
provided the court with several reasons why it was more efficient to
allow the defendant to appeal from the adverse order than to force
prisoners to file a separate habeas proceeding. The most important reason
was that the respondent in a habeas action, usually a jailer, would have
no interest in such a matter.' The decision preserved habeas corpus as
the proper course for review of district court actions regarding bail while
allowing appeal for challenging bail in felony cases. As stated earlier, this
policy was later codified in RCr 4.43,21" thus removing an historic
function of habeas corpus from felony cases.
Other forms of illegal pretrial detention, however, are still subject to
habeas corpus relief. In Watkins v. Turner, the petitioner, Watkins, was
being held in the Breathitt County jail for murder!1 Both the defense
and the prosecution agreed that he was hopelessly incompetent to stand
trial in the foreseeable future."' Under these circumstances, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held that it was improper for the trial court to
" The Kentucky Constitution provides a right to reasonable bail and imposes a
presumption in favor of granting bail. KY. CONST. §§ 16, 17. Historically, state prisoners
have had some success in challenging, through a habeas petition, the denial of bail. See,
e.g., Thacker, 394 S.W.2d at 589 (holding that Commonwealth had failed to sustain its
burden of showing either evident proof or great presumption as to petitioner's guilt and,
thus, that denial of bail was improper); Day v. Caudill, 300 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. 1957)
(holding that sufficient proof or presumption of guilt did not exist to justify the denial of
bail).
2 565 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
" Id. at 154-55.
214 Id. at 154.
71 In fact, RCr 4.43(2) specifically provides that "the writ of habeas corpus remains
the proper method for seeking circuit court review of the action of a district court
respecting bail." See William H. Fortune, Kentucky Law Survey - Criminal RuIes, 70 KY.
L.J. 395, 408 (1981-1982) (discussing major changes to the Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure as a result of the 1981 amendments adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court).
2'6 587 S.W.2d 275 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
21 Id. at 276.
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have dismissed Watkins' habeas corpus petition2"8 The appellate court
ordered that the petition be granted and instructed the trial court to begin
proper proceedings to have Watkins committed to a state mental
institution.219
c. Extradition and Loss of Jurisdiction
Other remaining uses of state habeas are to test the legality of
extradition proceedings 0 and to test a prisoner's claim that Kentucky
has lost jurisdiction over him by voluntarily surrendering him to another
state for service of sentence on another crime. T' A recent case in which
a state prisoner won immediate release from custody through habeas
corpus is Yost v. Smith. 2 Yost, convicted of burglary and theft in
Kentucky, was also wanted on criminal charges in at least six other states.
A Louisiana prosecutor and a Louisiana district judge executed and
218 Id.
219 Id.
mExparte Noel, 338 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Ky. 1960). The challenge may also be made,
and is probably better made, by invoking Kentucky's extradition statute. See Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.150 - .420 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1985). The Kentucky statutory scheme specifically provides anyone arrested pursuant to
this statute the ability to utilize habeas corpus, to obtain counsel, and to have a hearing.
Id. § 440.250; see Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Ky. 1985) (rejecting the
argument of a death penalty defendant, on appeal from the overruling of his 11.42 motion,
that reversible error occurred because he was not allowed to file a writ of habeas corpus
under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and test the legality of his detention), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
m See Interstate Agreement on Detainers, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 440.450
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992). Under this statute, an individual facing
confinement in another state or in the federal system may escape service of his or her
sentence in Kentucky if prematurely turned over to other authorities for service of
sentence in another jurisdiction. In Hemdon v. Wingo, 399 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Ky. 1966),
the court specifically held that RCr 11.42 was unavailable to challenge the return of the
prisoner to Kentucky since the legal issue was not related to the validity of the original
judgment of conviction. See generally Shanks v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 688, 690
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, seeking
to obtain prisoner for prosecution in another jurisdiction, was not considered a detainer
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, where the writ was issued prior to the
detainer).
State prisoners, however, are foreclosed from using federal habeas corpus to
challenge extradition proceedings arising under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
until the remedies provided by the agreement have been exhausted. Norton v. Parke, 892
F.2d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990).
2" 862 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1993).
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forwarded to Kentucky a standard form request for temporary custody
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in order to try Yost in
Louisiana and then return him to Kentucky for service of sentence. The
state delivered Yost up to Louisiana despite a Kentucky trial court's
denial of the state's motion to transfer. It was then discovered, to the
embarrassment of all sides, that Louisiana was not a signatory of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the transfer was improper z
Basing its decision upon Section 2 of the Bill of Rights to the
Kentucky Constitution, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that, by its
actions, the state had lost jurisdiction over the prisoner and could not
require Yost to serve out his sentence in this statetm The dissent
argued for a "good faith exception!' and noted that Yost had not spent
any additional time in prison because of the brief transfer to Louisiana,
that he was returned to Kentucky by Louisiana without delay once the
mistake was uncovered, and that the majority's decision was simply an
undeserved reward for Yost dubiously based upon "an honest mistake"
by Kentucky authorities.
d Probation, Parole, and "Good Time"
State habeas corpus can still be used to claim that the sentence
of imprisonment the prisoner is serving has already expirede'
Habeas corpus also has been used, sometimes improperly, to challenge
revocation of probation or parole where the indigent prisoner was not
afforded counsel at the revocation hearing, a hearing was not
. Id. at 853.
Id. at 853-54. This holding is based on Jones v. Raybom, 346 S.W.2d 743, 748
(Ky. 1961), an earlier habeas corpus case which established the principle that transfer of
a state prisoner to the authorities of another jurisdiction, when done without the consent
of the prisoner and without lawful authority, caused the state to relinquish jurisdiction
over the remainder of the sentence. Similar cases utilizing habeas corpus and relying upon
the decision in Jones v. Rayborn are collected in the Yost opinion. Yost, 862 S.W.2d at
854.
m Yost, 862 S.W.2d at 856 (Spain, J., dissenting). Because this petition was Yost's
second habeas petition, the opinion of the majority seems to authorize multiple successive
habeas corpus petitions dealing with the same issue, a troublesome holding. Yost, 862
S.W.2d at 853.
w Howard v. Ingram, 452 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Ky. 1970); see Ross v. Wingo, 433
S.W.2d 137, 137 (Ky. 1968) (noting that a petitioner who claimed prison records showed
an incorrect future release date could not establish a habeas corpus claim because he was
not being illegally restrained).
2r Reeder v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Ky. 1973) (holding that there
is no duty to provide counsel in revocation proceeding where the petitioner fails to assert
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held, 8 the prisoner was required to serve sentences in an improper
mannerz  and probation was improperly revoked.)3  Habeas corpus may
not, however, be used to challenge administrative decisions regarding "good
time' reductions in sentence unless immediate release will be the result. l
that he did not violate his probation or that mitigating circumstances would make
revocation inappropriate). Note that the case is incorrectly styled for a habeas corpus
proceeding and could have been dismissed on that ground.
2- Hester v. Wingo, 473 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Ky. 1971) (holding that revocation of
parole without a hearing is not a basis for habeas corpus relief); Shepherd v. Wingo, 471
S.W.2d 718, 719 (Ky. 1971) (recognizing that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy for
revocation of parole without a hearing).
Habeas corpus has also been used to challenge other defects in the parole board's
actions or authority. In a companion habeas case, the Kentucky high court held that
'!mandamus is the only proper remedy for an abuse of authority by the parole board in
connection with re-arrest and revocation of parole." Allen v. Wingo, 472 S.W.2d 688, 688
(Ky. 1971). But see Boulder v. Parke, 791 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
in habeas corpus proceeding that parolee's due process rights were not violated by
automatic revocation of his parole upon conviction for the crime committed during his
parole); Anglian v. Sowders, 566 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Ky. CL App. 1978) (rejecting
petitioner's argument that delay in holding parole revocation hearing prejudiced him in
various ways, thereby entitling him to release on habeas corpus). Apparently, these two
cases were raised and decided under the assumption that habeas corpus provided a proper
remedy.
Wallace v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 557, 557-58 (Ky. 1970) (holding that petitioner
was not entitled to habeas corpus because, by committing crime while on parole, he
terminated his parole status).
230 Wells v. Webb, 511 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky. 1974) (holding that procedure violated
recently imposed federal standards under Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 790
(1973), which held that due process entitles probationer to receive both a hearing and the
representation of counsel before his probation can be revoked). See generally Lynch v.
Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Ky. CL App. 1980) (resolving the issue of
improper revocation which was raised on KY. P, CRIM. P. 11.42 motion).
23' Bnumley v. Seabold, 885 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
petitioner's claimed entitlement of immediate release due to improper administrative
procedures in calculating sentence properly invoked habeas corpus); Polsgrove v.
Kentucky Bureau of Corrections, 559 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Ky.), rev'g549 S.W.2d 834 (Ky.
CL App. 1977). Polsgrove claimed the prison authorities had incorrecty calculated his
"good time!' (a term used to refer to statutorily authorized reduction of sentence for good
behavior). Id. The intermediate appellate court had held that habeas corpus was the proper
means to raise this challenge, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, saying.
Polsgrove is not seeking immediate release, but a reduction of his sentence.
In this jurisdiction it has been held as far back as "the memory of man nmneth
not to the contrary" that in criminal cases a writ of habeas corpus has been
esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom, having for
its object the speedy release by judicial decree of persons who are illegally
restrained of their liberty.
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A habeas corpus challenge to "good time" revocation may be barred by
laches.
e. Other Available Uses
In Chick v. Commonwealth, the defendant had escaped from jail in
1943, after his conviction but before sentencing. 23 After arrest, convic-
tion, and service of a life sentence in Texas, he was returned to Kentucky
and was awaiting sentence in the Boyd County jail when he filed a
habeas petition challenging his 1943 convictions. However, RCr 11.42
was held to be unavailable, since it required a person to be held "in
custody under sentence" before the Rule could be utilized, and, of course,
the defendant was not under sentence.u Habeas corpus, therefore, was
appropriate as a remedy although, under the facts of the case, relief was
denied. 5
In contrast, habeas corpus was used successfully in Spurlock v. Noe
to obtain release from jail time imposed solely as the result of an indigent
prisoner's inability to pay a fine. Compelled by a recent holding of
the Supreme Court to overrule long-established precedent, the Kentucky
court ordered the prisoner released from custody. 7 The court empha-
sized, however, that the fine was still owed and its payment could be
compelled by other legal means. Habeas corpus was also used at least
Id. (emphasis added). This issue had been reserved in Haney v. Wingo, 453 S.W.2d 556,
556 (Ky. 1970) ("We pass the question of whether habeas corpus was an appropriate form
of remedy, considering that immediate release from custody was not sought"). Two
recent cases are O'Deav. Clark, 883 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding writ
of habeas corpus to be inappropriate for restoring "good time" or expunging inmate
records), and Graham v. O'Dea, 876 S.W.2d 621, 621-22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that restoration of good time credits was not cognizable on habeas corpus where prisoner
had not asserted that immediate release would result).
2 1 Brum!ey, 885 S.W.2d at 956-57.
' 405 S.W.2d 14 (Ky.) (affiming denial of habeas corpus while holding that
Kentucky had not forfeited jurisdiction over petitioner arrested in Nevada and wanted in
both Kentucky and Texas), cert. dnied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
Id. at 15 (quoting KY. R. CRMIL P. 11.42 which, by its terms, affords relief only
to "[a] prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released on the ground
his sentence is subject to collateral attack").
2 467 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1971) (reversing circuit court's denial of habeas corpus
where petitioner had served out sentence but was still held in custody for failure to pay
fine).
237 Id. at 321.
2" Id. at 321-22.
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in one case to test the constitutionality of Kentucky's system of allowing
lay judges to preside over police court in certain smaller, rural areas. '
Yet another successful use of habeas corpus may be found in Brock
v. Sowders. In this case, the prosecutor had agreed that if Brock pled
guilty the prosecutor would recommend that Brock's Kentucky sentence
run concurrently with an Indiana sentence. Brock agreed and plead guilty,
and the trial court, following the prosecutor's recommendation, sentenced
Brock according to the terms of the agreement. When Brock was returned
to Kentucky some years later, having been placed on parole in Indiana,
the Kentucky Bureau of Corrections refused to credit him for time
served."
Once the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the plea bargain
had to be enforced,242 an additional and more pertinent question was
presented. Because Indiana, in contrast to Kentucky, treated time on
parole as service of the actual sentence, Brock was being illegally
detained unless the Indiana sentence had been fully served, a fact not in
the record.' 3 Brock was entitled to serve out the Indiana sentence,
whether actually in prison or on parole, before being forced to begin his
Kentucky sentence in prison. Brock's habeas petition, therefore, required
at least a hearing to determine the status of the Indiana sentence, and if
it were not fully served, Brock would be entitled to immediate re-
lease.244
In summary, the writ of habeas corpus, having been restricted in
recent years to matters which RCr 11.42 could not reach, has now been
broadened to overlap with RCr 11.42 in certain situations where a
judgment is alleged to be void ab initio and speed of relief is impor-
tant."s Although, as a general rule, state habeas corpus does not lie to
attack a judgment and the present exception is narrowly drawn, it remains
2" North v. Russell, 516 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1974).
In the subsequent proceeding, Kentucky's high court again affirmed, holding that due
process was not violated by the lay judge's power to fine and imprison within the limited
power of that office. North v. Russell, 540 S.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Ky. 1975), affld, 427 U.S. 328
(1976).
24 610 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1980) (reversing denial of habeas corpus, enforcing plea
ageement for Kentucky and Indiana sentences to run concunently, and construing the
Indiana sentence to include time on parole as time served, as required by Indiana law).
2' Id. at 592.
242 Id. (citing Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Ky. 1979), which
held that "[t]he government should not be allowed to welsh on its bargain").
' Id. at 592-93.
24 Id. at 593.
24 See Commonwealth v. Marcun, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994).
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to be seen whether other claims based upon the relative speed of habeas
corpus will result in further expansion.
B. Coram Nobis in Kentucky
The common law writ of error coram nobis has a long history in
Kentucky as a means for a trial court to correct its own judgment2 6
While coram nobis was legally distinguishable from the writ of habeas
corpus, which did not correct judgments but merely released prisoners,
and from the similar writ of coram vobis, in American practice coram
nobis and coram vobis were used interchangeably u7 Although a "rather
technical writ,V " coram nobis was later purposefully extended by
Kentucky's high court in an unsuccessful attempt to provide the state with
an adequate post-conviction corrective process?' 9 At times, coram nobis
supplemented state habeas corpus, filling in the areas where habeas
corpus could not reach. At other times, it appeared to be a substitute for
habeas corpus, having, as it did, several distinct advantages over that writ.
Kentucky's most significant utilization of coram nobis occurred between
1937 and 1953, when the writ was finally abolished in the civil rules.
Between 1953 and the enactment of the criminal rules in 1963, the
m See Sublett, .vupra note 17, at 441.
2" In accord with the highly stylized language of early common law, comm vobis was
technically distinct since it was issued by a reviewing court as an order to the court of
judgment (trial court) to correct an error in fact. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 337 (6th ed.
1990). Over time, particularly in American courts, the distinction between coram nobis
and coram vobis was lost. George v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Ky. 1961)
(noting that comm nobis is sometimes "indiscriminately" called coram vobis); YACKLE,
supra note 23, at 38-39; Robert R. Nelson, Comment, Coram Nobis as a Post-Conviction
Remedy: Flight of the Phoenix?, 32 S.D. L. REv. 300, 301 (1987) (reviewing the history
of coram nobis in South Dakota and in American law).
Whether the early Kentucky courts using the writ felt it was more properly
designated coram nobis or coram vobis is not easily determined. Many early cases use
coram vobis, but the United States Circuit Court observed in 1831 that
a writ which is issued by a court to reverse its own judgment, is called in
England a writ of error coram nobis, and such is its title as used in the state
courts of [Kentucky]. . . . The writ has grown out of use in England, and is
seldom issued in the practice of the state courts. In this state, however, its use
is still continued ....
Ledgerwood v. Pickett's Heirs, 15 F. Cas. 132, 133 (C.C.D. Ky. 1831) (No. 8,175).
2 Clark v. Commonwealth, 259 S.W.2d 446, 446 (Ky. 1953).
m9 See infra notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Hamm v. Jones, 353 S.W.2d 544, 544 (Ky. 1962) (noting that when
petitioner filed a writ of coram nobis in 1957, "the writ of coram nobis [had] been
abolished").
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Kentucky courts normally applied and further developed coram nobis
principles as part of CR 60.02. However, before going further into
the progression of coram nobis, it will be beneficial to discuss the use of
this writ at its inception.
1. 1792 to the Early Twentieth Century
As originally conceived by the English courts, coram nobis allowed
a trial court to reopen and correct its judgment in light of the discovery
of a substantial factual error not appearing in the record which, if known
at the time of judgment, would have been grounds to prevent judgment
from being pronounced. ' 2 Errors of fact alone could form the basis for
the writ."s3 Despite its narrow focus, the writ of coram nobis or vobis
was recognized in Kentucky quite early and proved useful. In 1810, an
appeal was taken in a civil matter in which one of the parties claimed
error at trial, alleging that he was a minor and that, contrary to law, a
guardian had not been appointed to represent him 4 The appellate
court acknowledged that, if true, error had been committed. It deferred
inquiry, holding that the factual issue of the defendant's age could be
raised only by coram vobis and should be determined by the trial
court.O'
"31 See, e.g., Bradley v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Ky.) ("Writs of coram
nobis have been expressly abolished, but the object of such a writ can now be sought by
motion or by an independent action under CR 60.02."), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961).
2 William W. Thomton, Coram Nobis Et Coram Vobis, 5 IND. LJ. 603, 606 (1930);
Michael F. Cole & Jeffrey Small, Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal
Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 159 (1965); see YACKLE, supra note 23, at 31-
32 (describing the core features of coram nobis and the divergence of case law); Edwin
W. Briggs, "Coram Nobis" - Is it Either an Available or the Most Satisfactory Post-
Conviction Remedy to Test Constitutionality in Criminal Proceedings?, 17 MONT. L. REV.
160 (1955) (examining the availability of this remedy under Montana law and whether
it satisfies the Supreme Court's requirements for an adequate post-conviction remedy).
23' See Case v. Ribelin, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 29, 29-30 (1829) ("[T]he judgment was
certainly erroneous; and as the error was one in fact, and not apparent on the record, the
writ of error coramn vobis, was the appropriate, if not the only proceeding for exposing
it, and rectifying the judgment."). This case established the common law for errors of fact
occurring before judgment, for which coam vobis (or coram nobis) was available and
satisfactory. Id. at 30. An act of the General Assembly, passed in 1802, had regulated the
procedure for attacking decisions affecting criminal bail and bond claims after judgment.
3 I'TELL, STATUTE LAW 1811, supra note 9, at 92-93.
2 Meredith v. Sanders, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 101, 102 (1810) (affning judgment against
minor child in dispute over title to slave).
25 Id.
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As with habeas corpus, the writ of error coram nobis or vobis was a
matter of right. However, the writ saw only scattered use in
published criminal cases prior to the twentieth century, making it difficult
to trace its American development.' The potential of coram nobis was
generally unrecognized until 1883 when the Indiana Supreme Court
decided Sanders v. State." This decision was influential in that it
convinced a number of state courts, including the Kentucky high court,
that use of coram nobis in criminal cases was justified and accept-
able. In these jurisdictions, the writ was "seized upon as a means of
reviewing the intrinsic fairness of a trial in criminal proceedings,"2 °
while other states, in contrast, allowed its use to decline or abolished the
writ by statute. 6'
2. Jones v. Commonwealth (1937)
The use of the writ in collateral attacks of Kentucky criminal
convictions was first recognized in 1937 as an unused but available
remedy inherited from the common law of Virginia. 2 The legal
imbroglio faced by convicted murderer Tom Jones in 1937 precipitated
this event. Jones, accused of shooting and killing his wife, was convicted
2m Combs v. Carter, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 178, 178 (1833).
'A noteworthy early example was the 1848 case of Exparte Toney, in which the
Missouri Supreme Court directed a lower court to issue coram nobis in a criminal case.
11 Mo. 661 (1848), cited in Abraham L. Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3
TEMP. L.Q. 365, 372-73 (1929) (reviewing the use of this writ at common law and in
American law). Another early case also cited by Freedman, supra, at 373, Adler v. State,
35 Ark. 517 (1880), held that coram nobis was recognized as an available common law
remedy to challenge sanity at time of trial.
' 85 Ind. 318, 320 (1883) (recognizing availability of coram nobis to free defendant
from guilty plea entered due to fear of violence by angry mob).
2 See, e.g., Morris v. Thomas, 275 S.W.2d 423, 423 (Ky. 1955) (citing to Sanders
for the proposition that coram nobis is no longer limited to civil cases but is applicable
to criminal proceedings as well).
m ELI FRANK, CORAM NOBIS 4, 8-10 (1953); see UNiF. POST-CoNvicIoN
PROCEDURE Acr, 11 U.L.A. 477, 480, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1974); Note, Post-
Conviction Remedies - The Needfor Coram Nobis, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 467, 473-76
(1962) (arguing desirability of coram nobis relief for wrongly convicted persons who no
longer qualify as 'in custody" so as to be eligible for habeas corpus relief).
2 Briggs, supra note 252, at 163-65; Freedman, supra note 257, at 375-90.
2a Jones v. Commonwealth ("Jones iP), 108 S.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Ky. 1937)
(holding that this writ, unless it was repealed, became part of Kentucky remedial law on
its admission to the Union), overrded on other grounds by Anderson v. Buchanan, 168
S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1943).
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and sentenced to death primarily upon the testimony of a six-year-old girl
and a woman purportedly testifying to the deceased's dying declara-
tion.263 Numerous arguments were raised on appeal, but the conviction
was affirmed. Sometime later, based upon affidavits of newly discovered
witnesses, an attempt was made for executive clemency, which was
denied" Only hours before his scheduled execution, Jones filed a writ
of habeas corpus in federal district court.265 A hearing was held May
7, 1937, with Jones' newly discovered witnesses cross-examined by the
Attorney General. Ten days later, the district judge issued an unpublished
opinion finding that the failure to grant a continuance unconstitutionally
deprived the defendant of a fair trial and that the conviction was based
on perjured testimony. The district judge was hesitant to intervene in a
state matter; thus, the opinion contained a suggestion that Kentucky
should provide post-conviction relief for Jones and a warning that if
Kentucky did nothing, the federal court would act.2! " Counsel for Jones
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus directly in the Kentucky
high court and a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the Bell Circuit
Court.2" It was believed to be the first use of coram nobis to collateral-
ly attack a criminal conviction in the history of the state.2" This
attempted use of coram nobis was promptly denied by the trial court and
appealed, resulting in the near-simultaneous issuance of two appellate
decisions styled Jones v. Commonwealth.2 The habeas corpus petition
was dismissed in the first Jones opinion,270 but the second established
the remedy of coram nobis in Kentucky" Nonetheless, the Kentucky
high court denied relief because newly discovered evidence, no matter
how probative, was not a ground for relief under coram nobis and
because Jones' evidence was of doubtful truthfilness itself.2 The
2 Jones v. Commonwealth ("Jones I"), 108 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Ky. 1937).
26 Perry B. Miller, &ate and Federal Administration of Criminal Justice, 2 KY. ST.
B.J., 12, 13 (1938) (describing how the author, a retired U.S. attorney, was moved to take
up Jones' cause and represent him in the habeas corpus action).
26 Id. at 13.
m Id.
267 Id. at 14.
Sublett, supra note 17, at 442.
Jones I, 108 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. June 11, 1937) (habeas corpus); Jones , 108
S.W.2d 816 (Ky. June 18, 1937) (coram nobis). See Grant F. Knuckles, Note, Coram
Nobis in Kentucky, 31 KY. L.J. 86, 86-87 (1942-1943) (finding coram nobis available in
criminal cases under certain situations, although displaced by statutory remedies in civil
cases); Sublett, supra note 17, at 442-43.
2" Jones I, 108 S.W.2d at 815.
ra Jones , 108 S.W.2d at 817.
Id. at 818-19. The Kentucky Attorney General, representing Kentucky in the
[Vol. 83
KENTUCKY POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
Kentucky high court could suggest nothing more than a further appeal to
executive clemency.273
The journey of Tom Jones through the court system, however, was
not yet over. Relief from Kentucky having been denied, the issue was
back before the federal district judge.274 The district court, doubtful of
the propriety of throwing out the Kentucky conviction on its own, issued
a stay to be effective only until the completion of Jones' habeas corpus
appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.275 The Sixth Circuit,
unlike the district court, had no hesitation in striking down the Kentucky
judgment and directing the district court to grant the writ and order Jones'
release 7  The legal reasoning of the Kentucky high court in its earlier
opinions was dismissed in scathing terms:
The judicial processes of the state have here been vainly invoked.
The court below stayed its hand until they had been given full opportu-
nity to function. Even then it was thought wiser to have the clearly
indicated relief sanctioned by a three judge reviewing court than to have
responsibility for setting aside a state court judgment assumed by a
single judge of an inferior Federal court. Considerations of delicacy and
propriety need no longer deter amelioration. The appellant is not to be
sacrificed upon the altar of a formal legalism too literally applied when
those who from the beginning sought his life in effect confess error,
when impairment of constitutional right may be perceived, and the door
to clemency is closed.2
This series of cases, with prominent personalities involved on all
sides and with genuine doubt being raised about the fairness of Ken-
tucky's criminal justice system, changed post-conviction remedies in this
state forever 7  The Kentucky high court had refused to yield, despite
the recommendation of the Attorney General279 and the willingness of
habeas corpus action brought directly in the Kentucky high court and having reviewed the
record and examined the witnesses, urged the Kentucky high court to grant relief and void
the judgment. Miller, suqpra note 264, at 14-15.
2m Jones f, 108 S.W.2d at 819.
2 Miller, sipra note 264, at 14.
27
S Id.
276 Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938).
"Id.
See Sublett, supra note 17, at 443.
Kentucky Attorney General Hubert Meredith, having personally cross-examined
the new witnesses and considering the potential for perjured testimony at the original trial,
told the Kentucky high court: "[We cannot ask the court to let the judgment of
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a former federal district attorney to come out of retirement to defend the
accused. The federal courts had demonstrated that they would utilize federal
habeas corpus to vindicate the rights of Kentucky prisoners, and it was
apparent that in the future this power would be wielded by a single federal
district judge. More than anything else, this case made apparent the need for
Kentucky to provide more comprehensive post-conviction review or, in the
alternative, to simply abandon that review to the federal courts. Of these two
policy choices, Kentucky chose the former." ° The court's recognition that
the existing scope of coram nobis could not reach such claims and Jones'
success with federal habeas corpus were instrumental in the subsequent
expansion of the writ of coram nobis in Kentucky." Jones, incidentally, was
never retried after federal habeas corpus procured his release.
An important opinion rendered within a few years of Jone was the
Kentucky high court decision in Smith v. Buchanan.2s The Smith opinion
authorized resort to comm nobis in a case where the defendant appointed
counsel was discovered, after defendantt conviction, to be unlicensed and
untrained in the law, although he had previously represented clients on
various matters in the local courts. When this deception came to light; the
Kentucky high court noted that habeas corpus was unavailable because the
defect was not part of the record!" Coram nobis was recommended as the
appropriate remedy since it could be brought in the trial court - the court of
conviction - where the evidence was close at hand? A fulrther advantage
was noted: if the judgment were held to be void under habeas, then the
petitioner would be entitled to immediate release. This drastic remedy "might
result in [the petitioner] final escape from apprehension and punishment for
the commission of his crime.: 8 Under coram nobis, the reviewing court
was "vested with inherent power to direct a suspension of the execution of
the judgment of conviction, if the necessities of the case require it, until the
application for the writ may be heard and disposed of"
conviction stand or to allow the judgment to be carried into execution." Jones, 97 F.2d
at 337 n.1.
2no See Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Ky. 1943) (finding that defendant
whose innocence could be established by showing he was convicted onperjured testimony
should not have to go to federal court to obtain relief).
21 Oxley, supra note 15, at 296-97.
2 Anderson, 168 S.W.2d at 52.
2 163 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1942).
2
" Id. at 7.
21 Id. at 8.
Id.
'Id.
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Smith was followed closely by Anderson v. Buchanan, in which the
scope of the writ was broadened significantly to include newly discovered
evidence.' By this holding, coram nobis was extended as an extraordi-
nary remedy to
revest the court with jurisdiction in an extreme emergency and permit
inquiry into the important question of whether the judgment of
conviction should be vacated because the defendant was unknowingly
deprived of a defense which would have probably disproved his guilt
and prevented his conviction, and if that probability be established to
grant the defendant a new trial of the accusation.'
The decision of the court in Anderson to open up coram nobis and allow
relief upon a claim of newly discovered evidence in the form of perjured
testimony - the identical legal issue presented and rejected in Jones v.
Commonwealth - represented a significant advance in the availability of
the writ. The lack of emphasis on unknown factual error and the scope
of the holding in Anderson led one dissenter to characterize the judicial
evolution of Kentucky coram nobis as "the wild ass of the law which the
courts cannot controL" Rhetoric notwithstanding, in practice Ken-
tucky's high court almost always treated the writ as broad in purpose but
narrow in actual applicatione 1 The actual parameters of the writ,
however, kept changing. The Kentucky high court simply could not make
up its mind as to what coram nobis was and how it should be applied.
3. Procedural Aspects to 1963
A major strength of coram nobis as a post-conviction remedy was its
ability, under the common law, to reach matters outside of the trial court
record.' This advantage was an important one which was not found
in early habeas corpus jurisprudence but was itself still subject to certain
peculiarities. Because the focus of coram nobis was on matters outside of
the record, the errors considered could "not include those of the trial
judge, since he had to be unaware of them in order for coram nobis to be
2 168 S.W.2d 48, 53-54 (Ky. 1943).
Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
Id. at 55 (Sims, J., dissenfin. This remark has been noted frequently in the
literature. See, e.g., Sublett, supra note 17, at 445. The undue expansion of coram nobis
was always a concem, as in Walsh v. Tuggle, 197 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Ky. 1946).
Harrod v. Whaley, 242 S.W.2d 750, 750 (Ky. 1951).
Cole & Small, supra note 252, at 159.
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available." 3 Although this theory of coram nobis was more strictly
enforced in England,
state judges in the United States never completely accepted the English
interpretation. Instead, these judges have placed far more importance on
whether the defendant had knowledge or should have had knowledge of
the fact in question at the time of his trial, rather than whether the court
had been presented with the fact at the nal.
At first in Kentucky, the cases emphasized that the unknown error
must be one of fact, not law. As stated in Ford v. Commonwealth: "The
writ of coram nobis will lie where [the] accused desires to bring some
new fact before the court which cannot be presented by a motion for a
new trial, appeal, or other existing statutory proceedings." 5  This
restriction had begun with the original Kentucky coram nobis decision in
Jones v. Commonwealth in 1937"g but was entirely consistent with four
hundred years of English and American law. At first this restriction was
narrowed to allow the use of coram nobis only for correcting factual
errors bearing on "guilt or innocence," a new and significant limitation
which did not last.' As stated in Walsh v. Tuggle: "A writ of error
2 Id. at 159-60; Creech v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Ky. 1956) (holding
that errors "allegedly committed by the lower court during the hearing on a motion for
a new trial at the original trial" were not cognizable on coram nobis).
2" Cole & Small, supra note 252, at 160.
2" 229 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. 1950) (emphasis added) (affmming denial of writ of
corna nobis where, in rape prosecution, defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that jury was influenced by the rumor that defendant was the father of the
illegitimate child of the victim's sister).
Jones H explained that the purpose of the writ was to allow a criminal defendant
a new trial
because of conditions for which the applicant was in no wise [sic] responsible
and which made the record in which the complained of judgment was rendered
appear regular, proper, and in confomity with law, but which the real facts, as
later presented on application for the writ, rendered the original trial tantamount
to none at all ....
108 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1937) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by
Anderson v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1943); see Beach v. Lady, 262 S.W.2d 837,
839 (Ky. 1953) ("[Flor coram nobis to be available it is essential there be a hidden
mistake of fact .... "); Harrod v. Whaley, 242 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Ky. 1951).
' Commonwealth v. Sirles, 267 S.W.2d 66, 66 (Ky. 1953) ("The error in the case
at bar, if it be construed as a mistake of fact, is a mistake which does not bear on the
question of guilt or innocence, and hence the enforcement of the judgment sentencing
Siles would not be a denial of justice."). The Sirles court recognized that it was denying
access to the writ in a potentially meritorious case "on technical grounds," but it offered
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coram nobis is a common law writ whereby one imprisoned upon
conviction of a crime may obtain a new trial by producing proof that, at
the previous trial, he unknowingly was deprived of a defense which
probably would have established his innocence 8
Eventually Kentucky's high court softened its earlier language and did
not speak of "facts" alone, but of "facts or grounds" as reviewable under
a coram nobis action to set aside a criminal judgment. Not softened
was the requirement that the petitioner exercise due diligence during the
trial proceeding ° or demonstrate that the error was not presented to
the trial court because of duress, fear, or other sufficient causeJ °  The
strict "due diligence!' requirement which had always been a part of
common law coram nobis was strengthened as the writ was utilized
increasingly from the 1930s to the 1950s by death-row inmates
attempting to gain a stay of execution and a new trial.'
the defendant only the suggestion that he apply for executive clemency. Id.
- 197 S.W.2d 253, 253 (Ky. 1946); George v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 843, 844
(Ky. 1961) (holding errors of fact should bear on guilt or innocence). But see Anderson
v. Buchanan, 168 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Ky. 1943) (explaining that the issue is not guilt or
innocence, but only "the probability that the conviction would not have resulted if the
truth had been revealed"); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Ky.
1959) (finding no impeaching testimony to support motion for writ of coram nobis under
Anderson standard).
2 Hamnm v. Mansfield, 317 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 928
(1959); Harris v.-Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky. 1956) (holding that coram
nobis is "an extraordinary and residual remedy to correct or vacate ajudgment upon facts
or grounds, not appearing on the face of the recol and not available by appeal or
otherwise, which were discovered after the rendition of the judgment without fault of the
party seeking relief).
30 A finding that due diligence was not used was fatal to a petition for writ of error
comm nobis. For application of the "due diligence" requirement, see Harm, 317 S.W.2d
at 173-74, and Walsh, 197 S.W.2d at 253. The burden was upon the petitioner to allege
or prove that due diligence was used to attempt to discover the fact or ground earlier.
Harris, 296 S.W.2d at 702; Duff v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Ky. 1944)
(affring denial of comm nobis where petitioner did not allege facts showing exercise
of due diligence on his part to discover errors).
31 Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983) (explaining that the
purpose of coram nobis was to bring before the trial court unknown errors of fact,
supported by a showing that due diligence had been exemsed or that failure to present
evidence had been caused by duress or fear).
' Three cases illustrate the use, and abuse, of the writ for this purpose. In Andeson,
168 S.W.2d at 54, the court adopted the due diligence requirement with the observation
that
[dielay in seeking this extraordinary writ until the executioner is seen
approaching is obviously a suspicious circumstance. It should always be made
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It is also significant that the writ was considered available "only after
all other judicial processes [i.e., all other available remedies] have been
exhausted."" 3 This requirement embraced the idea of default. The writ
of coram nobis was unavailable if the defendant's claim could have been
or had been presented by direct appeal, motion for new trial, or other
proceedings. Because the writ emphasized uncovering the facts and
because any hearing would be in the nature of a collateral attack made in
front of a judge, the rule excluding hearsay evidence was not as strictly
observed.' However, the petitioner still had a high standard to meet,
for "[o]btaining the writ is not a matter of right but the granting of it is
a matter of sound judicial discretion based upon a showing of reasonable
certainty."3 5 Finally, the state received an important procedural and
practical advantage through the use of coram nobis as a post-conviction
remedy. If a judgment were voided under coram nobis, the result for the
defendant would be only a new trial- not, as in habeas corpus,
to appear with reasonable certainty that earlier action to secure relief and
redress was not reasonably possible, or that there is an extreme exigency, before
a stay of execution should be ordered.
A similar problem had arisen in Bircham v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 932 (Ky.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 951 (1952), in which the petition had been filed only two days before
execution, yet the evidence in support of the petition had been known to both the
appellant and his counsel since either before or during trial. The court found the delay
"strongly persuasive of the fact [the] petition lacks merit' and affirmed the trial court's
denial of coram nobis relief. Id. at 934. Finally, in Reed v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d
9 (Ky. 1953), cert. demied, 347 U.S. 957 (1954), the appellant was convicted and
sentenced to death for the murder of a woman whose bones were commingled with those
of another victim buried at the same time. The appellant claimed that both women's bones
were displayed to the jury, an allegation the court found to be contr-ary to the evidence.
Id. at 9. Even if this fact could be proved, however, the court held that coram nobis relief
was unavailable. Appellant's trial counsel could hardly have failed to notice the "two
skeletons" if this was observable to appellant's prejudice by the jury. Id. Appellan's
counsel had waited approximately three years to raise this claim, brought only ten days
before appellant's scheduled execution; this circumstance caused the court "to doubt that
the petition was made in good faith." Id. at 10.
Merrifield v. Commonwealth ex rel. Buclnan, 283 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky. 1955)
(alteration in original); Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Ky. 1956)
(afTmng denial of coram nobis where defendant had ample time to take advantage of
another remedy).
3- Reed, 261 S.W.2d at 10 (holding that; although the rule excluding hemarsay
evidence was not as strictly observed in coram nobis proceeding, petitioner still had to
show alleged error in fact to be supported by proof of convincing character).
" Anderson, 168 S.W.2d at 54; Richardson v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 154, 155
(Ky. 1959); see Elliott v. Commonwealth, 167 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Ky. 1942) (affirming
denial of coram nobis where trial court's short notice of hearing held not to prejudice
defendant), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 775 (1943).
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immediate release, which would enable the defendant to flee the
juridiction."6
During its relatively short existence as an important post-conviction
remedy, the writ of error coram nobis was used in a variety of legal
challenges, but with limited success. It is now hard to imagine the extent
to which inmate litigants' claims were foreclosed by the narrow scope of
this traditional writ and the slowness of its judicial expansion. Particularly
striking is the ineffectiveness of coram nobis in adjudicating claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel; these claims were simply not available
using this writ. A good example of this limitation is found in Kbnder v.
Commonwealth 1 7 In his petition, Kinder stated that he was unaware of
his right to testify in his own defense and would have done so if he had
been properly informed by his attorney. The appellate court rejected this
claim because the petitioner was not unknowingly deprived of a
defense,"' the alleged errors in attorney performance were not properly
brought under coram nobis,"9 and Kinder's denial of involvement in the
killing, had it been presented to the jury, would not have created a
probability of disproving his guilt.3 . Even in a death penalty case, the
court had earlier noted, "inexperience, incompetency or inefficiency of
counsel is not ground for granting coram nobis" in many state and federal
jurisdictions. 1
'06 Smith v. Buchanan, 163 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Ky. 1942); Creedle, supra note 167, at 232.
Modem practice allows federal district courts granting a writ of habeas corpus
against a state to make the writ "conditional" by allowing the state to retry the prisoner
within a set period of time. Thus, the prisoner does not gain immediate release in any
event and, if retried promptly and again convicted, will remain in prison continuously. See
Gardner v. Forister, 472 F. Supp. 1,2 (W.D.N.C. 1979) ("ITihe typical order of a district
court in state prisoner [habeas corpus] cases is a conditional release.") (quoting Davis v.
Pitchess, 388 F. Supp. 105, 108 (C.D. Cal.), affld, 518 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 421 U.S. 482 (1975)).
"- 269 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1954) (affirming denial of coram nobis where defendant
alleged he was unaware of his right to testify in his own defense).
Id. at 214. The petitioner admitted that his counsel had advised him not to testify
but alleged he had not known he had a right to testify if he so desired. From the
petitioner's perspective, this scenario made his claim "unknown' at the time of trial. This
"ingenuous" claim was rejected with the additional observation that, ifit were accepted,
"then in every criminal case the accused could merely not testify and, after conviction,
claim he did not know he had the right to testify, and apply to the court for a writ of
coram nobis. We will not sanction such a procedure." Id.
" Id.; see Meredith v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Ky. 1958); Spears v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Ky. 1952) (noting that ineffective assistance of
counsel was not a ground for writ of coram nobis).
310 Kinder, 269 S.W.2d at 214.
311 Spears, 253 S.W.2d at 572.
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In a series of cases, the appellate court also rejected the use of coram
nobis to retry the original case through newly discovered evidence.
Again, the hurdle for the inmate litigant was very high. The newly
discovered evidence had to be "of such a conclusive character as to
remove from the case the basis upon which the conviction and judgment
were predicated" for the petitioner to prevail 3
In summary, the limitations upon the use of the writ at the height of
its development reflected, in general, the prevailing legal norm that a state
post-conviction remedy represented extraordinary relief which would be
granted only under unusual and compelling circumstances. Restrictions
on the use of the writ of coram nobis, therefore, were substantial. First,
because of the emphasis on errors of fact, coram nobis was manifestly a
trial court proceeding at which arguments of law, as in appellate review
or upon a writ of error, were unavailable."' This limitation theoretically
excluded the constitutional arguments of law which today comprise the
bulk of claims raised by state prisoners. Second, the error also had to be
"hidden or unseen!' for the defendant to prevail - common trial errors of
court or counsel, therefore, could not be raised."" Apparently, some
cases required that the petitioner demonstrate what would today be termed
"actual innocence." These limitations, in addition to the simple awkward-
ness of creating a modem post-conviction remedy out of a common law
writ, led to the eventual demise of coram nobis. What became increasing-
ly clear was that the ancient writs were too narrow to remain in place as
the state's primary forms of post-conviction remedy.
4. Since Enactment of CR 60.02
It should come as no surprise, then, to find that the adoption of the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure in 1953 resulted in the specific
abolishment of the writ of error coram nobis 15 Motions to vacate
" Merrifield v. Commonwealth ex rel. Buckman, 283 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky. 1955);
see Underhill v. Thomas, 299 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Ky. 1957) (holding that trial judge's
denial of coram nobis was not abuse of discretion where petitioner failed to show due
diligence in presenting alibi evidence); Harris v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 703
(Ky. 1956); Creech v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 565, 566-67 (Ky. 1956) (holding that
impeaching testimony affecting the credibility of witnesses was not a basis for coramm
nobis relief).
" Green v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Ky. 1958) (denying coram nobis
relief because alleged errors were all on record).
314 Creech, 291 S.W.2d at 566.
3
" The new civil procedure rules were designed to eliminate inconsistent, conffsing,
and technical distinctions between various forms of action and to create instead uniform
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judgment under coram nobis were routinely treated as motions for relief
under CR 60.02 after the civil rules came into effect 16 This treatment
meant that CR 60.02 motions were to be applied to issues of fact, not
issues of law, and that the scope of the remedy under CR 60.02 was
coextensive with that provided by the common law writ.?"7
While it is clear that CR 60.05 abolished the use of coram nobis in
civil cases and that coram nobis, like habeas corpus, generally was
considered a civil remedy used to attack a criminal conviction, to some
extent coram nobis apparently retained its status as a criminal* remedy
until the adoption of the criminal rules. For example, the Criminal Code
Revision Committee Report of 1961 stated that the writ of coram nobis
in criminal practice would be replaced by RCr 11.42 and RCr 10.06.'
rules applying to all kinds of actions. Amen v. De Weese, 304 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Ky.
1957); see Porter Sims, The Work of Kentucky's Civil Code Committee, 40 KY. L.J. 7
(1951-1952) (discussing how civil procedure refonn in Kentucky proved necessary).
According to CR 60.05, "Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills
of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment [under the civil rules] shall be as provided in Rule
60.02 or 60.03."
316 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 344 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Ky.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 842
(1961) (converting motion to vacate judgment into 60.02 motion); Wallace v. Common-
wealth, 327 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Ky. 1959) (holding cromm nobis abolished "in name only");
Sherrill v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 586, 586 (Ky. 1959) (converting motion to vacate
judgment on coram nobis into 60.02 motion); Green, 309 S.W.2d at 179; Underhill v.
Thomas, 299 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Ky. 1957); Haris, 296 S.W.2d at 701-02 (noting that KY.
R. Civ. P. 60.02 was simil to FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b), which also utilized coram nobis
priniples).
Th fact that the proceeding was civil in nature had procedural implications; no
constitutional rights were violated where procedures normally associated with criminal
prosecutions were not followed. Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.2d 54,57 (Ky. 1956)
(finding that a failure to grant a hearing on the motion was not a violation of petitioner's
constitutional rights), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 816 (1957); Abrams v. Commonwealth, 296
S.W.2d 210, 210 (Ky. 1956) (holding that petitioner had no fight to be present in court
when merits of coram nobis petition were considered and decided), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1013 (1957); Elliott v. Commonwealth, 167 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Ky. 1942) (holding that
petitioner had no right to be present in court when merits of coran nobis petition were
tried).
... Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983); Bradley v.
Commonwealth, 347 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Ky.) (explaining that objects of coran nobis can
be sought under 60.02), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 859 (1961); Green, 309 S.W.2d at 179-80.
As noted in Davis v. Home Indemnity Co., 659 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1983), "CR 60.02
was hitended to codify the common law writ of coram nobis."
316 KY. L CRnM. P. 11.42 cmt. (1962). This view is reinforced by the 1960 comment
in Dee A. Akers, Revision of Criminal Procedure, 24 KY. ST. B.J. 130, 134 (1960), that
under the proposed revision of criminal practice "[t]he Writ of Coram Nobis is abolished,
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The relationship of CR 60.02 to the traditional remedy was first clarified
in Harris v. Commonwealth, which held:
CR 60.02 does not extend the scope of the remedy nor add
additional grounds of relief. A criminal judgment may be set aside only
in extraordinary and emergency cases where the showing made is of
such a conclusive character as to indicate the verdict most probably
would not have been rendered and there is a strong probability of a
miscarriage of justice .... [R]elief may be granted only upon
recognized and limited coram nobis principles. 9
Moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently made clear that CR
60.02, in some ways, is even more limited than its common law
predecessor. In Gross v. Commonwealth, the court thoroughly reviewed
the position of the use of this extraordinary civil remedy in the criminal
justice system,"2 and, as one commentator observed, "strictly limited
the availability of CR 60.02.'3"' Although noting that "the remedies
formerly available in criminal cases by writ of coram nobis have been
preserved by CR 60.02," the high court recognized that the very
language of CR 60.02 limits its application. Claims of mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or perjury
are limited to motions for relief filed not more than one year after
as in civil practice."
" Harris v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ky. 1956); accord Harem v.
Mansfield, 317 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1958), cert denied, 359 U.S. 928 (1959); Green,
309 S.W.2d at 179.
3" As stated in the opinion:
The stnacture provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment of a trial
court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and
complete. That sructure is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr
11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02. CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an addi-
tional opportunity to raise Boyldn defenses. It is for relief that is not available
by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42. The movant must
demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the
movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must affirnatively allege facts
which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special
circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.
648 S.W.2d at 856.
32 Susan S. Clary, Recent S'gnficant Opinions of the Kentucky Supreme Court, 48
KY. BENCH & BAP, 22, 46 (1984).
m Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856 (citing Balsley v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 614, 616
(Ky. 1967)); see Harris, 296 S.W.2d at 702.
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judgment. The additional grounds found in CR 60.02, including
reasons of an "extraordinary nature,"'us are "specific and explicit."'
According to the holding in Gross, claims that a defendant's constitutional
rights have been violated fit only the last ground: "any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief. 326 In addition, CR 60.02 is
discretionary with the reviewing court, and relief may be denied if the
motion is not made within a "reasonable time" based upon the facts
of the particular case- a further matter for the discretion of the
reviewing court' Any claim which could have been made in an earlier
proceeding is barred, and a movant is not entitled to appointed counsel
in CR 60.02 proceedings.'
From the foregoing it is evident that, as with the writ of coram nobis,
relief under CR 60.02 will be extremely difficult for the criminal
defendant to procure. By its own terms, CR 60.02 is an extraordinary
remedy for relief from a challenged final judgment.33 It is a supple-
ment to RCr 11.42 and is not supplanted by it, a point made in cases
such as Perkins v. Commonwealth.3 It is, in a very real sense, a last
resort; as such, the burden on the movant is extraordinarily high. For
constitutional errors occurring at trial, this burden may mean, as under
coram nobis, "a showing of conditions which established that the original
3 KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a)-(c); cf. KY. R. CJNL P. 10.06(1).
"A Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 857.
= Id.
116 Id. The court did not explain why a judgment reached by newly discovered
unconstitutional means could not be a judgment which was simply no longer equitable
or was "void," as also allowed by CR 60.02(e). This oversight does not affect the court's
argument, however, that in any event the ground urged must be one of an "extraordinary
nature." See id
3- Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 857; KY. R. CIV. P. 60.02.
', Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 857-58; accord Ray v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 71, 73
(Ky. Ct. App. 1982) '(holding that motions for KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02 relief must be filed
within a reasonable time).
12 Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Ky. 1983); Gross, 648 S.W.2d
at 857.
" The reasons of an extraordinary nature jusf""ing the relief sought by the movant
must relate to the judgment of conviction. Allegations which are irrelevant to the fairness
of the process which resulted in detention can never be cognizable under CR 60.02. Wine
v. Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (holding 60.02 motion
requesting early release from sentence based upon a change in family situation was
properly overruled).
1 382 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Ky. 1964); accord Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d
710, 712 (Ky. 1966) (holding that KY. R. Cv. P. 60.02 "is an extraordinary remedy and
is available only when a substantial miscarriage of justice will result from the effect of
the final judgment").
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trial was tantamount to none at all" As a result, CR 60.02, like
coram nobis, will rarely be used with success by criminal defendants.
IV. HIGH COURT RULE MAKING AND KENTUCKY
RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11.42
A. Code Revision and the Enactment of RCr 11.42
The 1952 adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure was a
significant development in the practice of law in Kentucky and represent-
ed the first comprehensive revision of Kentucky's civil code in over one
hundred years.' Recognizing the difficulty of maintaining the practice
codes through legislation, the Kentucky General Assembly simultaneously
created the civil rules and turned their future amendment over to
Kentucky's highest appellate court.3 The transfer took place July 1,
m Harris v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Ky. 1956); accord Jones I, 108
S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1937), overruled on other growud by Anderson v. Buchanan, 168
S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1943).
-3 Watson Clay, What About the Civil Code Revision?, 15 KY. ST. B.J. 68 (1951)
(citing examples from the newly proposed code to show the strides made by the
committee); Ben B. Fowler & George M. Catlett, Report of the Civil Code Committee,
16 KY. ST. BJ. 23, 23-24 (1951) (noting the importance of totally revising the code to
form a single set of rules); Morton Holbrook, The CMil Code Committee, 14 KY. ST. B..
201, 204 (1950) (discussing committee's part in developing plan for revision of civil
code); Porter Sims, The Work of Kentucky's CMv! Code Committee, 40 KY. L.I. 7, 9
(1951-1952) (noting that the revision represented the greatest overall reworking since
1851).11 1952 Ky. Acts 29-31, 214-42. This choice reflects the modem view that court
procedures are matters for the judiciary and that the legislature cannot constitutionally
intrude into this area without the acquiescence of the judicial branch. General authority
to enact rules of civil and criminal procedure is derived from section 27 (establishing
three branches of government) and section 28 (separation of pow6rs) of the Kentucky
Constitution. For two recent cases, compare Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525,
527 (Ky. 1987) (holding that videotape interview section of child sex abuse prosecution
statute violated separation of powers and was unconstitutional), with Commonwealth v.
Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 796-98 (Ky. 1987) (holding that KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.055 (Michie/Bobbs-Menrill 1988), the "Truth-in-Sentencing' statute, violated
separation of powers but refusing, for the time being, to hold it unconstitutional since it
was not an unreasonable encroachment and could be accepted under the principle of
comity).
The courts have usually guarded their appellate nile-making power closely. ExParte
Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Ky. 1980) (holding that auditor could
not constitutionally audit funds of state bar association which existed solely through rules
of court); Commonwealth v. Schumacher, 566 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding statute affecting appellate procedures unconstitutional).
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1953, when "all laws relating to [civil] pleading, practice and procedure
shall be effective as rules of court until modified or superseded by
subsequent court rule, and upon the adoption of any rule pursuant to this
Act the rule shall take precedence over such laws."
335
The Kentucky General Assembly initiated criminal code changes in
1958 through the creation of a study committee' The legislature
adopted the study committee's proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure,
including RCr 11.42, in 1962.' 7 The legislative version of RCr 11.42,
however, was inadequate, and, using its inherent rule-making powers, the
Kentucky high court decided to model the proposed rule more closely on
the post-conviction review statute available to federal prisoners and
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'" More specifically, the Kentucky high
"s 1952 Ky. Acts 31.
1958 Ky. Acts 140. See generaly Dee A. Akers, Proposed Revision of Criminal
Thal Proceedings, 24 KY. ST. B.L 16 (1959) (explaining the proposed revisions to be
drafted); Akers, supra note 318, at 130 (explaining the drafted rules and plans for putting
them into effect); Gardner Turner, Why No Revised Criminal Code?, 49 KY. L.L 477
(1960-1961) (explaining the failure of the code to pass the 1960 Kentucky General
Assembly).
'a3 1962 Ky. Acts 789-827. The proposed rule was insufficient. Although it apparently
provided for a mandatory hearnig on every motion that could not be summarily dismissed,
it was weak on the details necessary for proper administration and made no provision for
assistance of counsel .The proposed rule, in its entirety, was as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released on the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or statutes
of the Commonwealth or of the United States, or that the Court imposing the
sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence was in excess
of that authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file
a motion at any time in the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the same. If the motion and the files and records of the case
show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is not entitled to relief, the
court shall so determine and enter an order accordingly; otherwise the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth
and grant a prompt hearing thereon. If the court finds that the judgment was
rendered without jurisdiction or that the sentence imposed was illegal or
otherwise subject to collateral attack, or that there was such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment subject to collateral attack, the court shall vacate the judgment and
shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant anew trial or conec the
sentence as may be appropriate. The court need not entertain a second motion
or successive motions for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
Id. at 822.
-8 The similarity between 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) and RCr 11.42 has been noted by
the Kentucky courts. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky. 1983);
Nickell v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Ky. 1970); Wilson v. Commonwealth,
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court sought to "provide a broader post-conviction review procedure in
which the right to counsel is secured and written findings of fact are
required."39 By the time of final promulgation, following review
and modification by the high court, RCr 11.42 had been substantially
altered:
[1] A prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be
released on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or statutes of the Commonwealth or of the United States,
or that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do
so, or that the sentence was in excess of that authorized by law or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion at any time in
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
same.
[2] The clerk of the court shall notify the Attorney General and the
Commonwealth's Attorney in writing that such motion (whether it be
styled a motion, petition, or otherwise) has been filed, and the Com-
monwealth shall have 30 days after the date of mailing of notice by the
clerk to the Attorney General in which to serve an answer on the
movant.
[3] Affirmative allegations contained in such answer shall be treated
as controverted of record. If the answer raises an issue of fact that
cannot be determined from the face of the record the court shall grant
a prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of record and is
financially unable to employ counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent
him in the proceeding.
[4] At the conclusion of the hearing or hearings the court shall
make findings determinative of the material issues of fact and enter a
final order accordingly. If it appears that the movant is entitled to relief,
the court shall vacate the judgment and shall discharge the prisoner,
403 S.W.2d 710, 711-12 (Ky. 1966); Collier v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 858, 859
(Ky. 1965); King v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Ky. 1965); Ayers v. Davis,
377 S.W.2d 154, 154 (Ky. 1964); see also John S. Palmore, A New Course for "udidal
Review, 28 KY. ST. B.L 25, 25 (1964) (discussing similarities of KY. R. CM P. 11.42
and 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
Like RCr 11.42, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 requires the federal prisoner to file the petition
in the trial or sentencing court Congress enacted this statute to provide a modem post-
conviction relief process for prisoners under federal sentence. This statute explicitly
replaced common law habeas corpus for prisoners with federal convictions and is their
primary post-conviction remedy.
3" John S. Palmore, &tatu Report on the New Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 KY.
ST. B.I. 31, 32 (1963).
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resentence him, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence as may be
appropriate.
[5] Either the movant or the Commonwealth may appeal to the
Court of Appeals, as a matter of right, if the controversy involves a
sentence of confinement or imprisonment for twelve months or more,
and by motion otherwise.
[6] The final order of the trial court on the motion shall not be
effective until expiration of time for notice of appeal under RCr 12.54
and shall be suspended pending final disposition of an appeal duly taken
and perfected.
[7] Original applications for relief of the nature described in this
Rule which are addressed directly to the Court of Appeals shall be
referred to the Chief Justice, who shall cause same to be transmitted to
the court in which the sentence was imposed for further disposition in
the manner above set forth.
[8] Counsel appointed for the movant under this Rule 11.42 shall
be entitled to reimbursement by the Commonwealth for his reasonable
expenses of travel and subsistence for necessary conferences with the
movant at his place of confinement, provided that each trip made for
that purpose be authorized in advance thereof by order of the trial
court.U
The legislative proposal had contained no explanation of RCr 11.42, but
the Kentucky high court added the following brief commentary:
RCr 11.42 supplements CR 60.02 and provides a post-conviction
review procedure consistent with the trend of U.S. Supreme Court pro-
nouncements. See Uniform Code Sec. 44. This rule and RCr 10.06
replace coram nobis.
Caveat: The provision for counsel's travel expenses cannot be given
effect until such time as statutory authority for payment is enacted.341
The new post-conviction relief mechanism had several strengths.
First, the motion was to be filed in the court which imposed the sentence,
mo LEMILATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, KmNUCKY RurES OF CRIMiAL PROCEDURE
30 (td.) (copy available in State Law Library, Frankfort, Ky.). In the original version the
Kentucky high court did not break RCr 11.42 down into sections or paragraphs; the text
was continuous. KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 (1962). This was corrected in 1965. KY. & CRm
P. 11.42 (1965). For clarity, the author has added paragraph numbers in brackets to the
original version.
4' LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 340, at 30-31.
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easing access to pertinent records and witnesses and thereby increasing
efficiency. 2 Second, where a legitimate issue of fact was raised, the
movant was entitled to a prompt hearing and, if indigent, appointed
counsel. 3 Finally, the movant was guaranteed an appeal if the trial
court overruled the motion to vacate.' Curiously, the Kentucky high
court eliminated the legislative recommendation that RCr 11.42 contain
a provision restricting successive motions, a mistake quickly discovered
and rectified within a few years.' 5
Although RCr 11.42 has been amended on several occasions in its
thirty-year existence, all major changes, except for two, were in place by
1965.' In an omnibus rule change effective January 1, 1965, RCr
11.42 was structurally broken into paragraphs, section numbers were
added, the first section was shortened to eliminate references to specific
grounds for attack while more inclusive language was substituted,3 7
and several new sections were added which reflected the frustration of
Kentucky's high court with abuses of RCr 11.42 by litigious inmates
filing indecipherable pleadings and advancing frivolous claims.' New
section 2 stated:
(2) The motion shall be signed or verified by the movant and shall state
specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and
the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure
to comply with this section shall warrant a summary dismissal of the
motione'9
342 Richardson v. Howard, 448 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that
petitioner "is benefited by having available at the place of his trial all pertinent records
relevant to the issue and the scope of the remedy is thereby broadened").
"3 Order, 28 KY. ST. B.J. 25, 28 (1964) (providing text of new KY. R. CRiM. P.
11.42).
3"Id.
34' KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(3) (1965).
Id. 11.42 compiler's notes.
The complete text of the Rule after amendment is reprinted in Order, supra note
343, at 28-29. The language of the first section describing the scope of RCr 11.42 was
broadened to indicate that any allegation of "a right to be released on the ground that the
sentence is subject to collateral attack' would be considered and that the prisoner could
"proceed directly by motion!' in the trial court to challenge it. KY. IL CRIM. P. 11.42(1).
" See generally Robert 0. Lukowsky, Post Conviction Relief. Tribulation After Trial,
57 KY. L.J. 439, 441 (1968-1969) (providing a practicing circuit judge's criticism of the
associated workload); Jack Ayer, Wings of an Angel: Makeshift Petitions Winning
Freedom for Felons, LouISvILL TIMES, Feb. 8, 1965, at 5 (describing the increase of
petitions by inmates and the creativity of their pleadings).
3" Order, supra note 343, at 28.
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New section 3 required all known claims to be filed in the original
motion and added a procedural bar against successive petitions, a much
needed improvement."s Other modifications by 1965 were provisions
reducing, from thirty to twenty days, the time within which the Common-
wealth could respond and making allowance for the appointment of
counsel on appeal351 Finally, section 10 of the Rule was modified to
give the chief justice discretionary power to retain a motion filed directly
and improperly in the state appellate court, presumably for summary
dismissaL32
With this omnibus amendment, most significant aspects of RCr 11.42,
as it exists today, were in place. The Rule focused on one motion, one
proceeding to determine the merits, and, if the movant desired, one
appeal As a practical matter, however, the necessity for further revision
developed from time to time. Learning the hard way that certain inmates
often saw the "facts" differently than more disinterested observers, the
court modified the Rule in 1970 by changing the requirement that the
motion be "signed or verified" to stipulate that it be "signed and verified"
as an aid for perjury prosecutions.' s Between 1970 and 1981, other
minor adjustments were made.'
310 Section 3 stated: "(3) The motion shall state all grounds for holding the sentence
invalid of which the movant has knowledge. Final disposition of the motion shall
conclude all issues that could reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding."
Id. This language was retained in the current version. Compare KY. R. CR!M. P. 11.42(3)
(1965) with KY. R. GL. P. 11.42(3) (1962).
In Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Ky. 1966), overruled on other
grounds by Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1969), the high court
explained that the procedural bar against successive petitions, added in 1965, was "merely
declaratory of the common law rule which already applied to RCr 11.42 as it was
originally drafted" and was therefore retroactive.
... Order, supra note 343, at 28.
Mn Id. at 29.
31 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH AMENDMENTS TO JANUARY 1, 1978
(reprinted from 9 BALDwIN'S KEmNUCKY REvISE STATUTES ANNOTATED (1978)) (copy
available in State Law brary, Frankfort, Ky.) (emphasis added). The requirement that
all applications be verified was suggested by Lukowsky, supra note 348, at 444.
Lukowsky later served on the Kentucky Supreme Court
3- RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE wr AMENDM EmS TO JANUARY 1, 1978, supra
note 353.
In further amendments effective July 1, 1976, the Kentucky high court directed that
misfiled applications in any court be automatically transferred to the sentencing court and
liberalized the appeal process from an adverse RCr 11.42 final order. KY. R. ClM P.
11.42(10) (1976).
A technical correction was made in 1978 to RCr 11.42(8). The reference to ' RCr
12.54" was amended to "RCr 12.04." KY. L CRiLM. P. 11.42(8) (1978).
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In 1981, the court amended RCr 11.42(1) to significantly enlarge the
class of defendants eligible to invoke the remedy. This group now
included, in addition to those "in custody," individuals subject to a
judgment of conviction who were no longer incarcerated or who had
never been incarcerated, but were "on probation, parole or conditional
discharge."355 Following this change, the court adopted only three other
amendments. In 1984, the court modified provisions for appointment of
counsel to permit appointment only upon the "specific written request"
of the movant" Shortly thereafter, the court modified RCr 11.42(4) to
clarify that the Commonwealth's Attorney, not the Attorney General, had
primary responsibility to respond on behalf of the Commonwealth of
Kentuky.357 In 1994, the court made a final amendment, probably the
most important addition to the Rule since it was adopted, which imposed
a three-year filing limitation, placed into the Rule the defense of laches,
and also included a provision that the trial court in an RCr 11.42
proceeding could not be reversed or remanded for failure to "make a
finding of fact on an issue essential to the order unless such failure is
brought to the attention of the court by a written request for a finding on
that issue or by a motion pursuant to CR 52.o2."i35
B. The Number and Pattern of Claims
In 1963, when the Kentucky Court of Appeals, then the state's highest
court, first considered and adopted the language of RCr 11.42, it intended
that the remedy offered by the Rule would provide the prisoner no more
than what was already available under Kentucky law through the writ of
habeas corpus.59 The principal advantage of RCr 11.42 over the
common law writs was a savings to the court system by requiring the
case to be heard in the court of conviction, where the witnesses, record,
... KY. R. CRam. P. 11.42(9) (1981). The provisions of former RCr 11.42(9),
governing travel expenses for counsel, were also deleted. See Ky. R. Ca. P. 11.42(9)
(1981) compiler's notes.
56 KY. L Cium. P. 11.42(5) (1984).
37 Id. 11.42(4) (1986).
31 Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules
of the Supreme Court; Kentucky Supreme Court Order 94-1 (entered Sept 7, 1994)
(amendment effective Oct. 1, 1994) [hereinafter The 1994 Amendment].
3" Tipton v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Ky. 1963). The limitations of
RCr 11.42 were lamented by at least one jurist of Kentucky's high court who wrote:
"When the new criminal rule was proposed, I, alone, seem to have had the impression
that under certain conditions the attack was frontal" Id. (Moremen, J, concurring).
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and other evidence were located.' The Rule also had the effect of
spreading the workload associated with its implementation across all judicial
circuits, not just those with major correctional facilities. In other words, the
major benefits of the Rule tended to accrue to the state rather than the
prisoner. Nevertheless, filings under the new procedure rapidly increased'
Although RCr 11.42 became effective January 1, 1963, the first related
substantive appellate decisions were not published until 1964.' During
1964 and 1965, over one hundred published decisions resolving RCr 11.42
questions were issued' In 1970, the Office of the Attorney General,
which represents the state in virtually all criminal appeals in Kentucky,
reported that of the 142 cases briefed before the Kentucky appellate court in
1969, filly-seven were RCr 11.42 appeals and eight were state habeas corpus
appeals, representing almost one-half of the total?" This "substantial
increase' in overall workload was "due chiefly to a larger number of appeals
in post-conviction cases involving motions to vacate judgments of conviction
under RCr 11.42! '" 5 It was not until the early 1970s that the flow of
published decisions leveled off to three to five cases a year, the currnt
average. Thus, much of the case law concerning RCr 11.42 is of an early
date.
3w Jones v. Breslin, 385 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1964) (explaining that the advantage to
hearing the motion in the sentencing court is that "all the available records would be in
that court and thus the expense and responsibility of copying and forwarding various
transcripts would be obviated"); Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ky. 1964)
(explaining that by having the KY. R. CRD& P. 11.42 hearing in the sentencing court, the
records and witnesses are readily available); Palimore, supra note 338, at 25 (discussing
that the net effect of new KY. R. CUM. P. 11.42 is to channel claims to the court of
record where it is less likely that eroneous allegations will be established as facts through
lack of information). A further perceived advantage was that factual findings of the court
of conviction,
if supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the federal courts. So,
although the Supreme Court has opened up for review belated claims of
constitutional infringenent, Rule 11.42 as promulgated and construed by the
Court of Appeals puts this review substantially where it belongs, in the state
court where the infringement is claimed to have occurred rather than some
distant federal court which might otherwise find it necessary to ascertain the
facts on inadequate and incomplete evidence.
Id.
'a C. Ayer, supra note 348, at 5 (noting that inmates had nothing to lose and were
encouraged by what few "success stories" existed).
'
6 Search of WL, Kentucky Cases Database (Oct. 24, 1994).
39 Id.
3"' OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., REPORT OF THE DEPARndmEr OF LAW: BMNNIUM
1968-1969, 4 (1970).
36 Id.
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As of January 1, 1995, some 342 published appellate opinions had
arisen from the appeal of an adverse decision by the court of record on
a motion under RCr 11.42, either by the movant or the state, and had
dealt with substantive criminal law issues. These published opinions
represent a statistically significant number of cases and may be assumed
to roughly indicate the range of issues in unpublished cases as well The
author surveyed the claims discussed by the appellate courts in these
opinions in an effort to analyze the focus of prisoner challenges through
RCr 11.42 motions.'
The results are quickly summarized. It should come as no surprise
that ineffective assistance of counsel allegations comprise the most often
raised ground for relief, appearing as one of the issues in over 47% of
RCr 11.42 appeals. Claims that the movant's guilty plea was coerced or
otherwise improper occurred in 21% of the appeals, and allegations that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been denied were found in
18% of the cases. Another popular claim, advanced in 15% of the
appeals, was that the right of the movant to a direct appeal of the
judgment of conviction had been unconstitutionally denied, usually
through ineffective assistance of counsel. Such claims are of interest
because, unlike the typical claim which at least has the potential to result
in a new trial, the remedy for unconstitutional denial of direct appeal is,
of course, the restoration of one's right to appeal.
In 7% of the motions, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial, a very difficult claim on which to prevail.
About the same percentage claimed to have been imprisoned under a
defective or otherwise improper indictment. Claims of incompetency or
insanity at some point during the proceedings, attacks on jury instruc-
tions, and miscellaneous "jury" issues (jury composition, tainted jury,
etc.) each commanded about 5% percent of the total. Below this level,
generalizations are not as easily made, and the significance of any
" The survey of cases covers volumes 371 through 890, Southwestern Reporter,
Second Series. Certain inherent difficulties accompany any compilation of this sort. First,
unusual or especially significant claims are more likely to result in published opinions,
which are used by the appellate court to instruct bench and bar. Second, the total figure
represents "pure" RCr 11.42 appeals on substantive issues of criminal law and substantive
RCr 11.42 procedural matters. Not included are cases merely citing the Rule and
contrasting it with habeas corpus or mandamus cases to compel the trial court to nile on
a pending RCr 11.42 motion.
Even weeding out these cases provides less-than-perfect results. In a number of
cases, the appellate court discussed the prisoner's main claim(s) and then dismissed the
others, without indicating their nature. This sample, however, provides a good
approximation of the claims filed under RCr 11.42 over the past three decades.
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statistics that could be generated becomes increasingly suspect. Nonethe-
less, the sheer number of challenges and the wide variety of legal
reasoning presented are impressive.
One result which would be expected and which is borne out by the
statistics is the low percentage of relief granted at the appellate court
level. In only five appeals, less than 2% of the total, was a new trial
granted.' In only two cases did the movant walk out the prison door
based on the RCr 11.42 appeal.' A significantly higher number of
petitioners obtained some lesser relief, including a remand for an
evidentiary hearing, a grant of access to a transcript of record, a
restoration of a lost right to direct appeal, and actions in the nature of
mandamus to compel the lower court to rule on a pending RCr 11.42
motion. Petitioners were successful in getting some action on their
motions, whether substantive or procedural, in 14% of the published RCr
11.42 opinions of the Kentucky appellate courts."
Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1974) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel due to lack of preparation and potential conflict of interest),
overruled on other grounds by Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Ky.
1982); Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1965) (holding that
movant received ineffective assistance of counsel, as lawyers had admitted no preparation
for trial was made); Dilhingham v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 307, 3 09 (Ky. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that attorney's failure to object to use of non-qualifying felony conviction
in persistent felony offender trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel); Holland
v. Commonwealth, 679 S.W.2d 832, 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that "counsel's
failure to subpoena favorable alibi witnesses" amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel); Scott v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 623, 626-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that waiver of rights on guilty plea was inadequate when the competency of the defendant
was in question).
361 Curtsinger v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. 1977) (holding that trial
court erred in ordering movant imprisoned for probation violation even though the court
had lost its jurisdiction over movant); Ivey v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506, 512 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers required dismissal
of the charge with prejudice).
0 The very small number of opinions in which a remand for an evidentiary hearing
occurred and the even smaller number of new trials are consistent with the experiences
of other states. Gary L. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Tennessee - Fourteen Years
of Judicial Administration Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 48 TENN. L. REV.
605, 624-25 (1981) (examining Tennessee's Post-Conviction Procedure Act and its
effectiveness); Gary L. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri -Five Years Under
Amended Rule 27.26, 38 Mo. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1973) (noting that Missouri does not give
literal meaning to language of its rule and that the scope of relief is narrow); Edward A.
Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in Maryland" Past Present andFuture, 45 MD. L. REv. 927,
948 (1986) (noting that petitioner probably obtains new trial in one case out of a hundred
at best).
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To provide a basis for comparison and to more accurately assess a
prison litigant's chances of obtaining relief on appeal from the denial of
his or her RCr 11.42 motion in the trial court, the author also surveyed
the Kentucky Legal Practitioner, a bimonthly publication which summa-
rized all opinions of Kentucky's appellate courts, both published and
unpublished. The survey covered the two-year period of 1990-1991 since
these were the last two full years of publication.37 Of 321 relevant
appellate opinions, only twenty-seven, less than 9%, showed any relief
whatsoever. Of these, only seven appeals, or 2%, involved the grant of
a new trial. The remaining twenty appeals, about 6% of the total, resulted
in minor relief such as a remand for an evidentiary hearing. The
remaining 294 appellate opinions, including government appeals, affirmed
the trial court's denial or grant of RCr 11.42 relief. Apparently, based on
this survey, most of RCr 11.42 cases are correctly resolved at the trial
court level, and even in some of the "reversals," room for legal disagree-
ment obviously exists. The burden on the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
which must hear all RCr 11.42 appeals except those in death penalty
cases, appears quite out of proportion to the relief granted.
V. APPLYING FOR RELIEF AND PROCESSING THE MOTION
The appellant is entitled to a fair trial under the law. He is not
entitled to try the court and his lawyer and the law?71
The goal of RCr 11.42 is to achieve meaningful and efficient state
post-conviction review of criminal judgments. As with most areas of
criminal law, the process through which this policy objective is realized
is of special significance. Errors appearing in the original record must be
tested on appeal, while alleged errors arising outside of the original
record are reserved for post-conviction relief." Therefore, an effective
3" The Kentucky Legal Pracitioner ceased publication in mid-1992. All appellate
opinions were indexed; this survey covers all cases indexed as "postconviction relief' for
the period January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1991.
37 Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968) (citing Penn v.
Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 808 (Ky. 1968)).
'2 Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983) (holding that KY. R.
CRiM. P. 11.42 is the "vehicle to attack an erroneous judgment for reasons which are not
accessible [on] direct appeal"); Howard v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky.
1963) (holding that trial errors should be corrected on direct appeal).
Note, however, that RCr 11.42 is available only to review a 'judgment and sentence
for constitutional invalidity of the proceedings prior to judgment or in the sentence and
judgment itself." Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1992). Constitution-
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post-conviction remedy must allow for the development of a supplemental
record, ifnecessary, and ensure that meritorious claims are quickly recognized
and fivolous claims are quickly discarded. By early 1965, the Kentucky high
court, acutely aware of the large number of post-conviction motions then
streaming into the system, had offered its view of both the relief offered
under the new Rule and the demands upon the court system necessary to
effectuate it. Speaking to the state-wide constituency then poring over law
books in an effort to understand and apply the new procedure, the court
provided a blunt summary
The purpose of RCr 11.42 is to provide a method by which a prisoner'
claim of constitutional infringement can be effectively settled in one
proceeding for all time. In order for this to be possible, that is, in order for
the resolution of the factual basis of the claim tobe accepted in the federal
courts as final and conclusive, it is necessary that the movant be given a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. No matter how unfounded it may
be, and even though the court knows it is not true, if on its face the claim
states a valid basis for relief the bare essentials of such an opportunity are:
(1) effective assistance of counsel, (2) a hearing, (3) a determination of the
material facts, followed by a judgment based on that determination, (4) a
transcript of the record (including the hearing) in the event he appeals, and
(5) an appeal? 3
Over the years, Kentucky appellate courts have rendered a considerable
number of opinions related to issues arising out of the mechanics of drafting,
filing, and processing the post-conviction relief motion. Kentucky case law
now provides some guidance on nearly every aspect of RCr 11.42 pleading,
practice, and procedure.
A. General Principles
1. Constfi tional Grounds for Attack
A collateral attack on a judgment of conviction, raised by motion under
RCr 11.42, must be based upon an allegation of a violation of the defendant
constitutional rights.374 Nothing less will do.
al violations occurring thereafter are not covered by RCr 11.42.
'7 Coles v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 465,466 (Ky. 1965); accordWisonv. Jefferson
Circuit Court; 384 S.W.2d 305,306 (Ky. 1964) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to formal
hearing and counsel unless allegations are insufficient); cf. Schroader v. Thomas, 387 S.W.2d
312,314 (Ky. 1964) (expressing view that KY. 1L CRz. P. 11.42 scheme is "constitutionally
adequate if trial courts adequately apply if), overruled by Lycans v. Commonwealth, 511
S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1974).
"' Hick, 825 S.W.2d at 281; Commonwealth v. Wine, 694 S.W.2d 689, 694 (Ky.
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2. Burden of Proof
It is well established that the "burden is upon the accused to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would
justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceed-
ings provided in RCr 11.42." 37s Should the prisoner fail to introduce
any evidence supporting a claim, the issue is waived.'7 In addition, as the
Kentucky high court has emphasized, "[T]he moving party on a motion
under RCr 11.42 undertakes a heavy burden to overcome the regularity
of the conviction."'
3. Timing the Motion
Prior to October 1, 1994, the language of the Rule permitted an
individual to "at any time proceed directly by motion in the court that
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it."78 Thus, as a
practical matter, no matter how far in the past the prisoner's judgment of
conviction had been rendered, it was still subject to attack under RCr
11.42. Although by 1992 an intermediate appellate court panel had
apparently recognized a laches defense for the prosecutor forced to defend
1985); Commonwealth v. Basnight, 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); see
Howard v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Ky. 1989) (Vance, J., dissenting) ("The
very purpose of RCr 11.42 is to allow vacation of judgments which are the result of the
denial of constitutional due process.'), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068 (1990).
3" Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968) (emphasis added);
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954) ("It is presumed the proceedings were
correct and the burden rests on the accused to show otherwise."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938) (holding petitioner had burden of proving that the right to
counsel was not waived); accord Commonwealth v. Campbell, 415 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky.
1967) (explaining that the fact the trial court had serious doubts regarding the adequacy
of the prisoner's counsel was an insufficient ground to grant relief under KY. R. CRM.
P. 11.42). Shifting the burden to the inmate in post-conviction proceedings is the universal
practice. FRANK, supra note 260, at 79; YACKLE, supra note 23, at 502; see Parke v.
Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992) (discussing burden of proof regarding the constitutional
validity of prior conviction).
376 King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. 1966) ("King did not introduce
any evidence on this issue at his RCr 11.42 hearing, so we consider it waived", cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 924 (1967); accord Matthews v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 313, 314
(Ky.) (holding that motion to vacate was properly overruled where defendant presented
no evidence to support claim), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971).
" Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
976 (1966).
'3' KY. R. CRlM. P. 11.42(1) (1965).
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stale RCr 11.42 claims,3 79 the "at any time" provision had been a
problem for decades, with numerous belated motions to vacate being
advanced. Although this decision was the first to recognize laches,
Kentucky's appellate courts had always shown a certain sympathy to the
prosecution for the problems created by delayed claims. ° One of the
older examples was Mclinney v. Commonwealth, where the movant
waited thirteen years after trial before filing his motion."1 By that time,
defense counsel was deceased and the foundation of the Commonwealth's
defense against McKinney's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
irretrievably lost.2 The Kentucky high court concluded that McKinney
did not meet the heavy burden of proof required by such circumstanc-
es.' In Jordan v. Commonwealth,' Prater v. Commonwealth,'
Wooten v. Commonwealth"s6  and Reams v. Commonwealth,' the
Kentucky high court seemed to recognize the existence of an ad hoc
laches defense, whether specifically plead or raised by the court sua
sponte.' On the other hand, citing approvingly from Heflin v. United
"' Hayes v. Commonwealth, 837 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (concerning a 23-
year-old conviction).
3- Lukowsky, supra note 348, at 441 (observing that the appellate courts quickly felt
the weight of delayed inmate motions to vacate). According to Lukowsky, three factors
led to serious difficulties in responding to stale inmate claims: "First, while the court itself
is perpetual, its judges die and otherwise vanish from the scene. Second, lawyers too are
mortal, they die and otherwise fade away. Third, the files and records kept by the courts
in criminal matters were surprisingly sketchy and inadequate." Id.
32 445 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1969).
32 Id. at 877-78.
30 Id. at 878; accord Miller v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Ky. 1970)
(holding that defendant had to establish that plea of guilty was 'nintelligent" in order
to prove counsel was ineffective); Ringo v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky.
1970) (explaining that conclusive character of public records increases with age and may
become unassailable).
3" 445 S.W.2d 878, 879-80 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that since defendant had waited
15 years to contest conviction, defendant was the only witness to testify against
conviction).
3' 474 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1971) (explaining that defendant who had waited 16
years to contest conviction bore a heavy burden).
3M 473 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. 1971) (explaining that defendant who had waited 25
years to contest conviction had waited too long).
3 522 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1975) (explaining that defendant who had waited 20
years to contest conviction had waited too long).
3U See, e.g., Hayes v. Commonwealth, 837 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
(Wilhoit, J., concurring inresult) (observing that the defense of laches, if available, should
be specifically pled under KY. R. Civ. P. 8.02).
3" See, e.g., Reams, 522 S.W.2d at 854.
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States,39 Kentucky's highest court had also recognized that the RCr
11.42 provision allowing a prisoner to file "at any time" meant that "as
in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no res judicata, and
the doctrine of laches is inapplicable." ''
The approach in the older cases appeared simply to be that, although
the petition could be brought "at any time," the movant's burden of proof
increased with the passage of time.3" No standard was provided to
guide the trial courts' determination of how much heavier that burden
became with each passing year, and the state of the law in this area was
unworkable.
This unfortunate situation was resolved when the Kentucky Supreme
Court amended RCr 11.42 in 1994 to add new section (10), which
requires the filing of a RCr 11.42 motion "within three years after the
judgment becomes final," within three years after the facts upon which
a previously undiscovered claim is predicated became known, or within
three years after the "fundamental constitutional right asserted" was
created and held to apply retroactively.393 The equitable defense of
laches was also recognized to apply even within these more restrictive
time frames.3" Arguably, the 1994 Amendment was the most significant
modification to RCr 11.42 in the history of the Rule and has greatly
simplified this aspect of RCr 11.42 pleading and practice.
Although the most important aspect of the timing of a motion under
RCr 11.42 is contained in the 1994 Amendment, another general
consideration exists. Any application of RCr 11.42 is subject to the
general requirements that the movant be a "prisoner in custody under
sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or conditional dis-
charge"395 and that the issues sought to be raised are ripe for resolution
under RCr 11.42. Therefore, in the first instance, a judgment against the
movant must be the object of the attack. A motion to vacate filed prior
to the entry of judgment warrants summary dismissal or at least
abatement. However, the trial court may and should fully consider a
motion under RCr 11.42 even though direct appeal is pending.39
-' 358 U.S. 415 (1959). For a lower court federal habeas corpus case on point, see
Phillips v. Black, 367 F. Supp. 774, 776 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (holding that passage of 16
years increased petitioner's burden in overcoming presumptively valid conviction), aftld,
497 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1974).
" Prater v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1971).
31 See supra notes 381-89 and accompanying text.
- KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(10).
3N4 Id.
3- Prater, 474 S.W.2d at 384.
' Wilson v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
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4. Successive Motions
The terms of RCr 11.42(3) require the prisoner to "state all grounds
for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.
Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues that could
reasonably have been presented in the same proceeding."397 The appli-
cant for post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42 is required to specify all
complaints of which he has knowledge "so that one careful and complete
consideration of his application will conclude the litigation and the courts
and the bar will not be required again to devote time and effort to his
cause. '' 399 This procedural bar to successive petitions is not absolute,
that defendant should be permitted to raise, with an 11.42 motion, considerations that are
not object of direct appeal and that are supported by facts).
' See, e.g., Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1983) (holding that
defendant who failed to challenge earlier guilty plea prior to challenging instant guilty
plea had waived right to challenge either plea); Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 857 (Ky. 1983) (involving a defendant who failed to challenge earlier convictions
while 'in custody, under sentence or on probaton' and was thus precluded fim
challenging the conviction under KY. R. CV. P. 60.02); Gregory v. Knuck es, 471 S.W.2d
306, 307 (Ky. 1971) (holding defendant not entitled to transcript of record in attempt to
appeal order overruling second motion for post-conviction relief).
Courts have disposed of a large number of successive RCr 11.42 motions based upon
this aspect of the Rule. Dismissals of successive petitions occurred in at least the
following published cases: Crick v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Ky. 1977)
(alleging invalid juvenile waiver); Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Ky.
1972) (claiming denial of right of appeal); Butler v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 108,
109 (Ky. 1971) (alleging coercion of guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel);
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Ky. 1970) (alleging incompetency at
time of guilty plea); Milner v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Ky. 1966) (holding
that since allegation should have been raised in first motion, court was correct in
overruling second); Deweese v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. 1966)
(holding that allegation was '"repetitious'); Jennings v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 233,
234 (Ky. 1966) (holding that allegation was the same as previous ones denied); Rowe v.
Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1966) (noting that second motion involved
same allegation of coercion); Warner v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 490, 490 (Ky. 1966)
(holding that allegation was same as previously one denied); Bell v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.2d 772, 772 (Ky. 1965) (holding that allegation was same as earlier ones denied);
Kinmon v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1965) (holding that subsequent
motion was merely an effort to trifle with the court), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 930 (1966);
Burton v. Tartar, 385 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Ky. 1964) (holding that allegation was same as
that twice brought previously amounted to trifling with the court), ceu. denied, 380 U.S.
984 (1965).
"' Case v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971) (holding that defendant's
second petition for post-conviction relief contained nothing that could not have been
brought in first petition); see Lycans v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 232, 232 (Ky. 1974)
(dismissing defendant's second motion under KY. R. CRiM P. 11.42 without an
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but it is a significant hurdle to overcome if the grounds raised could have
been presented earlier. However, where the first motion was denied
without a hearing and subsequent Kentucky case law made it clear that
a hearing should have been provided, a movant advancing the same
grounds would be granted a hearing on the second motion.' The
application of this standard is clearly left to the discretion of the judge.
A successive motion under RCr 11.42 apparently may be allowed if a
new claim, unknown and not reasonably discoverable at the time of the
first motion, was raised! e' This situation occurred in Smith v. Common-
wealth, in which the appellate court reversed and directed the trial court
evidentiary hearing because the issu should have been raised in the first motion);
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Ky. 1970) (denying defendant's
successive motions imder KY. R. CaiM. P. 11.42 and KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02 because new
evidence presented by defendant had been available to defendant at the time of trial); see
also 1965-66 Kentucky Court ofAppeals ReMew, 55 KY. L.L 253, 377 (1966-1967). The
appellate courts have criticized piecemeal litigation, the effects of which provide the
reason for this restriction. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 798, 798 (Ky. 1972)
("Appellant seems to believe that RCr 11.42 gives him the right to advance reasons for
vacating the judgment one at a time in a series of motions that will allow him to
command the attention of the courts in perpetuity. In this he is mistaken.").
3" Johnson v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Ky. 1970) (finding defendant
who was denied appeal on original claim to be entitled to hearing on the issue). The
Kentucky appellate courts have sometimes invoked the procedural bar but then have
addressed the merits in a sentence or two, almost as an afterthought; this practice may
have unfavorable federal habeas corpus implications, in that the court rules on the merits
of the prisoner's claims by merely mentioning them as being groundless. In effect, a court
which intended to dispose of the claims on procedural grounds in a sentence or two can
end up ruling on the merits. This enables a federal habeas corpus court to also reach the
merits of the issue. For examples of such unwise dicta, see Szabo v. Commonwealth, 458
S.W.2d 167, 168 (Ky 1970) (resolving unnecessarily eight issues in one sentence); Angelo
v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Ky. 1970) (deciding ineffective assistance of
counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal); Odewahn v. Commonwealth, 407
S.W.2d 137, 138 (Ky. 1966) (deciding merits of successive motion); Tipton v.
Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. 1966) (deciding merits of successive motion),
overruled on other grounds by Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1969);
Carter v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1965) (dismissing appeal of
subsequent motion but resolving issues raised in first motion, the denial of which was not
appealed).
On other occasions, the appellate courts have upheld completely the procedural bar.
See, e.g., Crick, 550 S.W.2d at 535 (declining to review allegedly invalid juvenile
waiver); Hampton, 454 S.W.2d at 673 (refusing to review overruling of successive motion
by trial court).
4 Gilliam v. 'Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1983) (explaining that a
defendant is not precluded from receiving relief under a subsequent KY. R. CRiM. P.
11.42 motion "upon a ground which was not known or reasonably discoverable at the
time the first motion was made").
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to grant appellant an evidentiary hearing since, at the time appellant filed
his first RCr 11.42 motion, the prisoner did not know and had no reason
to know that counsel had failed to timely file a notice of appeal."' The
first RCr 11.42 motion had been overruled on the reasoning that all issues
raised could and would be resolved on direct appeal, but the direct appeal
was later dismissed because of the error of counsel. The trial court
then dismissed appellant's second RCr 11.42 motion as successive.'
Under these circumstances, the appellate court found that the trial court
had abused its discretion.'
5. Other Procedural Bars
A procedural bar arises when a criminal defendant takes or fails to
take some action, the result of which can be construed as waiver of his
or her claim.' For example, RCr 11.42 is not a substitute for direct
appeal, and a litigant is therefore properly barred from raising in an RCr
11.42 motion an issue that either was raised on direct appeal or could
have been raised on direct appeal or by another pre-RCr 11.42 proceed-
ing.' This principle was succinctly stated in Cole v. Commonwealth,
when the court concluded: 'The issues Cole now raises could have been
raised on that appeal. They were not of such character as to render the
judgments utterly void and thus subject to collateral attack without
reference to the appeal. It is now too late." 7 Finally, a procedural bar
-1 502 S.W.2d 516, 516-17 (Ky. 1973).2 Id. at 516.
4M Id.
404 Id. at 516-17.
40 Brown v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Ky. 1990).
' Id. (adopting decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals that since KY. R. CRiM
P. 11.42 issues had been decided adversely to petitioner by the Kentucky Supreme Court
on direct appeal, they should not be considered on 11.42 motion); Holt v. Commonwealth,
525 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Ky. 1975) ("RCr 11.42 is not a substitute for appeal"); Thacker
v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ky. 1972) (explaining that the purpose of KY.
L CRIM. P. 11.42 is not to retry settled issues); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d
69, 71 (Ky. 1971) (holding that failure to raise claim of improper instructions in motion
for new trial constituted waiver for purposes of KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42); Clay v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Ky.) (holding that KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 is not
a substitute for appeal and does not penit review of all trial err rs), cert. demed, 400
U.S. 943 (1970); Yates v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Ky.) (holding that
failure to appeal precludes post-conviction attack), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964).
4 441 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Ky. 1969) (holding defendant's allegations of incompetent
counsel, biased jury, and denial of continuance to be an insufficient basis for a collateral
attack since defendant had failed to raise these issues on appeal).
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exists regarding the appeal of a denial of an RCr 11.42 motion. Once the
motion to vacate has been overruled by the trial court and the decision to
appeal that ruling is made, the movant cannot raise new issues. The issues
appealed must, for obvious reasons, have been presented to the trial court
in the original motion or through amended pleadings.
The Kentucky appellate courts usually hold that any claim under RCr
11.42 which could have been raised on direct appeal but was not is
barred. On one hand, for example, Kentucky's highest court has held that
where the movant was represented by counsel at trial and his counsel
made no motion for a continuance, the request for RCr 11.42 relief based
upon the failure of the trial court to grant a continuance was properly
denied.4' In a similar fashion, it has been held that the failure of
counsel to object at trial to an allegedly tainted in-court identification
waived movant's claim under RCr 11.42,41' as did the failure to pursue
a timely appeal of a juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction.411 Compare
these cases to Smith v. Commonwealth, where the defendant complained
he had not been represented by counsel in a 1958 juvenile proceeding
leading to conviction.4 The 1958 conviction was not appealed, but the
Kentucky appellate court still allowed Smith to raise the issue of the
juvenile waiver. The court reasoned that since the right to counsel in a
juvenile proceeding did not exist in 1958, the appellant was not dilatory
in failing to raise the issue 13 This situation justified an exception to
the general rule.414
4'6 Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1983) (holding that
defendant who had failed to request counsel for KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 hearing was
precluded from appealing based upon failure to appoint counsel); Brock v. Common-
wealth, 479 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1972) (finding that the claim the trial court had failed
to advise defendant of right to appeal was not raised in KY. R. CPJM. P. 11.42 motion);
Russell v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1971) (declining to consider
defendant's arguments which were not raised at trial court level); Quarles v. Common-
wealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky. 1970) (declining to consider defendant's claims which
were not raised at hearings); Angelo v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Ky. 1970)
(declining to consider claims which were not set forth in appellant's motion); Brister v.
Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Ky. 1969) (declining to review claims which were
not presented to trial court); Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky. 1965)
(explaining that issue of "inadequate" counsel would not be considered on appeal), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966).
9 Williams v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 503, 503 (Ky. 1966).
410 Butcher v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ky. 1971).
411 Holt v. Commonwealth, 525 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Ky. 1975).
412 412 S.W.2d 256, 257-58 (Ky.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 873 (1967).
4,3 Id. at 259.
414 Id.
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Moreover, any procedural bar potentially can be overcome under
Kentucky law through several avenues and at several different stages of
the proceedings. First the fact that an issue has been raised and decided
on direct appeal does not mean that the issue is concluded. On the
contrary, litigants and their attorneys have learned to raise the barred
issue by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis of the
claim. This approach merely shifts the emphasis from the error itself to
the failure of counsel to prevent the error from occurring in the first
place.41 5 Second, a procedural bar or default may be overlooked on direct
appeal from a judgment if the court finds prejudice to a substantial right
of the defendant under RCr 10.26, or if upholding the judgment of
conviction would result in a "manifest injustice. 4 6 Third, without
careful analysis, a reviewing court may be tempted to view a serious
departure from accepted procedure as a defect in the court's jurisdiction,
thus preventing enforcement of the procedural bar. One area which
illustrates this problem is the allegedly improper transfer of jurisdiction
from juvenile court to circuit court, followed by a failure of the defendant
to appeal, which is considered a waiver. This subject is exhaustively
discussed in Schooley v. Commonwealth4 7 The Schooley court was
careful to distinguish between issues of jurisdiction and due process,
concluding that an improper transfer from juvenile to circuit court was
not jurisdictional and that procedural defects in the transfer could be
waived by failure to appeal4  This approach is the correct one, since
jurisdiction concerns the power to act; not the manner in which the court
has acted, even if defective!'
411 Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Ky. 1990) (involving claims of
fraud by psychologist and errors in instructions, raised and rejected on direct appeal,
which were resurrected on KY. I. CRIM. P. 11.42 as ineffective assistance of counsel),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 844 (1991); Brown v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Ky.
1990) (involving a juror bias claim raised on direct appeal which was transformed into
ineffective assistance claim based on failure of counsel to discover juror bias); Williams
v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. CL App. 1982) (holding that while
sufficiency of evidence claim was not raised on direct appeal and was therefore barred,
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising out of same facts must be considered).
Note that this situation is different from that presented when defense counsel has failed
to preserve an issue at trial, thereby waiving it on direct appeal and leaving RCr 11.42
as the only possible remedy. See infra notes 686-88 and accompanying text.
416 See, e.g., West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Ky. 1989).
417 556 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. CL App. 1977). For a complete examination of this case
and its importance, see Matthew J. Fritz, Kentucky Law Survey - Cr'minal Procedure, 67
KY. L.J. 599, 605-08 (1978-1979).
41. Schooley, 556 S.W.2d at 915-16.
419 Id.
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B. Pleading Requirements
The text of RCr 11.42 itself offers only minimal guidance on
pleading requirements. The appellate courts have added broad, common
sense restrictions through their decisions. 420 Many of these restrictions
were the result of published opinions from the 1960s, when the Kentucky
high court found it necessary to articulate basic standards governing the
filing of a prima facie challenge under RCr 11.42 while insuring that the
Rule continued to fulfill its purpose of offering an orderly mechanism to
deal with complaints of constitutional magnitude or fundamental fairness.
Four general principles are highlighted here as especially significant.
1. Basis for Complaint
First, RCr 11.42 is grounded on the premise that the movant is aware
of a significant constitutional or jurisdictional trial error sufficient to
warrant voiding the judgment. Consistent with this position, an indigent
is not entitled to a transcript, provided at the state's expense, to search the
trial record for errors which might somehow evolve into a motion for
post-conviction relief or which do not attack the judgment.421 The
purpose of the Rule "is to provide a forum for known grievances, not to
provide an opportunity to research for grievances." 4' The complaint or
allegation must be of such a nature that the grounds presented, if true,
would entitle the prisoner to relief!' Where no such basis for relief has
been provided, the motion may be summarily dismissed without
appointment of counsel or a hearing.!' Above all, the allegation cannot
be an attempt to utilize RCr 11.42 as a substitute for an appeal!'
' See Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1983) (denying
transcript due to lack of evidence that basis for KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 motion existed);
Odewaim v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1964) (holding that motion which failed
to factually demonstrate existence of valid grounds for grant of relief could be dismissed);
Oakes v. Gentry, 380 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Ky. 1964) (holding that failure to file a timely
appeal precluded grant of motion for transcript).
4" Clements v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Ky. 1969), provides an
example. The allegation was that the defendant's lawyer received $400 to "guarantee"
probation, and, of course, the defendant was not probated. Even if true, this event
occurred after conviction and could not be a ground for relief under RCr 11.42, since
under RCr 11.42 only the judgment could be challenged. Id. at 160.
42 Gilliam, 652 S.W.2d at 858.
423 Oakes, 380 S.W.2d at 238.
41 Odewahn v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1964).
,' See, e.g., Cinnamon v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1970)
[Vol 83
4CENTUCKY POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
2. Supportng Facts
By the terms of the Rule itself, the motion, which is to be in writing,
"shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being
challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such
grounds.'!" 26 The burden, therefore, is on the defendant to file a motion
which adequately describes the nature of the constitutional violation and
presents sufficient facts in support4 27 This burden allocation is particu-
larly vital where counsel has been appointed, as required by Common-
wealth v. Ivey,"' as appointment of counsel ensures that the movant is
given legal assistance for preparing and presenting his claims. Summary
dismissal is the penalty for failure to comply.4 This rule of law is
justified because it would be unfair and inefficient to ask the state to
investigate nebulous claims in a vain effort to determine the truth. It is
not enough, therefore, to simply charge the denial of the right to a fair
trial and leave it at that. To pass this hurdle, "[tjhe movant must aver
facts with sufficient specificity to generate a basis for relief "4'
Failure to comply with this requirement may occur in any variety of
ways. For example, a bare allegation that a guilty plea has been obtained
through "trickery" has been held insufficient on at least two occa-
sions.4 1 In another case, the movant advanced the claim that his guilty
plea was "coerced" by delay in bringing his case to trial, but because no
facts were presented to support the allegation, the motion to vacate was
(explaining that the allegation that appellant only pled guilty to one charge and not othem
must be raised on appeal, not under 11.42), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971).
4m KY. R. CRI. P. 11.42(2) (emphasis added); see Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854
S.W.2d 742, 748 (Ky. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994); Skaggs v. Common-
wealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Ky. 1990), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 140 (1991).
42 Stanford, 854 S.W.2d at 748.
42 599 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1980) (holding right of indigent to free counsel extends
to KY. R. C, M. P. 11.42 hearings).
4 Stanfbrd, 854 S.W.2d at 748 ("Without a minimum of factual basis, contained in
the verified RCr 11.42 motion, the motion should be summarily overruled."; Skaggs, 803
S.W.2d at 576; Cook v. Commonwealth, 402 S.W.2d 847, 847 (Ky. 1966); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
4'30 Lucas v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1971) (holding that the claim
for relief was without any legal basis). To allow the movant to proceed with only
conclusory allegations, devoid of facts, would place an intolerable burden on trial courts.
Jennings v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Ky. 1964); accord Sharp v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 317, 317 (Ky. 1964).
43' Brumer v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970); Newsome v.
Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1970).
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properly dismissed!' In guilty plea cases, the movant is required to
affirmatively state, as a constitutional basis for relief; that the guilty plea
was not knowing and voluntary.433
Finally, although it has been held that pro se pleadings are subject to
less stringent standards than those presented through legal counsel, a pro
se motion is justly required to give both the court and opposing party fair
notice of the nature of the claim.4 Allegations made in bad faith will
cause the motion to be stricken and the proceedings to be dismissed.43
3. Substantial Compliance
The requirement on the face of the Rule that a motion for post-
conviction relief be in writing is jurisdictional.436 Under the civil rules,
the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment ten days after entry!'
The filing of an RCr 11.42 motion is a rule-based resumption of the
original criminal case in the court of conviction. Because the motion may
be made after the trial court has lost jurisdiction over its judgment, the
requirement for a written motion is particularly important Cleaver v.
Commonwealth teaches:
The procedure for obtaining relief pursuant to the provisions of RCr
11.42 must be complied with. The motion for relief must be in writing,
verified by the movant, and state specifically the grounds of challenge
and the facts in support thereof. In the instant case, there being no
written motion, there could be no compliance with the provisions of
RCr 11.42, not even a substantial compliance. It is jurisdictional that
Boffman v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1970); accord Wedding v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Ky. 1971); Parker v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d
280, 281 (Ky. 1971) (holding that allegation of coercion of guilty plea was unsupported
by facts); Farmer v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 494, 494 (Ky. 1970) (holding that
allegation was not sufficiently definite to merit further inquiry).
3 Lucas, 465 S.W.2d at 268.
4 Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1983) (finding that
defendant had filed form of indigency which was not sufficiently specific in requesting
private counsel); Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Ky. 1967) (explaining
that failure to follow pocedural standards of KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 and KY. R. CIV. P.
60.02 by prisoner proceeding pro so could be excusable if fair notice had been given to
other parties).
43 Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Ky. 1993), cert. demied 114
S. Ct. 703 (1994); Miller, 416 S.W.2d at 360-61.
4m Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1978).
4' KY. R. CrV. P. 59.05.
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the terms and provisions of RCr 11.42 must be complied with, even
though a substantial, and not an absolute, compliance is adequate.
Therefore, even had RCr 11.42 been an appropriate remedy in this
instance, in the absence of an appropriate motion as required by RCr
11.42, the Johnson Circuit Court would not have had the authority to
enter an order granting the appellant any relief
43
Failure to make the motion in writing, therefore, is a fatal jurisdictional
error, as is failure to sign the motion and verify its accuraCy.4s None
of these requirements imposes a substantial burden upon the movant, and
each is essential for the orderly processing of RCr 11.42 motions. Even
the requirement that the movant verify the contents of the motion is an
important component of an orderly process, equivalent to "due process"
for the state. This requirement aids accountability and helps ensure that
the state does not waste valuable resources - both executive and judi-
cial - in processing false claims. This requirement thus frees those
resources for the consideration of more substantial and substantiated
allegations.
4. Custody
Additionally, RCr 11.42 provides that the motion for relief may be
made by a "prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant on
probation, parole or conditional discharge."" 0 This pleading require-
ment was initially intended to be the equivalent of the "in custody"
requirement under federal habeas corpus.O1 The original wording of
RCr 11.42 limited its use to a "prisoner in custody" and, by its own
terms, limited the collateral attack to the sentence actually being served
569 S.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added).439 Id.
KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(1).
t The jurisdiction of federal courts is extended to federal habeas petitions filed by
state prisoners 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988).
This provision had been interpreted to require physical incarceration at the time of
filing. In Jones v. Cumningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1963), the Court expanded the
scope of the 'in custody" requirement to include a prisoner on parole, as significant
restrictions on liberty still exist because the release from prison is not unconditional.
Where, however, a previous sentence has been flly served, it cannot be directly attacked
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding even though it may someday be used to enhance
a prisoner's sentence under a persistent felony offender or habitual criminal statute.
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam).
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through confinement at the time of filing. The Rule was later amended,
consistent with developments in federal habeas corpus, to expand the
concept of "custody" to its present understanding, but the basic require-
ment of an outstanding judgment which the prisoner or defendant seeks
to attack through RCr 11.42 remained. 2 In certain circumstances, the
movant's status forecloses review. For example, a sentence which has
been completely served is not subject to collateral attack,"M3 and there-
fore, as a matter of policy, a former prisoner cannot use RCr 11.42 to
simply clear his or her name.
The chances of overturning a judgment of conviction through a
successful RCr 11.42 motion are extremely small. Scarce judicial
resources justify the policy decision that the Rule is not available once a
sentence has been completely served, even though technical or personal
disabilities, such as difficulty in finding a certain type of employment.
may remain. Nor may prisoners awaiting trial or sentencing utilize RCr
11.42, since they are not yet "under sentence." '
This policy extends to prior felony convictions which may, if the
person is tried for later crimes, entail significant consequences. In Wilson
v. Commonwealth, the court held that an RCr 11.42 motion was not
available to attack a 1933 conviction which had been completely served,
even though it was one of several used to impose a sentence of life in the
defendant's prosecution as a persistent felony offender or habitual
criminal.' In Commonwealth v. Stamps, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reiterated that RCr 11.42 was "never intended as a defense to a persistent
442 See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
4 Keltee v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Ky. 1983) (affirming denial of
request for relief under 11.42 because sentence had been completed 'long before" the
motion was filed); Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332, 332 (Ky. 1964) ("RCr
11.42 does not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any judgment other
than the one or ones pursuant to which the movant is being held in custody.").
This approach is consistent with that of the federal courts. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at
492 (holding that conviction for which sentence had been served was not itself subject to
federal habeas corpus statute merely because it might be used later to enhance a future
sentence under a state's persistent felony offender or habitual criminal statute); Gavin v.
Wells, 914 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that fully served prior sentence was
not subject to collateral attack).
4" KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(1); Chick v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Ky.),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
5"' 403 S.W.2d 705, 712 (Ky. 1966); accord Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 857 (Ky. 1983) (holding that defendant was not permitted to use KY. R. CRlM. P.
11.42 to attack a conviction for which period of incarceration and parole had been
completed); see also mupra note 441 and accompanying text.
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felony offender charge and the legal system has been badly abused by the
misuse of the rule for this unintended purpose."'
The language of the Wilson opinion remains instructive. The court stated
that defendant Fmncis Wilson "is not in custody by virtue ofthe 1933 Warren
Circuit Court conviction, nor has he shown or claimed a right to be released
from custody of that sentence." 7 A persistent felony offender or habitual
criminal charge simply results in the possibility of an enhanced sentence on
a current, or triggering, felony based upon the defendant status as a
persistent felony offender." An attack upon one of the underlying convic-
tions used to meet the prosecution's statutory burden of proving that status is
simply not an attack upon the judgment of conviction of the triggering
felony. 9 The decisions of the Kentucky appellate courts provide defen-
dants seeking to challenge prior convictions an avenue prior to trial or
pursuant to CR 60.02, but only upon grounds that could not have been raised
on direct appeal or via RCr 11.42, regardless of whether such grounds were
actually raised45 Finally, the "in custody" requirement of RCr 11.42
4, 672 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ky. 1984) (holding that defendant's failure to attack earlier
conviction operated as a waiver of his right to use motion to vacate).
'47 403 S.W.2d at 712 (emphasis added). The court noted that Wilson was "seeking
to use a remedy in a manner which was never intended by the Court in drafing RCr
11.42" and that Wilson'sproper remedy was through CR 60.02, which had replaced cormn
nobis. Id.; accord Keltee, 648 S.W.2d at 860.4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994).
'"" Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983) (denying defendant's
motion to attack previous conviction); Ray v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 71, 72-73 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1982) (denying defendant's motion to attack a completely served 12-year prison
sentence). One commentator provides an alternate view, concluding that "Ray's 1980
persistent felony offender sentence, as a practical matter, was the product of the 1969
convictions and the underlying substantive conviction in 1980. Ray's custody status was
as much the result of what happened in 1969 as what happened in 1980." William H.
Fortune, Kentucky Law Survey - Criminal Procedure, 71 KY. L.J. 367, 393-94 (1982-
1983).
4'0 This avenue of attack on direct appeal was strictly limited for prior convictions
obtained by a guilty plea in McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 936-37 (Ky.
1994) (holding that, as in federal jurisprudence, the Commonwealth can meet its burden
of proof by showing the fact ofthe prior conviction so long as there was not a complete
denial of counsel at the guilty plea) (citing Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732
(1994)). See Howard v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Ky. 1989) (instructing that
defendant should attack conviction "when challenge [is] a live issue"); Commonwealth
v. Gadd, 665 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Ky. 1984) (instructing that effort to suppress evidence of
prior convictions should be made by pretrial motion); Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648
S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1983) (holding that failure to challenge earlier conviction prior to
entering guilty plea to subsequent charge waives right to attack the earlier conviction).
411 Gross,'648 S.W.2d at 857.
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contemplates a sentence of imprisonment; a criminal conviction resulting
in only a fine may not be challenged under the Rule since the prisoner is
not in custody.452
C. Indigents and Prisoners Proceeding Pro Se
Numerous issues arise in the context of inmates proceeding without
counsel or without other resources available to the non-indigent defen-
dant. Several are discussed below.
1. Transcripts
In general, an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to a free
transcript of the trial in order to perfect a direct appeal.' Once a state
has established a post-conviction procedure, it cannot permit financial
considerations to limit its availability to an indigent4  However, an
indigent defendant contemplating the filing of an RCr 11.42 motion is not
automatically entitled to have a trial transcript prepared or copied at the
state's expense.455 To obtain the transcript, the inmate must have already
filed an RCr 11.42 motion, demonstrated that his claim is not frivolous,
and shown why the trial transcript, or a relevant portion thereof; is
necessary to resolve the issue.4 The trial court may decide to release
412 Lewallen v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (involving
a defendant who pled guilty to four counts of distributing obscene material and was fined
$1,000).
4 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
41 Id.; see Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961).
41 Jones v. Breslin, 385 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1964) (holding that copies of transcripts
did not have to be forwarded to defendant where no motion had been filed).
4m A transcript will not be provided prior to the filing of an RCr 11.42 motion.
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Ky. 1983); Harden v. Turner, 394
S.W.2d 749, 750 (Ky. 1965); Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1965);
Allen v. Wolfinbarger, 385 S.W.2d 160, 160 (Ky. 1964); Oakes v. Gentry, 380 S.W.2d
237, 238 (Ky. 1964).
The motion to vacate judgment must present a claim which, if true, would entitle the
movant to post-conviction relief. Gilliam, 652 S.W.2d at 858; Gregory v. Knuckles, 471
S.W.2d 306, 307 (Ky. 1971).
The relevance of the transcript must be shown. Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 452
S.W.2d 613, 614 (Ky. 1970) (furnishing petitioner only the portion of transcript relating
to the issue at hearing), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Rose v. Simpson, 411 S.W.2d
329, 330 (Ky. 1967) (holding that absent a showing of the necessity for the tranuscript, one
need not be furnished); Moore v. Simpson, 411 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Ky. 1967) (holding that
record of tril would not be given where petitioner gave no reason why any part of record
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to the defendant only those portions of the trial transcript relevant to the
issues raised in the motion!' 7 The matter is thus left to the discretion
of the trial court in which the motion is filed. Kentucky decisions have
noted that these restrictions are necessary to prevent the inmate from
embarking on a state-sponsored "fishing expedition."'  As stated in
Gilliam 'v. Commonwealth, the "purpose of the rule is to provide a forum
for known grievances, not to provide an opportunity to research for
grievances."'459 Although an independently wealthy prisoner would not
face these obstacles, the Kentucky Supreme Court has rejected due
process and equal protection challenges. Even if the trial transcript
is available without additional cost to the state, the trial court is not
required to turn it over to a prisoner until a legally sufficient RCr 11.42
motion has been filed.4"'
In practice, these requirements affect few prisoners seeking post-
conviction relief. Many will have retained, or have available from
court-appointed appellate counsel, a copy of the transcript from the direct
appeal. Such restrictions are consistent, however, with the limited purpose
of collateral attack and the state's interest in controlling frivolous requests.
It should be noted that these restrictions apply to indigents obtaining trial
transcripts for use in preparing an RCr 11.42 claim. If a hearing is
conducted on the motion which is later overruled, then the indigent has
an absolute right to a transcript of the RCr 11.42 proceeding for purposes
of appealing the trial court's decision on the motion.' Mandamus will
was necessary).
41 Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1983).
411 Moore v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 161, 161 (Ky. 1964) (denying writ of mandamus
where sole reason petitioner requested court record was to lay groundwork to attack
conviction).
4 652 S.W.2d at 858 (applying United States v. MacCollon, 426 U.S. 317 (1976)).
40 Id. at 859.
41 Id.; Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1965) (stating that trial
court gave indigent more than the law required since it furnished him a transcript before
the motion was filed, thereby permitting movant to embark on a "wholly unwarranted
fishing expedition").
"' Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (holding that state cannot deny
transcript of hearing necessary for post-conviction appeal); Richardson v. Cannon, 506
S.W.2d 509, 510 (Ky. 1974) ("To deny such a transcript would be a denial of equal
protection of the law.'; Davis v. Knuckles, 407 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Ky. 1966) (entitling
petitioner to transcript in order to perfect appeal); Roark v. Stivers, 401 S.W.2d 56, 56
(Ky. 1966) (holding that mandamus would issue to insure that record of 11.42 proceeding
is fumished to indigent); Davenport v. Winn, 385 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Ky. 1964) (holding
that mandamus would issue to compel trial court to furnish indigent with transcript of
11.42 proceedfin).
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lie for such a purpose even where the trial court has affirmatively
responded that the movant had a fair trial and that the allegations in the
RCr 11.42 motion were meritless.7
2. Appointment of Counsel
A prisoner who is entitled to seek post-conviction relief cannot be
barred from assistance of counsel in preparing the motion. However, the
state is under no federal constitutional duty to provide such assis-
tance.4" The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that section 31.110 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes limits the trial court's discretion to appoint
counsel if requested by an indigent but the failure to make such an
appointment is prejudicial error only if the motion and answer raise a
material issue of fact that cannot be determined without an evidentiary
hearing. 5 In appropriate cases, counsel should be appointed early in
the process, because RCr 11.42(3) requires the movant to present all
grounds for relief of which the prisoner has knowledge. This requirement
acts as a bar to successive motions, and, therefore, "[w]ithout the
assistance of counsel [the movant] could be effectively precluded from
raising valid grounds by failure to include such grounds at the time of his
first motion." 6 Any request for counsel must be "clear and unambigu-
ous," and absent such request, RCr 11.42 does not require automatic
appointment.'
' Bingham v. Stivers, 396 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Ky. 1965) (holding that record must be
provided regardless of merits of appeal).
"" Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (holding that indigent has no
constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceeding); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (holding that states are not subject to a federal constitutional
requirement to provide counsel for collateral proceedings); Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672
S.W.2d 336, 339 (Ky. 1984) ("Such right to counsel for a needy person as exists in an
RCr 11.42 proceeding is provided by rule and by statute.'J.
"' &amps, 672 S.W.2d at 339 (holding that no constitutional right to an attorney
exists in KY. R. CRD. P. 11.42 proceeding), modifying Commonwealth v. Ivey, 599
S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1980).
"Ivey, 599 S.W.2d at 458 (holding that KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.110 and KY. R.
CalM. P. 11.42 are complementary and clearly provide for appointment of counsel).
16 Ky. R. Cium. P. 11.42(5) (mandating that request be specific and written);
Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Ky. 1983) (holding a form affidavit
of indigency not to be specific request for counsel).
The movant should specify the purpose for which counsel is desired. Allen v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that request for
counsel to assist in evidentiary hearing was properly -denied where no hearming was
necessary).
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The common practice is for prisoners to simultaneously file an RCr
11.42 motion and a request for counsel to aid in its preparation. This
approach would seem to be required, or at least authorized, by Beecham
v. Commonwealth.' This somewhat contradictory practice is actually
beneficial since it gives the trial court a "feel" for the case, the signifi-
cance of the issues raised pro se, and the abilities of the inmate. The
original motion becomes the basis for the decision on whether to appoint.
If counsel is appointed, the original motion to vacate is either substituted
or supplemented by pleadings prepared with the assistance of counsel. It
should be noted that a trial court's denial of a request for counsel does
not affect the authority of the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy,
which can provide counsel for indigents at post-conviction proceed-
ings. If a hearing is ordered, the movant normally is entitled to
representation to prepare for and conduct the hearing 7 If an indigent
movant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in the RCr 11.42 motion,
then the trial court should be alert to the potential for conflict of interest
in appointing a public defender from the same office as trial counsel.
However, in any event, the defendant would have the burden to demon-
strate prejudice from any conflict'- which would require a showing that
the outcome of the RCr 11.42 motion would have been different.41 The
better practice involves establishing on the record that the movant, aware
of the possible conflict, intelligently chooses to waive it'4 If no waiver
is obtained, then a public defender from another office or a private
attorney should be appointed 73 Finally, failure to appoint counsel as
required by section 3 1.110, where the movant has raised a material issue
of fact and has submitted a written request as required by RCr 11.42(5),
is harmless error unless prejudice to the movant is shown.474
657 S.W.2d at 237 (holding that request for appointed counsel must be "clear and
unambiguous and contained in the body of the RCr 11.42 motion!).
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.110(2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1992). Under the
authority of Ray v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), the indigent
must be represented on the conviction under which he or she is presently being detained.
The appointment of counsel authorized by § 31.110 is not available where the sentence
has been completely served.
4" Coles v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ky. 1965).
'a Milsap v. Commonwealth, 662 S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (denying
motion to vacate conviction where appellant failed to show counsel's conflict of interest
affected the adequacy of representation).
47 Id.
4 
"Id. at 491.
474 Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Ky. 1984); Allen v. Common-
wealth, 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding denial of appointed counsel
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3. Standards for Pro Se Motions
A motion made pro se is not required to meet the same standards as
a pleading filed by counsel47 Even so, two fundamental threshold
requirements must be met to avoid a summary dismissal of the pro se
motion to vacate. First, the allegations and the supporting facts provided
in the motion to vacate must be specific enough to inform the trial court
of their nature and to allow the Commonwealth an opportunity to
respond.76 Kentucky appellate courts have steadfastly supported this
basic obligation.4' Second, the allegations must be truthful, or else the
motion to vacate judgment may be summarily dismissed and the movant
may be subject to the consequences of contempt of court478 or perju-
ry. 7 Courts may not be required to rely on the allegations of a movant
upon basis that record clearly refuted need for hearing); WAUAM S. HAYNES, KENTUCKY
JU IpRUDECE: CpUMINAL PROCDUR, 449 (1985) (stating that failure to appoint counsel
is reversible error only if movant shows that prejudice resulted from error).
' Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Ky. 1967) (stating that prisoner's
pro se motion was sufficient as it gave court and opposing party notice); see also Case
v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Ky. 1971) (holding that pleadings prepared by
prisoner need not meet the standards for those submitted by legal counsel); Miller v.
Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Ky. 1970) (denying Commonwealth's argument
that allegations did not meet required standards); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 447 S.W.2d
614, 618 (Ky. 1969) (stating that more liberal standards apply to prisoners proceeding pro
so); c Griffith v. Schultz, 609 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Ky. 1980) ("[T]he nature and legal
effect of a pleading will be determined by its substance rather than by mere linguistic
form:).
476 Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d at 360.
47 E.g., King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Ky. 1966) (denying
petitioner's motion because grounds were '!meaningless"); Ringo v. Commonwealth, 391
S.W.2d 392, 392 (Ky. 1965) (explaining that court is entitled to know exactly what
petitioner intends to prove); Oakes v. Gentry, 380 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Ky. 1964) (holding
that petitioner must specify with particularity the grounds of his claim).
,7 As the court in Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d at 360-61, explained:
Courts should not and will not permit a pleader, even though the proceeding be
pro so, to make allegations which he knows or should know are false. Our
system of justice is based on truth, without which it cannot survive. Resort to
untruth is contemptuous. Miller was in contempt and trifling with the court ....
When the trial court discovered that Miller had made material statements in his
motion, which were false, the motion should have been stricken. It was error
on the part of the trial court not to strike the motion and dismiss the proceed-ings.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Burton v. Tartar, 385 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Ky. 1964) (denying
petitioner' motion because it was not filed in good faith), cert denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965).
4 Adkins v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Ky. 1971) (calling for pejury
prosecution for those who knowingly submit false applications); Taylor v. Common-
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with a history of false statements in previous pleadings, and this prior
conduct may be taken into account in dismissing the motion."'
4. Presence of the Movant at Hearings
Not every hearing requires the circuit court to order the personal
presence of the movant, and the movant has no constitutional right to be
present.' Even if material issues of fact are to be decided, the movant
has no right to be present if he or she has nothing to contribute to the
resolution of those issues. The presence of the movant at an evidentiary
hearing is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.4'
In Odewahn v. Ropke, the inmate filed a petition for writ of
mandamus to compel the trial court to order his presence at a preliminary
hearing.4& ' The appellate court rejected the petition, stating:
It is not every filing of an RCr 11.42 motion which will entitle the
movant to appear in person in the court. Only upon those cases wherein
it is determined that counsel should be appointed and a hearing granted
will it be necessary, usually, for the movant to be in court by his own
proper person. Conceivably, other situations could arise where the
personal appearance would be appropriate, but such is not the case at
bar.4"
wealth, 642 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Ky. CL App. 1982) (expressing hope trial court will refer
case to a grand jury for possible perjury indictment, including of 'lay inmate coumser'
who advised appellant and prepared pleadings).
[W]e are now constrained to call to the attention of the Attorney General and
local prosecuting attorneys that sworn allegations in a court proceeding which
are patently false violate our criminal statutes against perjury. We believe it is
likely that the prompt indictment and conviction of such offenders will have a
much greater chilling effect upon the filing of perjured applications than will
the continued summary dismissal of such applications.
Adlns, 471 S.W.2d at 722.
480 Reams v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1975).
4" Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20 (1963) (explaining that although a hearing
was required, it may not be necessary for petitioner to be present); Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1962) (explaining that sometimes facts can be investigated
without prisoner's personal presence); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952)
(holding that prisoner should be produced where there are "substantial issues of fact as
to events in which the prisoner participated").
402 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 21.
- 385 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1964).
4 Id. at 165; accord Nickell v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 651, 652-53 (Ky. 1970);
Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Ky. 1969).
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The same reasoning, yet leading to a different result, may be found
in Hall v. Commonwealth.' Hall charged on appeal that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on his contention that appointed
counsel ha "refused to prepare a defense" because he was not being
compensated, thereby coercing Hall to pleading guilty.' The appellate
court agreed and ordered an evidentiary hearing with Hall in attendance,
noting that "the investigation of the allegations without the personal
presence of the prisoner cannot be appropriately accomplished." In
most cases, however, appellate courts have proved reluctant to grant
petitioning inmates their "desired ambition of a vacation and a trip to the
sentencing court" ' unless need for that presence can be shown or is
apparent from the nature of the allegations. This burden is a modest one
for the movant to meet.
D. Response, Hearing, and Duties of Trial Court
1. Commonwealth's Response
Under RCr 11.42(4), the Commonwealth has twenty days to respond
to an 11.42 motion, but a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
is not a pleading and no written response is required to establish the right
of the Commonwealth to oppose it.4' In Ramsey v. Commonwealth, the
accused argued that the trial court should have accepted the allegations
in the motion to vacate as uncontroverted because the Commonwealth
4" 429 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1968).
46 Id. at 359.
4 7Id. at 360.
4' Nickell, 451 S.W.2d at 652; cf Thomsben-y v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 226,
226 (Ky.) (approving a refusal to allow movant to attend 11.42 hearing), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 868 (1966).
' Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Ky. 1969) (holding that 11.42
allows but does not require the Commonwealth to provide an answer); Roark v.
Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Ky. 1966) (holding that no response was necessary
because motion did not present grounds necessary for relief); Ramsey v. Commonwealth,
399 S.W.2d 473, 4 75 (Ky.) (explaining that no written response is required to oppose a
motion), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 865 (1966); Underhill v. Thomas, 299 S.W.2d 633, 634
(Ky. 1957) (denying petition for writ of coram nobis even though no response was Med
because movant established no relief which should be granted). This approach is in accord
with CR 55.04, which states that "[n]o judgment by default shall be entered against the
Commonwealth... unless the claimant establishes his claim or fight to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the Court." See TERRENCE R. FhiZERAID, 8 KEmUCKY PPACIICE:
CRMwAL PRAC"ICE AND PRoCEDURE 482-83 (1978).
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had not filed an answer!' ° The prosecutor had, however, orally denied
movant's claims, and on appeal, the Kentucky high court upheld the lower
court's judgment in overruling the motionL4 ' Polsgrove v. Common-
wealth was similar, in that the movant contended that the prosecutor's
response to the RCr 11.42 motion was insufficient and that the trial court
erred by not taking his allegations as "confessed" and granting him a new
trial.4 The denial of this contention was affirmed.
49 3
Nor is the movant automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his motion simply because the Commonwealth failed to answer the
allegations.4" This aspect of RCr 11.42 practice and procedure is
presumably governed by section (5), which stipulates that allegations in
the answer are "avoided of record."'495 This formulation is confusing
and seems inconsistent with CR 8.04, which states that "averments in a
pleading to which no responsive pleading is required shall be taken as
denied or avoided."49 It also seems inconsistent with CR 55.04, which
prevents a default judgment from being entered against the Common-
4 399 S.W.2d at 475.
49 Id.
491 439 S.W.2d at 778.
40 Id. at 780.
4 Roark v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Ky. 1966) (holding that where
motion on its face did not present grounds for relief no response was necessary and
overruling motion without a hearing was not error).
' "Affitive allegations contained in the answer shall be treated as controverted
or avoided of record. If the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be
determined onthe face of the record the court shall grant aprompt hearing .... " KY. R.
CIUM P. 11.42(5) (emphasis added). The "answer" to an RCr 11.42 motion is clearly the
reply of the Commonwealth to the inmate's allegations.
As presently written, RCr 11.42(5) seems to conflict with CR 8.04, CR 55.04, and
the basic purpose of "avoided of record" language. It makes no sense to require that the
allegations contained in the answer be "avoided of record." Perhaps the high court wished
to emphasize that the trial court could not rely upon an unproved assertion of fact
provided by the Commonwealth in its answer. (In other words, that the Commonwealth's
answer is not "self-proving" or is not itself "evidence.") If this idea is what the high court
wished to carry out, the court has chosen an ineffective way to communicate it, with
potentially drastic consequences. The Commonwealth should not be allowed to default by
accidentally failing to respond to the motion.
The typical purpose of "avoided of record" rules is to prevent entry of a default
judgment where the moving party, such as an inmate attacking a presumptively valid
conviction, carries the burden. Thus, section (5) should be amended to read: "Affirmative
allegations contained in the motion shall be treated as controverted or avoided of record.
If the motion raises a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the
record the court shall grant a prompt hearing ... 
4
" KY. R. Civ. P. 8.04.
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wealth unless the claim of the other party is proven to the court by
satisfactory evidence.4 Whether the Commonwealth chooses not to
respond or inadvertently does not respond, the merits of the motion
should not be affected because the Commonwealth has no duty to
respond. If no duty to respond is imposed by RCr 11.42, how can the
Commonwealth "default" for failure to perform a duty it never had?
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that the trial court also has the
power, in its sound discretion, to allow the Commonwealth additional
time to file an answer should that be necessary.498
2. Evidentiary Hearing
The trial court, upon receiving a motion to vacate under RCr 11.42,
frequently will be confronted with a motion for an evidentiary hearing.
Initially, the court must decide whether the motion to vacate raises some
material issue of fact which must be resolved in order to dispose of the
movant's claim.4! " Yet it is black letter law in Kentucky that even if
4
9 Id. 55.04.
4- Weigand v. Ropke, 419 S.W.2d 151, 151 (Ky. 1967) (explaining that the court was
within its authority to extend time for filing an answer under 11.42).
4
' Turner v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 13, 13 (Ky.) ("Obviously an evidentiary
hearing (with the appellant present) would serve no purpose when no material issue of
fact was raised by appellant's motion.'), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 888 (1966); Lawson v.
Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 734, 734-35 (Ky.) (holding that trial court's action in
overruling motion was proper because appellant had failed to show that he was entitled
to relief), cer. denied, 381 U.S. 946 (1965); Bell v. Gentry, 380 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky.
1964) (holding that a motion may be overruled when, on its face, it fails to state a
specific ground which would entitle movant to relief).
One such issue which may require a hearing is whether the movant was prejudiced
by a constitutional violation occurring during the trial. In one case where the trial court
had summarily found constitutional error and granted anew trial, the Commonwealth was
held to be entitled to a hearing on the issue of prejudice, and the case was remanded to
the trial court for that purpose. Commonwealth v. Gilpin, 777 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Ky. CL
App. 1989).
The trial court's refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing has been held proper. See,
e.g., Lay v. Commonwealth, 506 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ky. 1974) (holding that where petition
does not state grounds upon which relief may be granted, the petition is properly
dismissed without an evidentiary hearing); Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401
(Ky. 1971) (holding that movant was not entitled to evidentiary hearing because his claim
was refuted by the record); Left v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1970)
(holding that movant was "abundantly" represented by counsel at trial and therefore no
evidentiary hearing was required); Bruner v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky.
1970) (denying movant's petition because it was refuted by record and did not allege any
facts upon which his conclusion was based); Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d
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material factual issues exist, it is "unnecessary for the court to order a
hearing if the material issues of fact can fairly be determined on the face
of the record!" or if the allegations, even if true, would not be
sufficient to invalidate the conviction." No hearing is required where
only a question of law is presented, nor is error committed by refusing
to hold a hearing when the court has no idea what evidence would be
offered.' Only when the movant makes out a claim with "prima facia
substance" is a hearing normally necessary to resolve the issue° 3
153, 154 (Ky. CL App. 1985) (holding that no evidentiary hearing was necessary where
record refited movant's allegations); Allen v. Commonwealth, 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that evidentiary bearing was not warranted after review of record
showed movant's guilty plea had been properly entered); Trice v. Commonwealth, 632
S.W.2d 458, 458 (Ky. CL App. 1982) (holding that evidentiary hearing was not necessary
where appellant's rights were fully protected at trial level).
' Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Ky. 1965) (holding that movant
cannot prevail ifrecord refutes the allegations); accord, e.g., Stanford v. Commonwealth,
854 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. 1993) ("Even in a capital case, an RCr 11.42 movant is not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994);
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Ky. 1990) (explaining that the purpose
of an evidentimy hearing is to determine factual issues which cannot be resolved from the
record), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 140 (1991); Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336,
339 (Ky. 1984) (upholding denial of an evidentiary hearing which would have been
futile); Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1971) (holding that the record
refuted petitioner's claim of an involuntary guilty plea); Messer v. Commonwealth, 454
S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1970) (reaffirming the language and holding inMaggard); Brewster
v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Ky. CL App. 1986) (conceming an actual
prejudice determination on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. CL App. 1986) (confining review, on appeal,
to whether motion's allegations were refuted on record); Robbins v. Commonwealth, 719
S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ky. CL App. 1986) (explaining that allegations in the motion were
conclusively refuted by the record); Allen v. Commonwealth, 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984) (denying an evideatiary hearing where the record refuted appella's
allegations).
50 Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Ky. 1965); cf. Stanflrd, 854
S.W.2d at 743 ('f the record refutes the claims oferror, there is no basis for granting an
RCr 11.42 motion."); Newsome v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1970) ("An
evidentiay hearing is not required ... where the allegations are insufficient").
5 Freeman v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Ky. 1985) (upholding the
denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where record failed to show what
evidence could be offered); Ringo v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 392, 392 (Ky. 1965)
(holding that no hearing is required where motion does not specify how effective
assistance of counsel was denied).
3 Curry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Ky. 1965) (holding that
petitioner's allegations of counsel's refusal to appeal were sufficient to make prima fame
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These restrictions, however, do not mean that hearings in RCr 11.42
proceedings are held infrequently. In fact, just the opposite is true. During
the period immediately preceding the enactment of RCr 11.42, Kentucky's
high court frequently complained of the sparseness of the post-conviction
record before it,5" and it therefore made sure that the Rule would be
adequate to properly develop the record for consideration by the trial
judge and for possible appeal The tradition in handling RCr 11.42
motions is far more conducive to hearings than under the common law
writs, and, indeed, the emphasis on evidentiary hearings is one of the
strongest protections of inmate rights in Kentucky's post-conviction
system.
The propriety of the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing
before dismissal of the pending RCr 11.42 motion is frequently one of the
claims of error on appeal. In general, where the trial court has denied an
RCr 11.42 hearing, the standard on appellate review is "whether the
motion 'on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the
record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.""' If the
motion failed to clear this hurdle, no hearing was necessary and no error
was committed. This result was recently obtained in MacLaughlin v.
Commonwealth, in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals again held that
where the existing record disposes of the movant's claims, no evidentiary
hearing is necessary.' Nor does the trial court abuse its discretion by
refusing to continue an RCr 11.42 hearing so the defendant can secure
out-of-state witnesses through the compulsory process provided by
section 421.250 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 7 While available
at trial, section 421.250 "is not applicable to an RCr 11.42
proceeding. , 508
case entitling him to evidentiary hearing).
' See, e.g., Barber v. Thomas, 355 S.W.2d 682, 682 (Ky. 1962); Tippit v. Thomas,
355 S.W.2d 149, 149 (Ky. 1962). The Kentucky Supreme Court has emphasized that trial
courts should "generally" hold evidentiary hearings to determine material issues of fact
Stanford, 854 S.W.2d at 744 (holding that, under the facts of the case, the trial court did
not er by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing).
' Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting
from Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)); accord Robbins v.
Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
717 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.250 (MJichie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994).
... McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 702 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order compulsory attendance of out-of-state
witness), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987); accord Gaily. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d
37, 45 (Ky. 1985) (finding that the denial of a continuance to allow petitioner to secure
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3. Duties of Trial Court and Appellate Court
Initially, the trial judge should determine whether the motion has
been filed in the proper court. If it has not, then the motion should be
transmitted to the sentencing court as required by RCr 11.42(9). The
court should also confirm that the motion is signed and verified, and the
record should be examined to ascertain whether a hearing is required.'
The requirement that the motion be signed and verified is jurisdictional
in nature, and the trial court does not have the power to review a motion
in violation of this requirement."' If an RCr 11.42 motion is filed but
the movant's present status does not allow application for reliet then the
trial court may apparently still reach the merits of the claims by treating
the motion as one filed under CR 60.02." Under some circumstances
the trial judge may be required to recuse himself or herself, but this
situation is rare,' and the defendant must raise the issue before the
RCr 11.42 motion is decided in order to apprise the judge of the possible
conflict.
13
The further duties of the trial court; aside from the appropriate
appointment of counsel, are found in RCr 11.42(6): "At the conclusion
of the hearing or hearings the court shall make findings determinative of
the material issues of fact and enter a final order accordingly." Speqiflc
written findings disposing of every ground or claim are required.
514
out-of-state witness was not abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).KY. R. CAL P. 11.42(2), (5).
510 See supra notes 436-39 and accompanying text.
.. Keltee v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Ky. 1983) (explaining that KY.
R. CR5L P. 11.42 motion filed after movant had completed his sentence could be treated
as KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion).
McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ky. 1970) (holding that
rocusal was not warranted although judge had been prosecutor on movant's first trial and
conviction and trial judge at second trial and conviction); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399
S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1966) (involving trial judge on post-conviction motion who was
fomaer Commonwealth's Attorney).
513 Commonwealth v. Carter, 701 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Ky. 1985).
14 Schroader v. Thomas, 387 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ky. 1964), overruled on other
grounds by Lycans v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1974). In dicta, the
Kentucky high court has indicated that 'facts and cirmmstances" which are not found in
the record may not appear in the court's order. Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601,
602 (Ky. 1965).
In another case containing some unfortunate dicta, the Kentucky Supreme Court
improperly interpreted RCr 11.42(6), which requires findings to be made "[a]t the
conclusion of the hearing or hearings." The high court stated this meant that "[i]f there
is no hearing, then no findings are required." Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d
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Although these requirements are mandatory for the court to follow, they are
not due process guarantees for the movant, and the failure of a trial court to
make findings is not by itself reversible error 15 If the trial court fails to
make specific findings, then it is incumbent upon the movant to request such
findings under CR 52.04, which is applicable to RCr 11.42 proceedings.5
Defects in the findings can therefore be waived5 7 This position found in
case law was confirmed in the 1994 Amendment to RCr 11.42(6), which
requires a written request or motion to preserve as error the failure to make
important findings or to include them in the final order. 18
An important function of the trial court at any evidentiary hearing is to
observe the witnesses and resolve issues of credibility and conflicting
evidence,519 as the trial judge is in a superior position to perform this
task."' However, an older published decision implies that the court should
not rely upon independent recollection of the movants trial or guilty plea in
deciding RCr 11.42 evidentiary issues' Another issue which is frequently
742, 744 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994). Where only conclusions of law
are necessary, the statement is true enough, but it is otherwise misleading. The trial court
should issue specific written findings even though the contested issues of fact may be
resolved based upon the available record.
-1' "A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded because of the failure of the
trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written request .... " KY. P_ Civ.
P. 52.04.
516 id.
517 Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that trial court's failure to make finding on a particular issue did not constitute
reversible enor since no specific request was made as required by KY. R. Civ. P. 52.04);
accord Lynch v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Ky. CL App. 1981).
. KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(6) (1994).
-"9 McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the
trial court has the right to resolve credibility issue against appellant), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1059 (1987).
Id.; Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978).
'
2 As the court in Lawson v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Ky.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 946 (1965), explained.
In passing, it is observed that the trial judge who presided at the rape trial
and who overruled the RCr 11.42 motion (without a hearing) incorporated in
the order a recitation that appellant's counsel at the rape trial had rendered
effective assistance, resulting in a light sentence. Although this may well be
quite true, we doubt the propriety of an ex pane finding based upm the
independent recollection of the presiding judge, and we do not base our present
holding upon that portion of the record.
Contra Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977) (holding that trial judge's
"recollection of the events at issue may enable him summarily to dismiss a [Title 28
U.S.C.] section 2255 [post-conviction] motion"); Triplett v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d
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raised in death penalty cases concerns the provision of funds for expert
witnesses at the RCr 11.42 hearing; this matter is in the sound discretion
of the trial court.'
The trial court may summarily dismiss an RCr 11.42 motion, thereby
obviating the need for an evidentiary hearing. Assuming the motion is
properly filed in the first place, summary dismissal is mandated on
occasions when the allegations lack specificity,' are mere conclu-
sions,' are untme, fail to constitute a ground for relief526 are
refuted by the record,527 were set forth in an earlier motion to vacate,
or were waived by a valid guilty plea.' The motion may also be
dismissed after an evidentiary hearing, or, if relief is to be granted, the
court "shall vacate the judgment and discharge, resentence, or grant him
a new trial, or correct the sentence as may be appropriate."' In all
cases, however, the "nature of the proceeding under RCr 11.42 is such
that the circuit court should expedite disposition of the motion," and
where "a hearing is required, it should be 'prompt.""'3
After the court has ruled, the movant is notified by the receipt of a
copy of the order, which begins the running of the ten days allowed to
file a notice of appeal"3 An appeal by either side is specifically
944, 946 (Ky. 1969) (denying hearing on bases that appellant's allegation was reftined by
the record and that judge on 11.42 motion was trial judge who know what had transpired).
2 McQueen, 721 S.W.2d at 702.
2 See supra notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 430-32 and accompanying text.
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Ky. 1971) ("Claims based upon
allegations which are blatantly false cannot be tolerated."); see supra notes 478-80 and
accompanying text
' Many claims simply fall outside the type of allegation RCr 11.42 was designed to
handle. A good example is Hargrove v. Commonwealth 396 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1965),
in which the ground raised was that the defendants were 'not guilty." Such a claim is not
a ground for relief under RCr 11.42. See sopra notes 421-23 and accompanying text.
'
27 Allen v. Commonwealth, 668 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) ("The record
refutes in every way the appellant's allegations in his motion to vacate judgment."); Trice
v. Commonwealth, 632 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that no hearing was
rqired since the record rebutted movant's claim); see supra notes 500-06 and
accompanying text.
See infra notes 794-805 and accompanying text.
KY. R. CTUM P. 11.42(6).
530 Helton v. Stivers, 385 S.W.2d 172, 172 (Ky. 1964) (stating that delay is not in the
best interest of the administration of justice); accord FITGERALD, sulpra note 489, at 483
n.63.
" KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.04; Kraus v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 162, 162 (Ky. 1964)
(indicating that trial courts have been lax in notifying movants of the status of their
motions, thus affecting the right of appeal); cf. Peiry v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 689,
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allowed by RCr 11.42(7). The movant is restricted to raising on appeal
only those issues presented in the original motion.' Under RCr
11.42(8), the order of the circuit court disposing of the issues presented
cannot become effective until the time to file a notice of appeal under
RCr 12.04 has expired and shall remain suspended until any RCr 11.42
appeal has concluded. 33 Mandamus will lie to compel the circuit court
to provide a transcript of the RCr 11.42 proceedings for appeal purpos-
es. 4 Where an RCr 11.42 motion is summarily overruled, appellate
review is limited to whether the motion states grounds which are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would render the
judgment of conviction void.535 The trial court's factual findings will
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.Im In at least one
case, the appellate court, faced with an inconclusive post-conviction and
trial record, deemed the mishandling of the guilty plea and the RCr 11.42
proceeding so severe that it reversed and ordered a new trial rather than
remanding for an evidentiary hearing, the normal remedy where the
record is unclear. 37
690 (Ky. 1964) (holding that appeal filed beyond 10-day deadline was properly
dismissed).
532 Russell v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1971) (rejecting petitioner's
arguments which were not raised at trial level); Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 784,
785-86 (Ky. 1965) (denying appellant an opportunity to raise issue of ineffective counsel
for first time on KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 appeal), cert. demied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966);
Kinmon v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. 1964) (refusing to consider
grounds which were not presented to trial court).
53' Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Ky. 1967). However, RCr
11.42(8) suspends the order of the trial court only pending the outcome of an RCr 11.42
appeal, not a direct appeal. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1988).
' Vanhoose v. Sparks, 410 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Ky. 1967) (granting petition for
mandamus and ordering circuit court judge to file a record of KY. R. CIM P. 11.42
proceeding with Court of Appeals and to forward a copy of same to petitioner); Brummett
v. Knuckles, 409 S.W.2d 807, 807 (Ky. 1966) (ordering circuit court judge to forward
record of petitioner's KY. R. CIUM P. 11.42 motion to vacate judgment to Court of
Appeals and to petitioner at no cost); Davis v. Knuckles, 407 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Ky. 1966)
(holding that petitioner was entitled to record of KY. R. CraM. P. 11.42 proceeding).
3 Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967) (explaining that review
is confined to face of motion); Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Ky.
1966) (directing court's review to grounds of motion).
3 Adams v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. 1968) (noting that the trial
court is in better position to view witnesses); Bell v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 784,
785 (Ky. 1965) (holding that the trial court's factual determinations would not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous), cert. deied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966).
'31 Scott v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 623, 626-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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Finally, where the trial court has ruled on the motion, the defendant
cannot normally expect to reopen the proceedings. In Crockett v.
Commonwealth, the Kentucky high court held that the failure to reopen
proceedings based on an affidavit produced' after the motion had been
overruled was not an abuse of discretion." Citing the "need for
finality" in post-conviction proceedings, the opinion made clear that the
court would not "ignore this need and allow the accused to reopen any
time he is able to conjure up a new contention for relief."'539 The court
noted that "[t]o do so would destroy the intent and purpose of RCr
11.42(3)," which is to have all claims presented in one proceeding.'
E. Mandamus and Reopening of RCr 11.42 Proceedings
The purpose of RCr 11.42 is to provide an orderly mechanism for the
resohtion of post-conviction claims. The Rule itself does not provide a
time frame within which the trial court must rule on the motion or
otherwise take action,"' and in the event of unnecessary delay, movants
have learned to file an original action in the Kentucky Court of Appeals
to compel the trial court to rule on the pending motion. 2 The original
action is brought under CR 76.36 as a substitute for the common law writ
of mandamus, but in practice these pleadings are often styled or referred
to as petitions for writ of mandamus. The large volume of pro se
mandamus actions has led the Kentucky Administrative Office of the
Courts to prepare a one-page "check-off form" through which the trial
court can respond and explain the delay;, the court must respond to the
- 473 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Ky. 1971).
n- Id. at 114.
No Id.
" Davis v. Knuckles, 469 S.W.2d 702, 702 (Ky. 1971) (holding that trial court's oe-
month delay in deciding case would not warrant mandamus).
" An original action to compel a trial court to rule on a post-conviction motion to
vacate may be brought only in the Kentucky Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate
court. Williams v. Venters, 550 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Ky. 1977); see also Francis v. Taylor,
593 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Ky. 1980) (holding that Kentucky Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction to entertain and issue writ of mandamus). Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
1.030(3) provides that the "Court of Appeals may administer oaths, punish contempts, and
issue necessary orders to give control over lower courts."
For early views of mandamus and prohibition in Kentucky, see George R. Hunt,
Control oflInferior by Superior Jurisdictons by Proper Writs, 11 KY. L.. 10 (1922-1923)
(discussing power of Kentucky Court of Appeals, under the state constitution, to issue
writs); Squire N. Williams, Jr., The Ancient Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, 26 Ky.
ST. B.J. 262 (1962) (tracing origins of writs of mandamus and prohibition).
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petition within ten days or the allegations are taken as confessed. 3 The
results of these actions depend upon the ficts and circumstances of each
case.' After notice of appeal has been filed, an original action or
mandamus may be used to obtain from the trial court a record of
movant's RCr 11.42 proceedings in order to perfect an appeal from the
overruled motion. 5
VL RECENT AND PROPOSED MEASURES FOR REFORM
The root causes of the problems identified and mitigated by many of
the reform proposals which follow have been evident from the beginning
of Kentucky's experiment with RCr 11.42 and stem directly from the
historic and procedural nature of the post-conviction process. In the years
since the Rule's enactment, the workload imposed by post-conviction
motion practice has increased substantially, but with very little critical
thinking about what is being accomplished. Clearly, part of the problem
is the sheer number of post-conviction motions. As early as 1964 the
Kentucky high court, which at that time had to hear all RCr 11.42
appeals, vented its frustrations with post-conviction practice:
The flood of baseless and meritless proceedings filed by indigent
prisoners has reached alarming proportions .... While the preparation
by indigent prisoners of proceedings of the type here considered may
be deemed to have certain therapeutic and rehabilitative benefits to a
prisoner, such benefits are accomplished at the expense of the courts,
' Davis v. Knuckles, 407 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Ky. 1966) (ruling that because no
response had been filed to petitioner's motion, its allegations would be treated as
confessed); Stacy v. Turner, 407 S.W.2d 131, 131 (Ky. 1966) (holding that no response
leaves allegations as confessed); Wahl v. Simpson, 385 S.W.2d 171, 171 (Ky. 1964)
(holding that allegations stood confessed since no response had been filed within 10
days).
" See Davis v. Knuckles, 469 S.W.2d 702, 702 (Ky. 1971) (holding that no
mandamus would lie as a result of a one-month delay); Moore v. Pound, 390 S.W.2d 159,
159 (Ky. 1965) (granting mandamus ordering judge to take action on prisoner's KY. PR
CIUM. P. 11.42 motion filed five weeks earlier); Collier v. Conley, 386 S.W.2d 270, 271
(Ky. 1965) (holding that mandamus would be granted after three-month delay); Helton
v. Stivers, 385 S.W.2d 172, 172 (Ky. 1964) (granting mandamus on four-month delay);
Flatt v. Wilson, 385 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1964) (granting mandamus on five-month
delay); Wahl, 385 S.W.2d at 171 (granting mandamus on five-month delay).
" Davis v. Knuckles, 407 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Ky. 1966); Davenport v. Winn, 385
S.W.2d 185, 186 (Ky. 1964).
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court personnel, litigants, and attorneys who have to prepare such
records, counsel such prisoners, and consider such cases.6
A similar observation was made by Justice John S. Palmore in Coles v.
Commonwealth: "The situation is not of our choosing, but is thrust on us
by the new look in federal constitutional rights. The alternative is a
plethora of new trials in old cases, starting from scratch." 7
Volume, however, is only one of the aspects to be considered. The
overarching concern in the administration of any criminal justice system
must, of course, be substantive justice for the defendant. This goal must,
in turn, be reconciled with the important doctrine of "finality" which
requires that criminal litigation, at some point, be brought to a
conclusion. The government has a vested interest in determining when
and how finality is achieved. All states have in place constitutional
provisions, statutes, rules of procedure, and common law doctrines
which limit the scope and unber of proceedings which may be brought
before their courts. In the context of a criminal case, the state
his an obvious interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation and in
achieving a final judicial determination of guilt. Both state59  and
Bauer v. Pound, 385 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Ky. 1964) (denying petitioner's request for
copies of trial records absent a basis for the claim that judgment under attack was void).
386 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ky. 1965).
a See infra notes 568-80 and accompanying text.
Considerations of finality have been approved in a variety of situations of
relevance to RCr 11.42:
Relief Under CR 60.02 - Merrifield v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Ky.
1955) (restricting application of writ of comm nobis in order to preserve finality of
judgments); Wine v. Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting
changes in family circumstnces as grounds for relief, because otherwise "great
uncertainty would arise surrounding the finality of judgments").
Acquittal on Criminal Charges - Davis v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Ky.
1978) (citing Brown v. United States, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)) (holding that double
jeopardy is a constitutional policy of finality which benefits the acquitted defendant).
Criminal Judgments - See, e.g., Goins v. Meade, 528 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Ky. 1975)
(' To adopt the petitioner's abstract argument would encourage the waste of public money
and delay finality in the disposition of criminal cases to the detriment of the affected
defendant and society which deserves protection. ), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 972 (1976);
Hord v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Ky. 1970) ("Judgments in criminal cases,
as in civil cases, must by necessity have some finality."); Gossett v. Commonwealth, 441
S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1969) (stating that there must be an end to litigation); Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968) ("[Tihis court absolutely will not turn
back the clock and retry these cases in an effort to second guess what counsel should
have or should not have done at the time. To follow such proceeding would be to deprive
the judgments of our courts of any finality."); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d
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federaP5 courts have expressed in strong language the importance of
finality as related to reviewing criminal judgments, compelling litigants
in criminal cases to advance their claims in an orderly fashion, and
focusing the judicial inquiry on a limited number of proceedings. The
common law requirement that the appellant must raise all possible issues
on direct appeal or else waive them is an obvious example. As the
Kentucky high court stated in 1963, errors are often "committed during
the course of a trial and unless there is a restriction upon the method and
time in which these errors are suggested and corrected, a chaotic situation
would result. Few judgments would ever achieve finality."55'
Finality is also an important consideration supporting the requirement
of contemporaneous objection for challenges to trial procedures5  and
in harmless error analysis." The doctrine of finality recognizes that, in
many cases, inmates are less concerned with vindicating abstract
constitutional rights than with "getting out." Once an inmate makes
parole, state post-conviction motions are usually not pursued. However,
if parole is revoked after the passage of years and the service of the prior
701, 704 (Ky. 1964) (Montgomery, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over lack of
finality created by allowing unlimited appeals under KY. R. CNM. P. 11.42); Howard v.
Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. 1963) (noting that, without reasonable
restrictions promoting finality, "a chaotic situation would resultf); Merrfield, 283 S.W.2d
at 215 (noting that depriving criminal judgments of finality would be a "greater evil than
would flow from rare cases of possible injustice"); Keller v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d
5, 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that principle of finality does not prevent judge from
rejecting plea to lesser offense); Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Ky. CL
App. 1982); Polk v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Goins to deny petitioner trial transcript).
'-' See, e.g., United States v. Thmmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Every inroad on the concept of finality underines confidence in the
integrity of our procedures; and, by incrsing the volume of judicial work, inevitably
delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.") (quoting with approval from
United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1971)).
... Howard, 364 S.W.2d at 810; accord Lewallen v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.2d 748,
749 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (involving attack on guilty plea under KY. R. Civ. P. 60.02).
2 Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 922, 927-28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) ("When
a defendant's attorney is aware of an issue and elects to raise no objection, the attorney's
failure to object may constitute a waiver of an error having constitutional implications.").
'n As stated in Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Ky. CL App.
1977), an error claimed in an RCr 11.42 motion
must be of such magnitude as to render the judgment of conviction so
findamentally unfair that the defendant can be said to have been denied due
process of law. The interest of the public in the finality of criminal judgments
of long standing weighs heavily in the determination when the error is relatively
minor.
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sentence is resumed, then the inmate often jumps back into litigation of
his or her claim.s
Can finality be reconciled with substantive justice? It can when
measures are taken to limit frivolous and wasteful practices without
substantially impacting meritorious allegations. Without reasonable rules
of procedure, the litigation of claims would follow the schedule and whim
of the criminal defendant, which would amount to an intolerable and
unnecessary extravagance. Already in effect are a number of procedural
"gatekeeping' rules which still allow, or even enhance, an opportunity for
inmate litigants to bring meritorious claims before the courts. 5' No
system will ever be devised to immediately and perfectly adjudicate all
claims in one court. Nonetheless, immediate measures exist which the
Kentucky Supreme Court could adopt to improve the fairness, efficiency,
and economy of the present post-conviction process.
Two such measures, already mentioned, have recently been adopted
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in its 1994 Amendment to the Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure.5' Effective October 1, 1994, the court
imposed a three-year time limit for filing under RCr 11.42 unless certain
specific exceptions are met 5 The same amendment also recognized
the defense of laches.5' As demonstrated below, the 1994 Amendment
will go far in preventing stale claims and in reducing the burden on the
criminal justice system, while imposing no cost upon the diligent
prisoner.
'-" As the court explained in Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky.
1983):
As is true in so many of this type of case, an appellant finds no fault with his
initial or earlier criminal proceedings but when he is released from confinement
and continues his life of illegal activities with its attendant persistent felony
offender charge, then, and only then, does it occur that the accused has been
denied due process.
This view is supported by U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Henry J. Friendly, who wrote:
"[My impression is that prisoners unsuccessful in their post-conviction applications
through the state hierarchy almost inevitably have a go at federal habeas, save when their
sentences have expired." Friendly, Collateral Attack, supra note 100, at 168.
"' In addition to RCr 11.42, prisoners may seek relief under RCr 10.02 (motion for
new trial), CR 60.02 (motion to set aside on grounds of mistake, new evidence, or fiaud),
and CR 73.01 (appeal).
s- The 1994 Amendment, supra note 358.
s Id.
s Id. Both of these changes were advocated by the author in the original draft of this
article as submitted for publication, their adoption has necessitated a hasty rewrite of
these sections, a task the author was pleased to perform.
1994-951
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
A. The 1994 Reform Amendment
1. Time Limitation
Kentucky has now adopted a three-year time limit for filing under
RCr 11.42.' The period for filing begins to run from the date of
judgment of conviction or, if the conviction is appealed, from the date
when the opinion affirming the judgment on direct appeal becomes final
Absent a showing either of the existence of previously unknown facts
material to the claim and not previously discoverable through due
diligence or that the constitutional right upon which the movant's claim
is based was not established within the time scheme and is to be applied
retroactively, claims not filed within this period are considered to have
been waived.' According to the current version of RCr 11.42(10):
(10) any motion under this rule shall be filed within three years
after the judgment becomes final, unless the motion alleges and the
movant proves either.
(a) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the movant and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(b) that the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not
established within the period provided for herein and has been held
to apply retroactively.
If the judgment becomes final before the effective date of this rule
[October 1, 1994], the time for filing the motion shall commence upon
the effective date of this rule. If the motion qualifies under one of the
foregoing exceptions to the three-year time limit, the motion shall be
filed within three years after the event establishing the exception
occurred.561
Thus, for older cases where finality has already been achieved, the
three-year period began on October 1, 1994, while a motion proceeding
o The 1994 Amendment, mupra note 358.
SId.
561 Id. It should be noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court forgot to remove the
provision allowing an RCr 11.42 motion to be filed "at any time" from RCr 11.42(1), thus
putting that section in seeming conflict with new section (10). In reality, of course, the
section which is more specific and more recent in time should control - especially since
what the Kentucky Supreme Court wished to accomplish with the change is obvious. The
"at any time" provision of RCr 11.41(1) is now meaningless.
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under an exception establishes its own "statute of limitation!' based upon
the date of the event creating the exception. The most obvious example
of such an event would be the rendition date of a U.S. Supreme Court
decision which retroactively applies a recently established constitutional
right.
The use of an express limitation as a restriction on the time available
for filing a post-conviction attack is well-established. As stated by the
U.S. Supreme Court: "A state's interest in regulating the workload of its
courts and determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated
certainly suffices to give it legislative jurisdiction to control the remedies
available in its courts by imposing statutes of limitation." Numerous
justifications exist for restricting the ability of the convicted party to
control the pace of litigation.
First, the remedy provided by RCr 11.42 is written in the broadest
possible terms, and the petitioner has the benefit of hindsight in bringing
claims.' Second, as a matter of fairness, claims should be advanced
and decided in the most expeditious manner possible. The court in Adams
v. Commonwealth aptly justified the defendant's burden in this regard:
"Justice is not denied by requiring an indigent defendant to bestir himself
to some extent to protect his rights and remedies."' Third, even the
simplest case in Kentucky takes from two to three years to traverse the
entire state/federal system. In fact, prior to the 1994 Amendment, a
relatively simple case could drag on for decades. The passage of
excessive amounts of time is virtually meaningless to the defendant who
has a lengthy sentence but is on parole; however, the delay is particularly
onerous to the state because, if the case is eventually reversed, retrial
becomes increasingly unlikely with the passage of time. 5 Of course,
'a Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (holding that the Constitution
does not bar application of forum state's statute of limitations to claims governed by
substantive law of different state); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) (holding
that the Constitution allows state time limitations on presentation of claims).
' For example, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are readily subject to
aIter-te-fact conjecture or, since only two parties were participants inmost conversations,
to m or outright falsehood. Courts have made similar observations. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Ky. 1969) ("Manifestly, it is
rather easy, inretrospect to suggest that some other course or tactic would have produced
different or better results. The difficulty is that there is no assurance that different results
would have been reached even if the newly-suggested tactics had been pursued"), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 956 (1970).
56 551 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (affirming trial court's decision that
petitioner waived right to appeal by remaining silent after being informed of fights).
o See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988)
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where probation or parole was denied, the defendant also wants to be
released and might push his or her case through to conclusion as rapidly
as possible. However, many serious offenders are already serving lengthy
sentences either in Kentucky or in other states (with detainers to return
the out-of-state offenders to Kentucky to begin service on their Kentucky
convictions as soon as the sentences in the other jurisdictions are served).
For both of these types of inmates, there is no penalty for delay. Finally,
the 1994 Amendment limiting the time to file contains explicit exceptions
to extend the period allowed for filing, thereby helping to prevent a
litigant from being unfairly penalized.'"
One advantage of establishing a mandatory period for filing is that it
allows post-conviction records to be developed in a more timely manner.
Previously, many claims arose out of cases in which one or more of the
(noting that it is best to dispose of collateral attacks promptly, before memories of events
fade, because a new trial might result). A common expedient is to allow the defendant
whose conviction has been reversed in a post-conviction proceeding to plead out to time
served. This decision is dictated by individual circumstances and is most likely to be
utilized where the defendant's time served is approaching his parole eligibility on the
sentence initially imposed. See FRANK, supra note 260, at 71 (noting that the difficulty
in retrying stale case often leads to misdemeanor or "time served" plea). This situation
is more likely to occur where no time limit on filing is imposed.
In 1986, Kentucky Court of Appeals Judge Anthony M. Wilhoit studied the
disposition of 77 cases remanded to circuit court for retrial in 1983 and 1984. Anthony
M. Wilhoit, A Study of the Kentucky Criminal Justice System Through Appellate Court
Opinions 24-26 (1986) (unpublished thesis, graduate program for judges, University of
Virginia School of Law) (on file with author). Guilty pleas resolved 32% of these cases,
withthe defendants receiving more favorable outcomes than those from the original trials.
In those cases which were retried, the defendant usually received a lesser sentence; one
defendant was acquitted. Dismissal resulted in 26% of the cases, presumably because
retrial was difficult or impossible, or because the defendant was already serving time on
other, more serious charges. The remaining cases were unresolved at the time of the
study, but since no action had been taken on most of them they were considered "de facto
dismissals." Id.
The result is that in "better than one of every three cases remanded for retrial
nothing further is done to the defendant ...." Id. As Judge Wilhoit concluded, these
figures support "the 'gut feeling' of most people that a defendant who successfully appeals
his conviction is treated much more leniently than originally." Id. Naturally, exceptions
occur. In Bruce v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Ky. 1971), the defendant's 1966
conviction for first-degree rape, carrying a 12-year sentence, was reversed because of an
illegal search and seizure. The defendant was retried in 1968, convicted, and sentenced
to life in prison without parole. Id.
' This approach is identical to that controlling the defendant's claim of the right to
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Demands of finality support the
provision of RCr 10.06(1) that a motion on this ground must be made within one year of
the entry of judgment except for good cause.
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necessary participants - prosecutor, public defender, court reporter,
judge - had died or had become otherwise unavailable.1 The time
limitation should result in an economic benefit to the Commonwealth,
since assistant public advocates, assistant attorneys general, and judges of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals or justices of the Kentucky Supreme
Court will not have to sort through stale claims. Moreover, fewer
frivolous claims should occur because inmates will be less likely to rely
on the hope that they will benefit from faded memories, lost transcripts,
or untimely deaths. In sum, the advantages of moving post-conviction
proceedings along shortly after the conclusion of trial or direct appeal are
substantial
Other states have successfully adopted similar approaches. In 1989,
Arkansas adopted rules of court requiring ineffective assistance of counsel
claims to be raised within thirty days of judgment and imposing a three-
year time period for the filing of post-conviction claims. After fifteen
months of study and comment by the bench and bar, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reduced the post-conviction time for filing from three
years to "ninety days in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty or did
not elect to appeal and sixty days where an appeal was taken."' The
Missouri Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of its thirty-
and ninety-day time limits on the filing of post-conviction claims.'
' See, e.g., Crockett v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Ky. 1971) (explaining
that Commonwealth's Attorney had died in the period between petitioner's conviction and
the filing of his KY. R. CRM P. 11.42 motion 15 years later); Warner v. Commonwealth,
385 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky. 1964) (explaining that defendant's chief attorney had passed away
before petitioner's KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 action 15 years later).
In re Post-Conviction Procedures, 797 S.W.2d 458, 458 (Ark. 1990) (explaining
that the 90-day time limit for post-conviction relief motions adequately protects
defendants' constitutional rights); In re Reinstatement of Rule 37, 797 S.W.2d 458, 459
(Ark. 1990); see ARx. CODE ANN., CT. R. CRiM. P. § 37.2 (Michie 1994). The Eighth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the Arkansas time limit under a former version of
the rule. Williams v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir.) (holding failure to comply
with Arkansas statute of limitation for filing post-conviction claim to be a procedural
default requiring dismissal of federal habeas corpus petition), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942
(1989).
" Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Mo.) (holding that defendants' failure to
file petitions for relief before deadline constituted waiver), cert. denied, Walker v.
Missouri, 493 U.S. 866 (1989); see Mo. R. CsIM. P. § 24.035(b) (providing that, for
judgments rendered after guilty plea, the time to file expires 90 days "after the movant
is delivered to the custody of the department of corrections"); id. § 29.15(b) (providing
that, for judgments rendered after trial, the time to file expires 30 days after the filing of
the transcript on direct appeal or 90 days after delivery to the department of conections
if no appeal is taken).
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New Jersey," Florida,7' Mississippi," Washington, 3  Oregon,"4
and Wyomings"5 have similar limitations. In 1986, the legislature in
Tennessee added a three-year statute of limitations to the Tennessee Post-
Conviction Procedure Act 6 Iowas three-year statute of limitations has
also been held constitutional!' Some states, like Colorado, allow actions
to be brought after the statute of limitations has run, if there has been a
showing of "justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.": 8 The statute of
' N.J.R. § 3:22-12; United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 439-40
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding that failure to file within New Jersey's five-year time limit
constituted a procedural default for federal habeas corpus purposes).
" .RA. IL CIM. P. 3.850(b) (mandating a two-year limitation on filing after the
judgment becomes final except in certain circumstances). This statute of limitations has
also been recognized by the federal courts. Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1266-67
(11th Cir.) (holding that unexcused failure to file within the time period constituted a
procedural default), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 834 (1990).
'
7 Part of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act bars filing
collateral relief actions after three years. Miss. CODE AN. §§ 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 1993).
This provision was upheld as constitutional in Cole v. State, 608 So. 2d 1313, 1319
(Miss. 1992).
' In Washington, a one-year deadline for filing, see WASH. REV. CODE §
10.73.090(1) (1990), was determined to be constitutional in Petition of Runyan, 853 P.2d
424, 431 (Wash. 1993).
' The Oregon Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as amended, contains a two-year statute
of limitations on post-conviction filings. OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510(2) (1993). A prior
version of the statute, allowing only 120 days for filing, was held constitutional in Bartz
v. State of Oregon, 839 P.2d 217, 225-26 (Or. 1992).
' Wyoming provides that post-conviction actions are barred ifnot commenced within
five years of conviction, unless the defendant can show that the delay was not due to
neglect. WYo. STAT. § 7-14-101(c) (1987).
57" TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102 (1990) (providing that "[a] prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief under this
chapter within three (3) years of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate
court to which an appeal is taken or consideration of such petition shall be barred").
Although a Tennessee court found this statute "complies with the requirements of the
United States and Tennessee constitutions," the court ruled its application in specific cases
may deprive a person of due process. Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn.
1992).
" Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Iowa 1989); see IOWA CODE § 822.3(1993).( The court in People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345, 354 (Colo. 1983), found Colorado's
statute of limitations to be violative of due process because it contained no exception for
default resulting from "justifiable excuse or excusable neglect." The Colorado legislature
then amended the statute to allow belated claims upon a showing of 'Justifiable excuse
or excusable neglect." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-402(2)(d) (West 1986).
However, the position of the Colorado appellate court is a minority one, and the fact
that the Kentucky provision does not include a similar "escape clause" does not affect its
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limitations imposed by the Illinois legislature has been in existence since
at least 1963, and its history is instructive. Although it began as a
five-year limitation on filing, it was lengthened in 1965, at the height of
federal habeas corpus review of state prisoner convictions, to twenty
years. The statutory period was reduced to ten years in 1984 and reduced
again in 1992 to three years from the date of conviction or six months
after denial of leave to appeal, or to the later of six months after a final
opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court or six months after denial of
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court."' Kentucky now has joined these
states in imposing a reasonable limitation on stale claims brought forward
in RCr 11.42 motions.
2. Laches
The 1994 Amendment makes a further advance by expressly
recognizing, as the federal courts have done, the doctrine of "laches. '
constitutionality. In the unlikely event that an inmate, through no fault of his own, truly
could not comply with the three-year limit, CR 60.02 remains available. This provision
allows vacation of the judgment "within a reasonable time' for "any other reason of an
extraordinaiy nature justifying relief." CR 60.02(f).
' ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/122-1 (1944) (historical and statutory notes).
SId
S1The doctrine of laches is recognized in the federal rules regarding federal post-
conviction proceedings for both state and federal prisoners. See RULES GOVERNING §
2254 CASES, Rule 9(a) 28 U.S.C. fol. § 2254 (1987); RULES GOVERNING § 2255
PROCEEDIns, Rule 9(a) 28 U.S.C. fol. § 2255 (1988). It is also commonly recognized
in federal courts. YACKLE, supra note 23, § 114 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Rule 9(a) regarding § 2254 cases states:
(a) Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the
state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it
is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise
of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state
occurred.
Thos, the doctrine of laches is applicable to protect state court convictions at the federal
level. Note, however, that the use of habeas laches at the federal level does not apply if
the delay simply hinders or prevents effective rei'al should the petitioner be successful
Vasquez v. Hilleiy, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (holding that states cannot rely on
difficulties in retrial alone to defeat petition for habeas corpus).
Nonetheless, Rule 9(a) is useful. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has relied upon
it onmore than one occasion to bar stale claims. See, e.g., Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115,
118-19 (6th Cir. 1982) (11-year delay), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); Ford v.
Superintendent, 687 F.2d 870, 872 (6th Cir. 1982) (14-year delay), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1216 (1983). The American Bar Association has suggested the use of a flexible rule such
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The use of laches in post-conviction proceedings is an equitable defense
based on the premise that it is unfair for petitioners or movants to profit
from delay and gain an advantage by prejudicing the defending party's
ability to respond to the allegation.' Since finding expression in early
cases, the importance of laches in post-conviction relief has been broadly
recognized, increasing the movant's burden of proof on stale claims'
The final sentence of the 1994 Amendment creating new section (10)
reads as follows:
Nothing in this section shall preclude the Commonwealth from
relying upon the defense of laches to bar a motion upon the ground of
unreasonable delay in filing when the delay has prejudiced the
Commonwealth's opportunity to present relevant evidence to contradict
or impeach the movant's evidence.
Prior to this amendment, Kentucky's approach to allowing the Common-
wealth a laches defense in RCr 11.42 proceedings was half-hearted and
uncertain, despite notable instances of prisoner abuse.' A recent
opinion of the majority of a Kentucky Court of Appeals panel in Hayes
v. Commonwealth apparently established laches as a defense.' Howev-
er, amending the Rule was a better alternative. Inmate litigants are now
as laches. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIuMINAL JusTICE: PosTcoNVIcnoN REMEDmS, ch. 22-
2.4 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
5 Some defendants may deliberately delay post-conviction processes until the
evidence of guilt has been substantially affected. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 581, at
ch. 22-2.4, cmt.; see Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1983) ("In
many instances the offender has a distinct advantage because with the passage of time
witnesses become unavailable, memories fade or any number of things may happen which
make a second prosecution impractical or even impossible.").
" See supra notes 378-89 and accompanying text.
'"The 1994 Amendment, supra note 358.
.. See, e.g., Reams v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1975) (delay of 20
years); King v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1972) (delay of 32 years); Wooten
v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1971) (delay of 27 years); Wedding v.
Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1971) (delay of 20 years); Left v. Commonwealth,
461 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1970) (delay of 29 years); Ringo v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49
(Ky. 1970) (delay of 20 years); Ruggles v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1970)
(delay of 18 years); Brister v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1969) (delay of 16
years); King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1966) (delay of 26 years), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 924 (1967); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1966)
(delay of 31 years); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 837 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
(delay of 23 years).
1" 837 S.W.2d at 905-06 (explaining that petitioner is not allowed to take advantage
of 23-year lapse between conviction and attempt at post-conviction relief).
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firmly on notice that stale claims may be barred if the delay in bringing
such claims prejudices the Commonwealth.
B. Unfinished Business: Additional Proposals for Reform
The Kentucky Supreme Court's 1994 Amendment has been the most
significant change to RCr 11.42 since its promulgation in 1963. However,
additional improvements should still be considered. The following
suggestions would also have a significant and beneficial effect upon the
practice of post-conviction relief in this state.
1. Appeal from the Denial of an RCr
11.42 Motion Should Be Discretionary
An appeal serves two purposes. First, it allows an appellate court to
correct the errors of the lower court. Second, it allows the appellate court,
through its published decisions, to control the lower courts and to unify
procedure. Both of these objectives would be undiminished if appeal from
the denial of an RCr 11.42 motion, except in death penalty cases, were
made discretionary in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. This result could
be achieved by deleting the portion of RCr 11.42(7) which specifically
provides that either the movant or the Commonwealth may appeal from
the final order or judgment of the trial court in proceedings brought under
the RuleW modifying RCr 11.42(8), which deals with suspension of
the trial court's order until time for appeal has run, and incorporating into
RCr 11.42 the procedure for discretionary review found in CR 76.20. In
the alternative, the court could adopt a leave-to-file procedure such as that
currently used by the appellate court in Maryland to control its post-
conviction docket.' A Maryland-like approach would create a special
3" Should the Kentucky Supreme Court adopt this procedure, § 22A.020(l) of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes would have to be amended or held unconstitutional. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22A.020(l) (MichiefBobbs-Merrill 1992). In the author's opinion, the
statute is in fact unconstitutional since it infringes upon the judiciary's power to control
its procedures and jurisdiction.
"'MD. R. P. § 8-204 (providing that leave to file application shall contain a concise
statement giving reasons why the judgment should be reversed, to which a response may
be filed within 15 days). The workings of this procedure have been described as follows:
The application for leave to appeal need only contain a brief statement of the
reasons why the Court of Special Appeals should reverse the judgment below.
The record on appeal contains only the original petition, the state's attorney's
response, any subsequent papers filed in the proceeding, and the trial court's
memorandum and order. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Court of
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discretionary review procedure specific to RCr 11.42. A similar concept
is utilized in federal courts with regard to federal habeas corpus appeals
brought by state prisoners. Unlike the procedure in Maryland, in the
federal system trial courts are expected to act as gatekeepers for the
appellate courts, weeding out frivolous appeals by denying litigants a
"Certificate of Probable Cause for Appeal," which acts as a leave-to-file
document.589
As has already been noted, surveys of the results of RCr 11.42 cases
on appeal indicate that the number of meritorious claims is very small
In only a few cases is the movant successful on appeal in receiving a new
trial, a remand for an evidentiary hearing, or some other form of lesser
relief; however, the number of post-conviction appeals continues to
grow- ° If the workload of the Kentucky Court of Appeals permits,
then the present system of providing full review of all RCr 11.42 appeals
can be continued. However, it as the author expects, the lower appellate
court is becoming increasingly overburdened and needs more time to
provide additional consideration to more important criminal and civil
matters, then the approach suggested herein should be adopted.
Would such a change violate the Kentucky Constitution? Section 115
of the state constitution provides a right to a single appeal to another
court, except for a Commonwealth appeal from a judgment of acquittal,
in "all cases." '59 The answer, therefore, depends on whether a motion
Special Appeals denies leave to appeal in an =mpublished opinion that merely
states that the court has considered, read and denied the application for leave
to appeal.
Edward A. Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in Mayland: Past, Present and Future, 45 MD.
L. REv. 927, 951 (1986).
RFED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
&' ee supra notes 359-70 and accompanying text In Judge Wilhoit's study of both
published and unpublished post-conviction opinions rendered in 1983 and 1984, he
reported that the 'most striking thing about these cases is how infrequently they resulted
in the reversal of a conviction. Of the 189 opinions issued in the two years, only three
directed the outright reversal of the appellant's conviction .... " Wilhit, sqpra note 565,
at 27. All three reversals involved ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id.
It may also be remembered that the author's survey of the Kentucky Legal
Practitioner for the years 1990 and 1991 showed that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
issued 321 published and unpublished opinions in RCr 11.42 cases, a significant increase
over the 189 issued in 1983 and 1984. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
I' Interestingly, § 115 cannot apply to an original action or piroceeding in a court of
last resort because no higher court exists to which one can appeal. Exparte Farley, 570
S.W.2d 617, 620, 622 n.2 (Ky. 1978). The author also considers CR 76.37(10), as
presently written and practiced by the Kenuky Supreme Court; to be unconstitutional,
since it makes discretionary the "one appear' by the Commonwealth for purpose of
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under RCr 11.42 is considered the beginning of a new "case' or a
continuation of the old one. In answering this question, it is understood,
of course, that RCr 11.42 provides for a direct attack, by motion, upon
any conviction that would otherwise be subject to a collateral attack by
petition for writ of habeas corpus or writ of error coram nobis;5'
however, a procedure allowing direct attack is not necessarily the
equivalent of starting a new "case." In contrast to a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, which is civil in nature,593 a proceeding under RCr 11.42
is criminal in nature.' Unlike habeas corpus, RCr 11.42 deals not with
the broad issue of illegal imprisonment, but only with attacks on a single
specific judgment. As such, RCr 11.42 is a post-conviction remedy in the
nature of coram nobis, mandating that the court of conviction should be
the first court of post-conviction review. In United States v. Morgan, the
Supreme Court contrasted habeas corpus with coram nobis in this regard,
observing that a comm nobis motion "is a step in the criminal case and
not, like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and
record, the beginning of a separate civil proceeding."595 These factors
all support the conclusion reached in most of the cases which have raised
the question: RCr 11.42 is a mere continuation or resumption of the prior
criminal proceeding at which the defendant was convicted.59
certification of the law in seeming violation of the plain language of Section 115 of the
Kentucky Constitution, which states, "In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be
allowed as a matter of fight at least one appeal to another court."
In KY. R. CLM. P. 11.42(1); Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ky. 1963)
(holding that Ky. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 motion is a "resumption or coinuation of the
m proceeding').
m Crady v. Cranfill, 371 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Ky. 1963) (holding that rules relating to
bail have no application inhabeas corpus proceedings because those proceedings am civil
in nature).
See infra note 596 and accompanying text
n 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954).
Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Ky. 1978) (holding that KY. R.
CRIM. P. 11.42 motion is resumption of criminal proceeding); Tipton v. Commonwealth,
456 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1970) (holding that 11.42 allows delayed review of criminal
judgments, after the trial court has normally lost jurisdiction); Fanelli v. Commonwealth,
423 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ky. 1968) (holding that a motion under 11.42 to vacate or to
modify is a continuation or reopening of the same proceeding); Higbee v. Thomas, 376
S.W.2d 305, 307 (Ky. 1964) (''An RCr 11.42 motion is a resumption or continuation of
the criminal proceeding."); c Commonwealth v. Basnight, 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1989) (observing that 11.42 motion represents an'%inependent action!' but providing
no explanation or justification for this view).
Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions, which initiate post-conviction proceedings for
federal prisoners, are also considered a further step in the original case. See RULEs
GOVERNING § 2255 CASES, Rule 1, 28 U.S.C. fol § 2255 (1988) (Advisory Committee's
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However, not all RCr 11.42 appeals would be discretionary, even
under the proposed amendment. If a defendant did not utilize his or her
direct appeal, then appeal from the denial of RCr 11.42 would still be
open as a matter of right since it would be the first appeal in that
particular case. Absent this last factual circumstance, it appears that no
constitutional right of appeal exists from an order denying post-conviction
relief under RCr 11.42. The Kentucky Supreme Court can and should
adopt this amendment and permit the Kentucky Court of Appeals to have
discretionary authority to review meritorious RCr 11.42 appeals except
in death penalty cases.
2. Summary Dismissal and Hearing Procedure
Additionally, RCr 11.42(5) should be modified to require the trial
court to summarily dismiss a motion to vacate or docket an evidentiary
hearing within forty days of its filing. The Rule should be amended to
read as follows:5'
(5) Within 40 days after the filing of the motion by the clerk of the
court, the court shall examine the motion and enter a written order
pursuant to this section. Affirmative allegations contained in the answer
shall be treated as controverted or avoided of record.
(a) If the court determines that the motion is frivolous, or is
patently without merit, or fails to state a claim for which relief may
be granted under this rule, or should otherwise be dismissed, the
order of the court shall summarily dismiss the motion.
(b) If the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be
determined on the face of the record, or the motion is not otherwise
subject to summary dismissal, the order of the court shall [grant a
prompt hearing, and] notify the movant and the Commonwealth
that an evidentiaiy hearing is required and set a prompt date for
such hearing. If the movant is without counsel of record and is
financially unable to employ counsel, the court shall, upon specific
written request by the movant, appoint counsel to represent him in
the proceeding, including appeal.
(c) Any order of the court pursuant to this rule shall be in
writing, specifying the findings offact and conclusions of law made
in reaching the decision.
Notes).
' Proposed changes are indicated in italics. Language which should be removed is
indicated by brackets and bold print.
[Vol. 83
4KNTUCKY POST-CONVICT1ON REMEDIES
This proposed change would make several improvements. Recogniz-
ing that the present text offers very little guidance to trial courts, this
proposal would standardize certain aspects of court practice across
judicial circuits and help insure not only that the inmate litigant is
properly served, but also that an adequate record is generated to aid the
Commonwealth in defending the trial court's decision on appeal and in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. To this end, the change would provide
a definite time period within which the court must examine the motion
and dismiss it or schedule a hearing. At present, no time limit applies to
actions by the trial court, although an original action in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, usually styled a mandamus action, is available to
compel resolution of the motion if the trial court "takes too long" in
ruling.5" The purpose of this provision would be to insure that RCr
11.42 motions are examined expeditiously, within a set period of time, as
is common practice in several states.' Also, the change would clarify
the grounds for summary dismissal. Additionally, the suggestion would
require the order of the court to be in writing, which is not a present
requirement under RCr 11.42(6) although it is impliedly required by case
law.' The importance of the writing requirement should not be
overlooked. Unless the order is in writing, including complete findings of
fact and conclusions of law, a real danger of prolonging future proceed-
ings is presented by the potential for loss or destruction of such items as
See supra notes 541-45 and accompanying text.
In Kentucky, the high court has already ruled that 30 days is sufficient to take
some action on an RCr 11.42 motion. Kivett v. Knucdes, 407 S.W.2d 405, 405-06 (Ky.
1966). Trial courts in Illinois have 90 days in non-death penalty cases to either dismiss
the petition in a written order or docket the case for fmther consideration. ILL. CowP.
STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/122-2.1 (1994). In Texas, the trial court must determine within 20
days of the state's response to the petition whether there are "controverted, previously
unresolved facts material to the legality of the appellant's confinement." Tsx CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art 11.07(2)(c), (d) (West Supp. 1995).
Schroader v. Thomas, 387 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ky. 1964) (explaining that due
process was met where specific written fidings disposed of grounds alleged), overruled
on other grounds, Lycans v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 232 (Ky. 1974). The American
Bar Association has recommended trial court preparation of a 'memorandum opinion" at
the conclusion of post-conviction proceedings. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 581, ch. 22-
4.7(b). Such a change is advisable because oral decisions are more likely to omit pertinent
facts and contain weak analysis. The increased workload on judges would be minimal
because, in general, most judges reduce their orders to writing anyway. In the alternative,
if requiring a written order in every RCr 11.42 is considered too burdensome, the oral
record of decision should be immediately transcribeA. See, e.g., MD. R. P. § 4-407(a)
(providing for immediate transcription of a court's ruling that was dictated into the
record).
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court reporter's notes and tape recordings. Every order resolving an RCr
11.42 motion should thus be in writing or, if given orally, transcribed
immediately and placed in the record.
3. Use of a Form Motion and Other Changes
Further improvement would be achieved if RCr 11.42 were amended
to require submission of the motion on a form to be provided by the
Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts. The only existing
requirements regarding the contents of such a motion - "whether it be
styled a motion, petition or otherwise"' - are that the body of the
motion contain specific allegations supported by facts and that the motion
be signed and verified.' In its present form, the Rule is inadequate,
and the movant should be required to furnish more comprehensive
information, as is commonly mandated by many states.' ° More detailed
requirements would benefit both the movant and the Commonwealth by
discouraging the submission of confused, sometimes almost indecipher-
able, free-form pleadings.' The American Bar Association has recom-
1KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42(4).
Id. 11.42(2).
' See, e.g., N.J.R. Gov. CM.L P. § 3:22-8 (requiring petition for post-conviction
relief to include, among other things, date and docket number of original case, previous
post-conviction proceedings relating to the same conviction, and the date and nature of
their disposition); PA. R. Cra.. P. § 1502 (requiring motion for post-conviction relief to
contain detailed information including, among other things, specific references in the
record supporting petitioner's claims); Mo. R. CRIM. P. FORM 40 (requiring detailed
information on prior convictions and earlier post-conviction proceedings).
' The proposed additions to the Rule are shown in italics:
(2) The motion shall be submitted on a form prepared for this purpose by the
Administrative Office of the Courts. The motion shall be signed and verified by
the movant and shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is
being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such
grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall warrant a summary dismissal
of the motion.
Prior to 1965, Wisconsin began using such a form for state post-conviction relief. Thomas
E. Fairchild, Post Conviction Rights and Remedies in Wisconsin, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 52,
58. The Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act encourages the use of a form, which
must list common grounds for relief. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-123(b) (1982); see also
Mo. R. CRIM. P. Fom 40 (1995).
A federal habeas corpus form has been used with success in the federal courts for
decades. See RULES GOvERNiNG § 2255 PROCEEDINGS, Rule 2, app., 28 U.S.C. fol. §
2255 (1988) (applying to federal prisoners); RULES GOVERNING § 2254 PROCEEDINGS,
Rule 2, app., 28 U.S.C. fol. § 2254 (1988) (applying to state prisoners); Aplications for
Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in the United States
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mended the use of a standardized form, citing the obvious advantages that
such a form provides in encouraging applicants to provide complete
information, including information regarding prior litigation in the case,
necessary to process claims."5 The use of such a form in RCr 11.42
proceedings was recommended by Judge Robert 0. Lukowsky as early
as 1969' and is a common sense and cost-effective measure which in
no way impairs the rights of the inmate litigant.
Three other changes also should be considered. First, the court should
remove the "at any time" language from RCr 11.42(1) in order to
harmonize that section with the 1994 Amendment now found in RCr
11.42(10).' Second, the court should clarify that an otherwise unmeritor-
ious RCr 11.42 motion does not require the trial court to grant relief
merely because the Commonwealth, for whatever reason, has failed to
respond. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he or she is entitled
to the relief sought. RCr 11.42(5) should be amended to substitute
"motion" for "answer," as previously discussed.' Finally, the court
should consider amending the Rule to provide for expedited review of
attacks on a judgment claimed to be void ab initio and entitling, if
successful, the defendant to immediate release. This would eliminate the
problem presented to the court in Marcum v. Commonwealth without the
necessity to rely upon state habeas corpus, with its attendant disadvantag-
es. 9
VIL RESOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES UNDER RCR 11.42
Because it is further removed from trial than a direct appeal, an RCr
11.42 proceeding requires the prisoner resorting to the Rule to carry the
burden of demonstrating fundamental, constitutionally based error which
prejudiced either trial or sentence. As stated in Commonwealth v.
Basnight: "Constitutional grounds must form the basis upon which relief
can be granted by collateral attack."" Yet not every violation of a
Cows, 33 F.R.D. 363, 364-66, 391-98 (1963).
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 581, ch. 3.2.
Lukowaky, supra note 348, at 444.
SSee supra note 561.
See supra notes 489-98 and accompanying text.
6'9 See 873 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1994); spra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
0 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (denying inmate's motion for relief
under KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42); see Warner v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky.
1964) (holding that post-conviction relief requires "violation of a constitutional right, a
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constitutional right will be significant enough to bring the validity of the
judgment of conviction or sentence into question. Dupin v. Common-
wealth further clarified that an RCr 11.42 proceeding "does not provide
an arena in which all claims of the violation of constitutional rights shall
be tested. Only those violations which may have had a bearing on the
legality or the fundamental fairness of the trial may be considered.""
Several advantages accrue to the state which maintains a system of
post-conviction relief. An RCr 11.42 motion to vacate which is properly
filed in the court of conviction helps secure access to evidence and
testimony pertinent to the case, insures that if a hearing is held an
adequate record will be developed which can be reviewed in later
appellate or federal proceedings on the same issue, and allows the state
to first defend on the constitutional issue in a "friendly" forum." These
advantages are guaranteed to the state by the federal requirement that
individuals wishing to test their claims in district court under a federal
habeas corpus petition must first present, or "exhaust," their claims in
state court." 3 Thus, RCr 11.42 is a stepping stone between direct appeal
of the original conviction and the relitigation in a federal forum of all
aspects of a state court conviction envisioned under current theories of
federal habeas corpus.
lack of jurisdiction, or such violation of statute as to make the judgment void"); Tipton
v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 290, 290 (Ky. 1964) (explaining that KY. R. CUM. P.
11.42 does not authorize relief from a judgment of conviction for mere errors of the trial
court).
1 404 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1966) (explaining that excessive bail has no bearing on
the propriety of the trial).
m This statement is not designed to imply that federal district court judges are not
"friendly," but it simply notes that most prosecutors would rather have a post-conviction
hearing in the court of conviction, where the witnesses and the record are readily
available, the procedures and the setting are familiar, and the presiding judge is a known
factor.
At the federal level, it is the practice in Kentucky that the Office of the Kentucky
Attorney General represents the interests of the state in most, if not all, evidntimy
hearings on federal habeas corpus petitions arising out of state court criminal convictions.
This division of labor is possible logistically only because such hearings in non-capital
cases are few in number; in three years as an Assistant Attorney General specializing in
federal habeas corpus litigation, the author only had one such hearing. All other cases
were able to be resolved on the basis of the record generated in state court.
a' This prerequisite is a long-standing requirement of federal habeas corpus
jurisprudence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (codifying the requirement). The
requirement of state claim exhaustion is "designed to give the State an initial 'opportunity
to pass upon and corrct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Wilwording
v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438
(1963)).
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Many RCr 11.42 motions are filed without the assistance of counseL
When first promulgated, RCr 11.42 sparked an explosion of claims, filed
mostly by inmates or inmate writ-writers." 4 In an effort to keep the
rapidly rising river within its banks, the Kentucky high court issued a
large number of published RCr 11.42 cases in the mid-1960s. The vast
majority of these decisions involved unfavorable results for the prisoner,
as the court was vigorously reestablishing the limits of post-conviction
relief in Kentucky while prisoners were raising every conceivable claim.
Most of these early cases simply held that RCr 11.42 was not available
as a remedy for a particular type of claim or that the allegations were not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity which attached to a
criminal judgment and which was strongest on collateral attack615 As
the body of case law grew, the appellate courts turned more to resolving
specific problems and filling in the gaps. This body of case law provides
comprehensive guidance on a large number of substantive RCr 11.42
criminal law issues.
A. The Need for Adequate Counsel
[A]ppellant's argument that his counsel was ineffective for not raising
a meritless contention is without merit. 6
' An inmate writ-writer is alay prisoner who undertakes to 'Yepresent" other inmates
in their various legal proceedings. Although the term is now rarely used in Kentucky, the
work of writ-writers is well known to the courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 488 (1969) ("It is indisputable that prison 'writwriters' like petitioner are sometimes
a menace to prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskilled as to be a
burden on the courts which receive them."). See generally Charles Larsen et al., Prison
Writ-Writing: Three Essays, 56 CAL. L. REV. 342 (1968) (discussing the development,
abuses, and shortcomings of an extensive inmate writ-writing system).
Kentucky appellate courts have had occasion to review the work of unscrupulous
inmates. See, e.g., Renfrow v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Ky. 1970) (criticizing
the role of writ-writers); McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Ky. 1969)
(noting that, since KY. 1& ClaM. P. 11.42 was enacted, "prisoners and jailhouse lawyers
have plagued this court"); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 642 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Ky. Ct. App.
1982) (expressing hope that Taylor and his 'lay inmate counser' would face perjury
charges).
"i See, e.g., Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W. 2d 912, 917 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)
('There are eirs which would require reversal on direct appeal but which do not justify
vacating a judgment of conviction by motion under RCr 11.42:); Peny v. Common-
wealth, 407 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 968 (1967).
6 Willinas v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982). For
somewhat similar sentiments, see Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Ky.
1993) ("Failure to offer at the penalty phase evidence which would not have been
admissible cannot rightly be characterized as ineffective representation."), cert. denied,
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No rights are more commonly asserted and reviewed in federal and
state post-conviction proceedings than those relating to assistance of
counsel As criminal trials grow increasingly lengthy and complex, the
need to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant through effective
representation has correspondingly increased. For representation of
counsel to be meaningful, not only must counsel be physically available,
but also the performance of counsel must rise to a certain level in order
to satisfy constitutional requirements. This level of performance is the
constitutionally mandated standard of "effective assistance of coun-
sel . "7 Indigents must generally be afforded counsel by the state.
However, the goal is not to provide, at state expense, all of the preroga-
tives of the monied defendant. For this reason, an indigent defendant
"does not have a constitutional right to be represented by any particular
attorney, and is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the
appointment of substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or a clear
abuse by counsel"61
The most frequent allegations found in RCr 11.42 motions attack the
performance of counseL6 This issue found its way into forty-seven
114 S. Ct. 703 (1994).
17 Even before the 1963 Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright applied
federal standards for assistance of counsel to the states, it was apparent that the right to
counsel was meaningless unless the appointed counsel was given sufficient time to render
"effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932). The Kentucky high court reached the same conclusion in Rice v. Davis, 366
S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1963), which applied to Kentucky habeas corpus proceedings the
federal rule that the right to assistance of counsel necessarily means effective assistance
of counsel See Wedding v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 105, 105 (Ky. 1965) ("[R]ight
to assistance of counsel ... means 'effective assistance.").
61a Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Ky. 1982) (citing Baker v.
Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) and Fultz v. Commonwealth,
398 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Ky. 1966)). Nor, under Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983),
does a defendant have the right to have a 'meaningful relationship" with his court-
appointed attorney or to refuse the appointment of a competent lawyer chosen by the
court.
' If raised in the trial court, this issue can be brought on direct appeal. Hopewell v.
Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Ky. 1982) (disallowing challenge of inadequate
representation of counsel for failure to raise issue at tril); Caslin v. Commonwealth, 491
S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. 1973) (holding that the question was not reviewable because it had
never been presented at lower court); Hibbs v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that defendant had properly preserved the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel by including it in motion for new trial). Even where an objection
has not been made at trial, appellate courts may, under some circumstances, decide the
issue. See Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1981) (explaining that "the state
appellate court has both agreed and refused to consider the issue of ineffetive assistance
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percent of the published RCr 11.42 cases of the last thirty years.'2 As
a subject of collateral attack, the performance of counsel is particularly
attractive. Every decision of trial counsel, or the sum of all of them, is
potentially suspect. In most cases no witnesses to and no record of
conversations between trial counsel and the accused will exist A
defendant may argue that if only counsel had acted or advised differently,
the result would have been an acquittal, a reduced sentence, a dismissal
of the charges, or a plea to a lesser offense. Additionally, to win on this
issue is to win a new trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel or an
unconstitutional denial of counsel is not subject to harmless error
analysis.62'
As with many fundamental constitutional rights, assistance of counsel
in a criminal case can be waived.' For a waiver to be valid, it must
clearly appear from the record that it was a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent relinquishment of the privilege, as determined by the facts of
each case.' Despite formidable obstacles, defendants can and do effec-
tively waive assistance of counsel, even at trial, and their convictions are
upheld.' Failure to permit an accused, properly counseled as to the
of counsel on direct appeal") (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky.
1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1091 (1981), andNickellv. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 145,147
(Ky. 1978)); Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
"' A distinction exists, of course, between a constitutional error committed by
counsel, which may be harmless, and judicial fact-finding which results in the legal
conclusion that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel Since prejudice
is one of the elements of ineffective assistance, a constitutional deprivation in that
situation can never be harmless.
-" 21A AM. JUIL 2D Criminal Law § 758 (1981 & Supp. 1994); see Richard A.
Wasserman, Note, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: SYmutards for Knowing and
Intelligent Pretrial Waivers, 60 B.U. L. REv. 738 (1980).
'Brewer v. W ims, 430 U.S. 387, 403-06 (1977) (failing to find an effective
waiver of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (concluding that the
issue of whether effective waiver exists depends "upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the backgrund, experience and conduct
of the accused").
_ As with the case of the monied individual who chooses to act as his own attorney,
the Constitution of the United States does not stand as a guarantor against vanity or bad
judgment. For a general discussion of the issues surrounding what might be termed
"self-appointment7' of counsel, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-88 (1984)
(describing the effect of court-appointed "standby "counsel on defendant's conducting own
defense); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-36 (1975) (holding that the state cannot
force a defendant to forego self-representation); ci. Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 399
S.W.2d 473, 475 (Ky.) (holding that the trial court's refusal to dismiss court-appointed
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consequences, to represent himself or herself, particularly on a guilty
plea, can be a ground for relief under RCr 11.42.'
B. Provision of Counsel
1. Failure to Appoint
Few areas of criminal law have received greater attention than the
provision relating to counsel for the accused."6 It has long been
recognized that seldom, if ever, will a defendant be able to formulate and
communicate to a trial judge or jury the legal and factual characteristics
of the case to the same extent as trained, experienced counsel. Therefore,
the courts provide appointed counsel for indigent defendants who are
unable to employ counsel. This general principle is not new - Kentucky
recognized a due process right to counsel in guilty plea cases, absent a
waiver, in 1948. 7 Kentucky has required appointment of counsel for
indigents "from time immemorial." In 1972, the Kentucky General
Assembly adopted the statewide public defender system.' However,
only in the past thirty years has the right to counsel become universally
applied through extension by the U.S. Supreme Court to indigent
counsel and allow defendant to represent himself was not an abuse of discretion), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 865 (1966).
'0 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812-36 (holding that failure to allow defendant to represent
himself at trial deprived him of the ight to self-representation secured by the Sixth
Amendment).
' See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 41-61 (1991) (discussing the history of
the right to counsel).
w Gholson v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Ky. 1948) (granting anew trial
based upon unconstitutional denial of petitioner's right to counsel); see Jennings T. Bird,
The Representation oflnifgent Criminal Defendants in Kentucky, 53 KY. L.J. 478, 501-02
(1964-1965) (providing historical overview of Kentucky'streatment of indigent defendants
and discussing Gholson); Norris W. Reigler, Note, Right ofAccused to Assigned Counsel
in Non-Capital Felony Prosecutons - Gholson v. Commonwealth, 38 KY. L.. 317
(1949-1950) (providing analysis of Gholson decision and its implications).
'n John S. Palmore, Counsel for the Indigent in Criminal Cases, 29 KY. ST. B.J. 21,
21 (1965) ("Gideon v. Wainwright came as no shock to the bench and bar of Kentucky.")
(citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 110 S.W. 339 (1908), which held that the court has
a duty to insure the defendant is properly represented).
m KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.010 to .250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrll 1993); Robert C.
Ewald & A. Wallace Grafton, Jr., The Kentucky Public Defender System, 36 KY. ST. B.J.
41(1972).
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defendants in all the statese and in new areas, such as juvenile pro-
ceedings.63
An area of potentially valid claims concerns the indigent defendant's
allegation that counsel was denied in violation of state or federal
constitutional law. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states
that the accused in a criminal prosecution has the right "to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'" The Kentucky Constitution
contains a similar provision." This right is said to "attach" at certain
times during the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.
Numerous cases at both the state and federal levels have been devoted to
making and refining this determination.' 4 In some instances, a claim
that counsel was denied can be refuted by the record;635 in others, it is
630Prior to 1963, indigents had no recognized right under the U.S. Constitution to
appointed counsel in state criminal cases. In that year the Supreme Court decided Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963), which applied the Sixth Amendment to the
states and held that an indigent defendant has the right to request and be assigned counsel.
This principle was subsequently expanded to include all offenses for which imprisonment
is the resulting punishment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (adopting actualimprisonment as the constitutional line); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)
(providing that, absent waiver, no person can be imprisoned unless represented by counsel
at tial).
Even before Gideon, many states, like Kentucky, had mechanisms in place to allow
appointment of counsel in specific cases. The trial court generally would determine the
seriousness of the case, the necessity for counsel, and the experience and availability of
local attorneys. The appointment was based upon some combination of these factors. See
Bird, supra note 627, at 509-12.
"' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (applying the Sixth Amendment to juveniles);
Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. 1968) (recognizing that the Sixth
Amendment applies to juveniles); Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky.)
(holding that juvenile proceeding was a critical stage of litigation in which the defendant
was entitled to counsel), cert. denied 389 U.S. 873 (1967).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
KY. CONST. § 11.
4 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (holding that the right
attaches at "critical state" of prosecution); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970)
(clarifying what constitutes "critical stage"); Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332,
332-33 (Ky. 1964) (holding that counsel is required when a defendant enters guilty plea).
" Lett v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1970) (holding that an evidentiary
hearing was not necessary); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Ky.
1970) (holding that, although defendant claimed he had been denied counsel and coerced
into pleading guilty, the record showed he had pled not guilty and was convicted after a
jury trial in which he had received the assistance of appointed counsel); accord Moore
v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 136, 136 (Ky. 1966) ("[Mere unsupported allegations of
lack of counsel will not be permitted to cmtradict plain, unambiguous court records."),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1038 (1967).
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necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing before the court can make a
determination on whether relief should be granted.'
Reversal of the conviction is required where the denial of counsel
occurs at a critical stage of the proceedings as determined under the state
constitution, or the denial violates one of the Supreme Court's "bright
line" determinations of which portions of the process are considered
critical under the U.S. Constitution. 7  For example, the constitutional
right to counsel during trial is fundamental and undisputed, since the trial
is obviously a "critical stage" of the proceedings.6' Pretrial proceedings
present a more difficult determination of what constitutes a "critical
stage." In response, the Supreme Court and the highest state courts have
utilized "bright line" holdings for discrete procedural steps and case-by-
case analysis for other situations. An example of the former is the right
to assistance of counsel at a guilty plea proceeding. There, the right,
unless waived, is absolute, since a guilty plea is clearly a critical stage of
the proceedings.3"
The problem becomes more difficult where investigatory events such
as pretrial interrogations or police lineups are concerned. The determina-
"" Moore v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. 1965) (holding that ahearing
was required where boilerplate judgment mentioned counsel but records submitted by
movant indicated significant factual issue existed as to that point).
67 Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54 (holding that arraignment is a "critical stage" in
Alabama); Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7 (containing the test for determining whether a
particular proceeding is a "critical stage").
'3' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (recognizing that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the right to representation by counsel at
trial); see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954) (holding that federal
conviction is barred when accused is denied assistance of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that federal courts do not have power to deprive an
individual of life or liberty unless he or she was furnished with counsel or waived the
right to counsel).
As the court explained in Sipple v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.2d 332, 332-33 (Ky.
1964):
The Commonwealth's response was to the effect that by reason of the guilty
pleas "there was no necessity for the appointment of counsel to represent the
interests of the defendant:' That proposition is not correct. He was entitled to
counsel, and unless he was advised or knew of that right and volmtarly waived
it the convictions were void.
Cf. Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 288, 288 (Ky. 1966) ("As the Attorney General
concedes, an allegation that the prisoner was deprived of counsel at any vital stage of the
proceedings charges a constitutional violation and entitles the movant to a hearing with
the assistance of counsel."); Moore v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 76, 76 (Ky. 1964)
(holding that a silent record and an allegation of denial of counsel during guilty plea
entitled movant to a hearing in which he would be represented by appointed counsel).
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tion of whether a critical stage has been reached in a pretrial confronta-
tion between the accused and the accusers is complex and largely
governed by federal case law.' " Pretrial lineups or showups (showing
the accused alone to the victim or witness) may require counsel depend-
ing upon the circumstances. For example, in Thomas v. Commonwealth,
the defendant claimed that the judgment of conviction should be vacated
because he had been held in jail for thirteen hours after arrest without the
assistance of counsel."' The court held that the RCr 11.42 motion was
properly overruled as to this ground since no evidence obtained during
this period was offered against him at trial 42 In Kentucky, counsel is
not required at a pre-indictment lineup."3 After indictment, however,
counsel must generally be provided as a matter of federal constitutional
law,6" although the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach prior to arraignment."
'4 Frequently the issues to be determined are whether the individual was the subject
of "custodial interrogation" as defined by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)
and derivative cases, and whether the right to counsel was invoked or waived. These
determinations are highly fact-specific, and a survey of relevant case law is beyond the
scope of this Article. Those interested may wish to review the following cases;, Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526-27
(1987) (examining what constitutes "functional equivalenf of interrogation); Michigan
v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626-36 (1986); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123-25
(1983) (illuminating the meaning of "custodial interrogation'); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that an accused who has requested counsel cannot be
subjected to further interrogation until counsel is provided, unless accused initiates it);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980) (analyzing the term 'nterrogaton"'
as used in Miranda).
1 437 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 956 (1970).
6Z Id. at 515. This same issue was decided, based upon the same reasoning, in Bartley
v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1971) and Messer v. Commonwealth, 454
S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1970).
"' Cane v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978), and Ashcraft v.
Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1972)).
'4 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967) (recognizing constitutional error
where in-court identification may have been tainted by illegal pre-trial lineup conducted
without notice to accused of Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (holding that a post-indictment lineup is a critical stage
requiring presence of counsel).
"' Denny v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 847, 849-50 (Ky. 1984) (citing Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)); accord Parrish v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 69,71.(Ky.
1971) (recognizing that a lack of counsel at mraignment does not provide grounds for
relief under KY. R. CRi. P. 11.42 where accused pled not guilty); McKinney v.
Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Ky. 1969) (holding that the absence of counsel
at arraigmnent does not provide grounds for relief); Collins v. Commonwealth, 433
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Preliminary hearings on the case are considered critical stages at which
the right to be represented by counsel has already attached, but the failure
to appoint counsel may be harmless error.'
Post-trial procedures present new circumstances. Because of
sentencing practices in this state, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
consistently held that sentencing in Kentucky is not a "critical stage" of
the proceedings unless prejudice is shown."7 On appeal, the right of an
indigent to the assistance of counsel is provided by statute and case
law.' The court-imposed right to counsel also extends to Kentucky
post-conviction proceedings, such as those under RCr 11.42, provided that
the indigent movant or petitioner carries the initial burden of establishing
the necessity for the appointment.a "9 Finally, section 31.110(2) of the
S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. 1968) (holding that arraignment is not a critical stage in Kentucky);
Yates v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Ky.) (holding that arraignment does not
require assistance of counsel), cert. demed, 380 U.S. 988 (1965); Carson v. Common-
wealth, 382 S.W.2d 85, 94 (Ky. 1964) (holding that assistance of counsel is not required
at arraignment), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938 (1965).
' Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (remanding for determination of
whether enal of counsel at preliminmary hearing was prejudicial); Shanks v. Common-
wealth, 575 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that since charges were
dismissed at the preliminary earing, the constitutional fight to counsel was not violated);
accord Satterly v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ky. 1969); Trodglen v.
Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Ky. 1968); Warner v. Commonwealth, 386
S.W.2d 455, 456 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966); see also Howard v.
Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 293, 293-94 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that failure to appoint
counsel at preliminary hearing is harmless er unless resulting prejudice at the trial level
can be shown).
67 Steenbergen v. Commonwealth, 532 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1976); Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Ky. 1969), cert. deied, 397 U.S. 956 (1970);
Coffins, 433 S.W.2d at 666; McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky.
1963). Bid see Oliver v. Cowan, 487 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that
sentencing in Kentucky is a critical stage), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 975 (1974). In Reams
v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1975), the Kentucky high court expressly
refused to follow the holding of Oliver. The U.S. Supreme Court has required counsel at
sentencing in a state criminal proceeding where the procedure adopted by that particular
state indicates that the substantial rights of the accused may be affected. Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1967) (construing Washington state law).
6" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.110(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); Douglas v.
Califomia, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that indigent must be represented by
counsel for purpose of appeal). The counsel provided must be effective counsel Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (holding that defendant has a right to effective
counsel on appebl); see supra notes 616-21 and accompanying text.
6
' Accordingly, RCr 11.42(5) provides for the appointment of counsel to assist the
defendant, to conduct an evidantiary hearing if necessary, and for purposes of any RCr
11.42 appeal:
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Kentucky Revised Statutes provides for the appointment of counsel for
indigents "at all stages ... including revocation of probation or parole,"
although providing counsel at revocation of probation or parole proceed-
ings is not a federal constitutional requirement.6'
2. Failure to Perform
The most notorious of all post-conviction claims is that trial counsel
was "ineffective." Since the action or inaction of defense counsel will
generally lie outside of the record, a hearing is normally required to
develop facts upon which the court may base its ruling. Typically, the
hearing will have only the movant and defense counsel as witnesses, but
in some cases other witnesses may be heard.
The original common law standard used in post-conviction determina-
tions of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in Kentucky was quite
strict, requiring a finding "that the circumstances of the representation
were such as to shock the conscience of the court and to render the
proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice."' The Kentucky "farce
and mockery" standard was dropped in 1982 in favor of the federal test
(5) Affinative allegations contained in the answer shall be treated as
controverted or avoided of record. If the answer raises a material issue of fact
that cannot be determined on the face of the record the court shall grant a
prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of record and if
financially unable to employ counsel, shall upon specific written request by the
movant appoint counsel to represent him in the proceeding, including appeal
See, e.g., Coles v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ky. 1965) (holding that trial
court in post-conviction evidentiary hearing should determine if prisoner is able to secure
an attorney).
' Gagnon v. ScarpellL, 411 U.S. 778, 787-91 (1973) (holding that counsel is not
required at proceeding where revocation of probation or parole is at issue).
65 King v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Ky. 1965). King is representative
of this line of cases. It is interesting to recall that for many years Kentucky did not
recognize a right to effective assistance of counsel from a privately retained attorney, the
theory apparently being that the consumer should face the result of his or her own choice
of counsel. See Sayre v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W. 737, 739 (Ky. 1922) ("A defendant
who is sui juris cannot complain after the trial for the first time that he selected the wrong
lawyer to represent him."). In Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Ky. 1963), the high
court set aside a conviction for ineffectiveness of counsel despite the fact counsel was
privately retained, but the court reversed itself in 1965. King, 387 S.W.2d at 585; see Carl
Ousley, Ineffective Assistance of Appointed or Employed Counsel in Kentucky. Why a
Difference?, 32 KY. ST. BJ. 38 (1968) (criticizing the court's dual standard); c. Ivey v.
Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Ky. CL App. 1983) (abandoning the dual approach
in 1983).
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adopted almost a decade earlier by the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 2 Analysis of two factors served as the basis for the new test.
First, the court had to determine whether appointed counsel was
reasonably likely to render effective assistance.653 Second, the court
had to decide whether such assistance actually was rendered in that
case.&M
Then, in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court rewrote the standard for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel in Srickland v. Washing-
ton,'5 probably the most important criminal case of the decade. The
' Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Ky. 1982) (utilizing the
standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974)). As a legal theory, the "farce and mockery" test protected
convictions but received strong criticism for being overly vague and inadequate. See, e.g.,
Bruce F. Clark Comment, Kentucky's Standard for Ineffectie Counsel. A Farce and a
Mockery?, 63 KY. L.J. 803, 820-21 (1974-1975).
As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Beasley. "We hold that the
assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." Beasley, 491 F.2d at 696. The
Kentucky Supreme Court's adoption of the new standard was justified for many reasons,
but none was more important than the fact that the test in Beasley was already being
applied to Kentucky convictions reaching the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on federal
petitions for writ of habeas corpus. See Berry v. Cowan, 497 F.2d 1274, 1276 (6th Cir.
1974) (recognizing that Kentucky high court had applied the wrong standard and citing
Beasley). In Perkins v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W.2d 873, 874 n11 (Ky. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975), which was decided soon after Beasley, Kentucky's highest
court specifically rejected the Beasley standard. However, later Kentucky appellate
opinions resolved constitutional issues under the Beasley standard anyway in an effort to
defend convictions on federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549
S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding that counsel was effective under both
state and federal standards).
'6 Presumably this portion of the analysis would involve an examination of counsers
training, credentials, and previous experience. See, e.g., Ivey, 655 S.W.2d at 509 (noting
that counsel for Ivey "was an experienced criminal defense attorney who had been
involved in a great number of criminal trials"). In actuality these factors are not very
helpful, since an inexperienced attorney with enough dedication and time is capable of
providing exceptional representation and an apparent lack of preparation need not result
in ineffectiveness. This prong of the test was always considered of little importance
because "it would make no sense to reverse a conviction where an ill-prepared lawyer
unexpectedly did an adequate, or more than adequate, job." William H. Fortune & Sarah
N. Welling, Kentucky Law Summary: Criminal Procedure, 72 KY. L.J. 381, 388
(1983-1984) (stating that in actuality, "the issue has always been whether the attorney
in fact did render reasonably effective assistance").
4 See, e.g., Ivey, 655 S.W.2d at 509 (recognizing that the second part of the
Henderson test requires finding whether counsel, in fact rendered reasonably effective
assistance); Henderson, 636 S.W.2d at 650 (adopting the Beasley standard).
"' 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Kentucky Supreme Court, in Gall v. Commonwealth, adopted the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. '
The basic premise underlying the Strickland decision is that effective
assistance of counsel is required to insure a fair trial.' Actual analysis
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland has two
components: deficient performance and prejudice. As for this first
component, the standard, therefore, "must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.""' Counsel's
actual qualifications or experience are therefore immaterial; the important
issue is the actual assistance rendered, which is determined by the court
on a case-by-case basis. 9 For example, in Holland v. Commonwealth,
the court held that the failure to subpoena family members who would
have testified in support of the defendant's alibi defense constituted
ineffective assistance.' 0 Yet in a seemingly similar case, the appellate
court reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that "merely failing to
produce witnesses in the appellant's defense is not error in the absence of
any allegation that their testimony would have compelled an acquit-
tal
6 6 1
Judicial scrutiny of ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be
"highly deferential" and therefore consistent with a proper reluctance of
appellate courts to second-guess strategic decisions of trial counsel and
the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.""' 2 In essence, ineffec-
6" 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1985) (noting that it was bound by the Strkckand
principles), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986). Kentucky first utilized the new standard
in Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (following the
rule in Strcdand).
"6 466 U.S. at 686.
I~' d.
The standard for effective assistance of counsel is based upon actual performance.
'The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688; see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 648
(1984) (explaining that defendant's case was counsel's first jury trial); c.f Stumph v.
Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1966) (holding that failure, in a capital case,
to grant a one-week continuance to two inexperienced attorneys was an abuse of
discretion).
679 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
Robbins v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. CL App. 1986).
6a1 SWrcand, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955)).
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tive assistance of counsel will not lie on appeal in matters which may be
fairly attributed to a reasonable trial strategy - for example, the decision
to offer only limited evidence of insanity in order to avoid a "battle of
the experts" over the issue.'8 That which is "normal" to defense
representation is not determinative of what is effective. For example, it
is "normal" for defense counsel to make a motion for directed verdict
regardless of the evidence presented in the particular case. Such a
deviation from accepted practice, however, is legally meaningless unless
the evidence was actually insufficient to establish an element of the
charged offense.' Failure to present character witnesses or make a
closing argument are other pertinent examples which fall into this
category. 665
Additional allegations concern the failure to challenge jurors for
cause,' the failure to demand separation of the witnesses,' and the
failure to request or provide that a trial be stenographically reported.'
Still other allegations raise issues regarding trial strategy,' conflicts of
6 (Jall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010 (1986).
6" Keeton v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1970) (refusing to find
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move for directed verdict where directed
verdict would not have been granted); Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154
(Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (denying inmate's motion because no prejudice from failure of
counsel to move for directed verdict occurred).
6 See, e.g., Ivey v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Ky. CL App. 1983)
(holding that attorney who did not make opening statement, cross-examie the prosecuting
witness, or put on evidence-in-chief was not ineffective).
' Dupin v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Ky. 1966) (holding that the
defendant had received effective assistance of counsel despite his attorney's alleged refusal
to challenge certain jurors during voir dire proceeding or to allow appellant to testify).
66 McHenry v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Ky. 1973) (holding that
defense counsel's alleged failure to demand separation of witnesses, to subpoena
witnesses, and to perfect an appeal was not pmjudicial to defendant).
60 Tipton v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. 1966) (holding that alleged
denial of court reporter at trial did not justfy reversal of conviction), overnded on other
grounds by Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1969).
' Because even the "best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way;' these allegations are subject to the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct constitutes reasonable professional assistance. Strickland v.Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); see Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Ky.
1993) ('After every trial, win or lose, candid lawyers can think of ways they might have
done better."), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994); Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 399
S.W.2d 473, 475 (Ky.) ("Effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee error-free
representation nor does it deny to counsel freedom of discretion in determining the means
of presenting his client's case"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 865 (1966); Hibbs v. Common-
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interest;670 pressure, duress, or "insistence" by counsel that the accused
plead guilty," disinterested counsel' or counsel who was preju-
diced against a defendant who refused to enter a guilty plea. 3
wealth, 570 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that the fact that another
attorney might have used a different approach was immaterial); Relford v. Common-
wealth, 558 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that defense counsel was
effective 'despite failure to insist on an accomplice instruction or to contest search and
seizure). As indicated by Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968), the
appellate courts have had very little patience with this approach.
We have previously pointed out, in what we believe to be forceful language,
that this court absolutely will not turn back the clock and retry these cases in
an effort to second guess what counsel should have or should not have done at
the time. To follow such proceeding would be to deprive the judgments of our
courts of any finality. The appellant is entitled to a fair trial under the law. He
is not entitled to try the court and his lawyer and the law.... Appellant was
convicted after a plea of guilty was entered by him freely and voluntarily in the
presence of counsel and with full advice of competent counsel We can not and
will not probe and search this record and psychoanalyze the people involved in
this proceeding in order to seek out some flimsey [sic] excuse to give this
appeal a semblance of validity.
See generally Penn v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ky. 1968) (CRCr 11.42
motions attempting to denigrate the conscientious efforts of counsel on the basis that
someone else would have handled the case differently or better will be accorded short
shrift in this court."); Dupin, 408 S.W.2d at 444 (explaining that counsers failure to
challenge jurors on voir dire and to have the defendant take the stand was '!mere
disagreement" on how the trial should be conducted).
' Dawson v. Commonwealth, 498 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Ky. 1973) (involving trial
counsel who was also city attorney); Cole v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 160, 161-62
(Ky. 1969) (stating that the fact defense counsel was also city attorney and therefore a
part-time prosecutor should have been raised on appeal); Doss v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.2d 807, 807 (Ky. 1965) (involving an alleged conflict where defendant initially
claimed he was represented by an appointed attorney who was also the master
commissioner).
'6 Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky. 1970) (explaining that
defendant was not denied effective counsel when he presented no evidence that his guilty
plea had been coerced); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 415 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1967)
(holding that defense counsel's advice that defendant plead guilty was proper and sound);
Burton v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1965) (explaining that alleged
isistence" by counsel that defendant plead guilty may actually have been good advice).
' Dupin, 408 S.W.2d at 444 (involving disinterest on the part of counsel who
allegedly first claimed defendant could beat the charges in exchange for $100, but, upon
learning defendant was indigent, allowed defendant to receive four-year prison sentence).
67 In Short v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky. 1965), the court stated:
The second claimed element of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
claimed 'rejudice toward defendant because he would not plead guilty" was
a matter entirely between appellant and his employee, his counsel If he was not
satisfied with the conduct of his attorney, he could have discharged him and
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In regard to the second component of Strickland, the burden is on the
defendant to affirmatively prove prejudice, which is defined as "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." 4 The trial court
may also consider and decide the question of prejudice before it actually
determines whether trial counsel was ineffective, for if the movant has
failed to show that the result would have been different but for the
alleged error, the trial court may decide the issue without an evidentiary
hearing and without a determination that error even occurred. 5
Several other problems add to the prisoner's difficulties in affirmative-
ly proving a violation under the strict standard imposed by Stricland.
First, S(rickand recognizes that the "presumption that a criminal
judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judg-
ment." 6 Second, in Kentucky, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel waives the attorney-client privilege for all matters relevant to the
claim.' Finally, a prisoner whose conviction has been affirmed on
direct appeal is not entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion on matters relevant to an RCr 11.42 hearing."
3. Application of the Performance Standard
In the thirty years since the adoption of RCr 11.42, petitioners have
raised numerous motions requesting vacation of sentence based upon
specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As with any collateral
attack, a complaint alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must be
employed another if still able; or if unable, he had a right to ask the court to
appoint another attorney. Not having done either he is in no position to
complain at this late stage in his motion to vacate under RCr 11.42.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For Kentucky cases adopting
and applying this standard of prejudice, see Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 43
(Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 837 S.W.2d
902, 904-05 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Kiser v. Commonwealth, 829 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1992); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. CL App. 1986) (guilty
plea); Brewster v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Ky. CL App. 1986); Adkins v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Robbins v. Commonwealth,
719 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); MacLaughlin v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d
506, 507 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
6' Brewster, 723 S.W.2d at 864-65.
676 466 U.S. at 697.
6" Ga/l, 702 S.W.2d at 44-45; Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
' McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 704 (Ky. 1986), cert denied, 481
U.S. 1059 (1987); Gall, 702 S.W.2d at 45.
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grounded in specific facts which are provided to the court and opposing
counsel in the motion.' In Brook v. Commonwealth, for example,
conclusory allegations that uncompensated counsel failed to exert
sufficient effort to prepare a defense and thereby compelled Brooks to
plead. guilty were refuted by the record."0 Since the movant had failed
to indicate the nature of the defense that counsel should have raised, no
arguable basis for delay existed and a hearing on the motion was not
required." 1 This case represents a long line of ineffective assistance of
counsel cases where failure to make specific allegations was fatal to the
defendant's case.'
Where ineffective assistance of counsel on a guilty plea is claimed,
the ultimate question to be decided is simply whether the actual assistance
rendered allowed the defendant to enter a plea intelligently and voluntari-
ly. An RCr 11.42 motion brought in a later case cannot challenge the
validity of convictions obtained through guilty pleas in prior cases, as this
is not the purpose of an RCr 11.42 motion.' Furthermore, a guilty
plea as a persistent felon (habitual criminal) in a prior case precludes
raising the issue of the constitutionality of the first conviction in
subsequent persistent felony offender trials. Failing to raise the issue
when first available is considered a waiver.' This situation merely
exemplifies the general rule that waiver may limit the issues raised in any
subsequent proceeding, whether a guilty plea or a conviction after trial is
involved.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, is very
effective in allowing a movant to at least present "waived" issues through
the back door by arguing that counsel was ineffective in preserving the
issue for appellate review, in presenting it at an earlier proceeding, or in
otherwise handling the issue in a competent manner. In 1984, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Dillingham v. Commonwealth, reversed
' See supra notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
ao 447 S.W.2d 614, 617-18 (Ky. 1969).
.' Id. at 618.
a2 ee, e.g., Brtmer v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970); Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 72, 72 (Ky. 1970); Harris v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d
690, 692 (Ky. 1970); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ky. 1970); Evans
v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1970); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 383
S.W.2d 342, 343 (Ky. 1964).
Alvey v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1983) (denying defendant in
a persistent felony offender case the right to challenge the validity of guilty pleas in
prior cases, reasoning that the defendant should not be allowed "a second bite at the
apple).
6 Id. at 860.
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as a result of just such a "back door" argument."5 The appellate court
declined on direct appeal to review the merits of the defendant's claim
that a non-qualifying conviction had been improperly used to enhance his
sentence as a persistent felony offender, since the issue had not been
preserved by timely objection." However, the appellate court reviewed
the claim on RCr 11.42 when raised in the context of ineffective
assistance of counsel'
Dillingham stands in contrast to the use of RCr 11.42 to merely
relitigate issues which were preserved but decided adversely to the inmate
on direct appeal. An example of this tactic may be found in Gall v.
Commonwealth, a death penalty RCr 11.42 proceeding in which many of
the defendant's multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims simply
recast direct appeal issues for RCr 11.42.' For example, a claim based
on the failure of the trial court to sustain a change of venue motion,
raised and decided on direct appealI became on RCr 11.42 a claim
of the failure of counsel to present an effective change of venue motion.
Allegedly improper instructions to the jury, an issue decided adversely to
the movant on direct appeal, became a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel in tendering the allegedly defective instruction.' Normally,
such an approach is unsuccessful and merely obscures more meritorious
RCr 11.42 claims that have not already been presented and'decided and
that are therefore more worthy of the appellate court's attention.
A frequent allegation is that the failure of counsel to request a
continuance is by itself grounds for relief, with the implication being that
counsel was unprepared for trial69 A factor which carries great weight
'' 684 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
a'Id. at 308.
W Id.
702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
'29 Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 101-04 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
989, overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.
1981).
' Gall, 702 S.W.2d at 43; squpra notes 662-73 and accompanying text (providing
further examples).
" The fact that a defendant believes counsel should have requested a continuance is
not sufficient to support a motion to vacate judgment. If counsel did not request a contin-
uance, it is presumed that counsel did not feel more time was necessary. Uwaniwich v.
Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Ky. 1965) (holding failure to request continuance
insufficient to overturn conviction for aimed robbery); Maye v. Commonwealth, 386
S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1965) (holding failure to request continuance irrelevant in light of
defendant's written confession). Even the insistence of the defendant that a continuance
be requested and the failure of counsel to do so would not constitute ineffective assistance
if the counsel's judgment was itself reasonable. Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601,
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in this analysis is the belief of counsel that the time to prepare was
adequate, as indicated by either a positive statement announcing readiness
for trial or a failure to ask for a continuance.6' However, where
counsel, believing the case was sufficiently prepared, did not request a
continuance, the defendant's burden of affirmatively proving ineffective
assistance of counsel is difficult to meet.693 In 1965, for example,
603 (Ky. 1965) (holding that disagreement between counsel and defendant as to
continuance was not enough to grant motion to vacate conviction); accord Fyffe v.
Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Ky. 1966) (holding that since record showed that
counsel was appointed eight days before trial and that no continuance was sought,
allegation of inadequate time for preparation was properly rejected); Hargrove v.
Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75,76 (Ky. 1965) (holding that failure of counsel, allegedly
appointed five minutes before trial, to request continuance was insufficient to vacate
conviction).
_ Stidham v. Commonwealfl, 444 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Ky. 1969). The Kentucky court
stated-
When an indigent defendant is given the lawyer whom he requests by name and that
lawyer agrees to a trial date and later states that he had sufficient time to prepare
defense, we believe it would be strange indeed to accept the unsupported statement
ofthe accused that his lawyer didnothave sufficient time. We believe this contention
to be completely without merit
StWdan, 444 S.W.2d at 111.
See Fultz v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Ky. 1966) (refusing to overturn
defendant's conviction where defendant dismissedhis original couasel andtrialcourt deniedhim
now counsel); Collins v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.2d 77,78 (Ky.) (holding that the 'Tact that
a person is tried and convicted the same day counsel is appointed to represent him does not
necessarily constitute a denial of due process"), cert denied, 382 U.S. 881 (1965); Tmence v.
Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40,47 (Ky. 1953) (holding that defendant had received a fair trial
and was not prejudiced by denial of continuance), cert denied, 348 U.S. 899 (1954). Contra
Vaughan v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1974) (holding that 15-minite
conference just prior to trial with newly appointed attorney who also had a conflict of interest
was not adequate time for preparation, even if attorney didnot ask for a continuance), overrded
by Henderson v. Comnonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1982).
3 The fact that counsel may have met with the defendant only briefly is not of
sufficient importance to require an evidentiary hearing unless the prisoner can demonstrate
that communication was somehow frustrated or that the attorney refused to talk to him
or her. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Ky. 1971) ("'he brief interviews
appellant had with his counsel could well be adequate under the circumstances.'), cert.
deied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972); Smith v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 285, 285-86 (Ky.
1966) (holding the fact that defendant's counsel advised guilty plea after short consultation
to be insufficient to vacate judgment).
In most cases, the record will indicate that adequate communication between the
defendant and counsel took place. In Lawson v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 734, 735
(Ky.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 946 (1965), the appellant stated that his attorney was
prejudiced and had failed to assist or defend him and that he had not been advised of his
rights. The court held that the trial court was correct in overruling the motion without a
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Kentucky's high court held an allegation that a defendant was given a
total of "thirty seconds or less" to confer with counsel, without more, to
be insufficient to entitle the defendant to a hearing because "[h]is attorney
could ask, 'are you guilty,' and get a yes or no answer in less than three
seconds." Similarly, a claim that movant was denied an attorney
"until the date of trial," without an allegation of prejudice, does not
entitle the movant to a hearing.695 These cases demonstrate that the
appellate courts require more than a mere conclusory allegation by the
movant of insufficient time. As with other claims of ineffective assis-
tance, the claimant bears the burden of proof6" and must demonstrate
prejudice based on the alleged lack of preparation.' This burden is
particularly hard to overcome in a guilty plea case. 8
It is also not ineffective assistance to &il to investigate an alleged
constitutional violation about which the attorney knows nothing. Unless
the defendant has indicated that an earlier conviction was the result of an
unconstitutionally obtained guilty plea, the attorney cannot be faulted for
hearing because the record showed
that appellant entered a plea of guilty to the rape charge; he received [the
minimum sentence]. Appellant does not assert that counsel badgered him into
entering a guilty plea, nor does he claim that he failed to understand the conse-
quences of his guiltyplea. Under these circumstances, the record shows on its
face that no basis has been laid upon which to support the claim of inadequate
counsel.
Finally, in Cole v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Ky. 1969), the court considered
a claim that counsel had refusd to consult with the prisoner or prepare a defense. The
court rejected this argument because sufficient evidence in the record "support[ed] the
findings of the trial court that this charge was unfounded." Id.
Burton v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1965).
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1966); accord Hibbs v.
Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky. CL App. 1978) (explaining that the fact
defense counsel, who had 27 years of experience, had secured minimum sentence for
defendant overrode allegations of unpreparedness on counsel's part); Fyffe, 408 S.W.2d
at 473.
6 Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that
defendant failed to prove inadequate representation and record indicated counsels diligent
efforts).
o' Taylor v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Ky. 1976).
mAccording to the court in Harris v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky.
1970), "When the record shows that counsel has been appointed sufficiently far in
advance of the time for trial and a plea of guilty is ultimately entered, a bare allegation
that the attorney did not adequately prepare a defense is insufficient." Accord Cox v.
Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 76, 77-78 (Ky. 1971) (holding that four days was sufficient
time for effective representation of counsel where defendant had pled guilty to
mwnslaughter).
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failing to make an independent check.' In another recent case, the
Kentucky Supreme Court also reaffirmed that the mere fact that an
attorney consults with the client, investigates the case, and then recom-
mends that the client plead guilty does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counseL7
Properly excluded from consideration in an RCr 11.42 motion are
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which most
frequently arise because counsel either fails to take an appeal or lets an
appeal lapse."' Although this issue has received considerable attention
in the last ten years, it is now settled that a defaulted appeal cannot be
restored by a trial court through RCr 11.42; this approach is sensible,
since restoration of a right to appeal has nothing to do with attacking the
judgment itself." The Kentucky Supreme Court now requires claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to be presented by motion
directly to the appropriate appellate court, which can then resolve the
issue and decide the proper remedy. 3 Nor can RCr 11.42 be used to
challenge counsel's alleged ineffectiveness merely because the defendant
disagrees with the way a completely processed appeal was handled. 4
Should a request for reinstatement of an appeal lost as a result of
'9 Eggerson v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Ky. CL App. 1983).
70 Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Ky. 1983).
0 Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees one appeal in each case as
a matter of ight. This state right is enforceable under the U.S. Constitution and includes
effective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed defendant effective counsel
on first appeal).
The Kentucky appellate courts waffled as to whether RCr 11.42 could be used to
raise: (1) a claim of ineffective counsel based upon a failure to timely file a notice of
appeal (for which the remedy is the granting of a belated appeal); or (2) a claim that
counsel procedurally defaulted the appeal after the notice had been filed (for which the
remedy is the reinstatement of the appeal). See Vunetich v. Commonwealth, 847 S.W.2d
51, 51-52 (Ky. 1992); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 736 S.W.2d 319, 321-22 (Ky. 1987);
Ewing v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 475,476 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth v. Wine, 694
S.W.2d 689, 694 (Ky. 1985).
Wine, 694 S.W.2d at 694.
Vunefich, 847 S.W.2d at 51-52; Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 280, 281
(Ky. 1992); Thompson, 736 S.W.2d at 320-21. The fact that an RCr 11.42 motion raising
the same issue has been overruled does not affect the right to file a motion for ineffoctive
assistance of appellate counsel. Ewing, 734 S.W.2d at 476.
70 iunech, 847 S.W.2d at 51 (holding that defendant could not claim ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel when an appellate court had fully reviewed defendant's
initial claim of ineffective assistance under KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42); Hick, 825 S.W.2d
at 281 (denying defendant's claim of ineffective appellate counsel when appeal had been
completely processed).
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ineffective assistance of counsel require a hearing, the trial court is the
appropriate forum."5 However, a defendant who enters a guilty plea
normally waives his or her right to a direct appeal, so such an individual
cannot later claim ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that no
notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction was filed. This use of
RCr 11.42 is foreclosed.7'
4. Appellate Review of Counsel's Performance
Once the trial court has applied the correct standard to determine
whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, the
findings of the trial court, if supported by "sufficient substantive
evidence," will not be disturbed on appeal from the denial of an RCr
11.42 motion to vacate." 7 Or, as interpreted in Ivey v. Commonwealth,
the matter is "an issue of fact to be determined by the trial court, and its
findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." 708 In
other words, the essential factual determination is made by the trial court,
and the defendant's subjective beliefs are irrelevant. An indigent
defendant has no right to new counsel and no claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel merely because the defendant believed appointed
counsel to be ineffective and was denied substitute counsel by the trial
court.7' The court in Lewis v. Commonwealth discussed the appropriate
standard of appellate review in cases where no hearing was held.710
Lewis claimed that his appointed attorney refused to take the case to trial
and was unprepared to do so, that Lewis himself had not even understood
the charges until the day of trial, and that he was therefore forced to
plead guilty or go to trial totally unprepared. The trial judge subsequently
ruled against Lewis without requiring a hearing. On appeal, these
allegations were held sufficient to require a hearing, based on the
standard of review applied by the appellate court, which was "confined
to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
I Thompson, 736 S.W.2d at 322; Jones v. Commonwealth, 714 S.W.2d 490, 491
(Ky. Ct App. 1986).
Greer v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
where defendant waives right to appeal by pleading guilty, defense counsel cannot be
considered ineffective for failure to file notice of appeal).
Cole v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Ky. 1969).
655 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); see also Robbins v. Commonwealth,
719 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
' Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Ky. 1982).
710 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967) (collecting cases).
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refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the convic-
tion."711
Considering the high volume of cases alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel, it is somewhat surprising that more claims are not found to
be meritorious on appeal. Although most of the RCr 11.42 claims which
merited reversal and a new trial were ineffective, assistance of counsel
challenges, the vast number of inmate litigants were unsuccessful. In
reviewing the cases that did not require reversal, it is apparent that the
usual weakness in the defendant's scenario is the failure to demonstrate
to the appellate court that the alleged error, if it occurred, would have
made any difference - that it was prejudicial.7 2 The courts simply will
not second-guess defense counsel's reasonable performance. As explained
in Mcffenry v. Commonwealth, an appellate court faced with "charges of
ineffectiveness [which] are based on trial tactics over which counsel has
a wide discretion .... will not fault a lawyer for using a reasonable
course which at the time seemed to be the proper one to follow.""71 In
summary, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is remarkably easy
to make. The hard part for most defendants is proving that counsel's
tactics or actions were unreasonable and that substantial prejudice to the
defendant was the result. Very few defendants are successful.
C. Attacking a Guilty Plea
The ability of a criminal defendant to waive the constitutional right
to trial by jury has a long history in American jurisprudence and, along
with plea bargaining, is administratively indispensable in most jurisdic-
tions. As a matter of policy, a presumption against waiver of basic
constitutional rights exists, and the validity of a waiver depends "in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case."' Under Kentucky case law, an unconditional plea of guilty
"waives all defenses except that the indictment did not charge an
offense. ' 715 If properly admitted, a guilty plea operates as a "break in
71 Id.
7 See Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ky. CL App. 1994) (holding
that appellant failed to show prejudice from trial counsel's failure to challenge unconstitu-
tionally empaneled grand jury); see also supra notes 674-75 and accompanying text
7 490 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Ky. 1973).
7 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also infra notes 794-805 and
accompanying text (discussing waiver by guilty plea).
" Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
failure to object to unconstitutionally empaneled grand juy waived issue for post-
conviction proceedings); Corbett v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Ky. 1986);
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the chain of events" which removes from the court's consideration alleged
violations of constitutional rights unrelated to the entry of the plea.""
Attacks on a guilty plea, therefore, whether raised on direct appeal or by
RCr 11.42, generally center on those aspects indicating the plea itself was
not "knowing" or "voluntary." In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Boykin v. Alabama, revolutionized the taking of guilty pleas by requiring
trial judges to build a guilty plea record so that the existence of a valid
waiver of basic constitutional rights could be determined from the record
on appeal" In Boykin, the record was silent, as the defendant had been
asked no questions and had said nothing to the court. Holding that waiver
could not be presumed, the Boykin Court established standards to be
utilized by state trial courts in determining valid waiver. In fact, RCr 8.08
conforms to the requirements of Boykin and requires that the trial court
"shall not accept the [guilty] plea without first determining that the plea
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge."7 8
To raise this issue, the motion to vacate must contain "an affirmative
statement that the guilty plea was involuntary or made without under-
standing of the nature of the charge" before review will be undertak-
en.719 This requirement is an unfortunate necessity to insure that such
is in fact the contention of the movant in his or her signed and verified
(and therefore subject to perjury prosecution) motion to vacate.
In reviewing the motion and record for constitutional error, the
Kentucky high court has directed that all the circumstances surrounding
Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky. 1970); Waddle v. Commonwealth,
391 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Ky. 1965) (holding that complaint of technically improper
indictment was waived by guilty plea); Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55
(Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made after
consultation with family and counsel); see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d
690, 692 (Ky. 1970) (dealing with waiver as related to beating by police officers);
Newsome v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1970) (dealing with waiver as
related to a variety of claims). But see Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100
(Ky. 1994) (holding that sentencing may nonetheless be considered since it is 'Jurisdic-
tional').
"6 Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 55; see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
7'7 395 U.S. 238 (1969). One limitation on Boykin is that it is not applied retroa-
ctively, so that the finality of guilty pleas entered prior to 1969 is strengthened. Hendron
v. Cowan, 532 F.2d 1081, 1082 (6h Cir. 1976); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d
65, 66 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972).
7" KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08.
Lucas v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1971) (holding that the
defendant's failure to include an airmative statement that guilty plea was involuntary or
made without understanding of the charge precluded post-conviction relief).
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the plea may be considered-not just the words that are said in the
proceeding itself rn These circumstances include the individual defendants
background and experience with the criminal justice system.7 Although
a new proceeding is required ifthe record of the plea is completely silent, the
record of the guilty plea need not be perfect and if it contains some evidence
of understanding it can be supplemented by an evidentiary hearing 7 The
court analysis is also subject to the common sense requirement that a
"knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver" does not envision the defendant
necessarily being "informed of every possible consequence and aspect of the
guilty plea! ' m Nor does the record have to reflect the separate waiver of
72 Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445,447 (Ky. 1978) (holding that; after looking
at all the evidence, the defendant's guilty plea had been entered voluntarily); Kiser v.
Commonwealth, 829 S.W.2d 432,434 (Ky. Ct App. 1992) (holding loat defendant's guilty plea
was volunay, as counsel had explained constitutional rights and allegations in the indictment);
Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54 (explaining that it is appropriate to look at accused's demeanor,
backgound, and experience in deciding whether a plea was voluntary); Sparks v. Common-
wealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. Ct App. 1986) (holding that in light of all evidence,
counsel's advice to plead guilty was sound); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 902, 904
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the evidence presented at hearing, including demeanor,
background, and appellant's "continuous relatihip" with Kentucky's criminal justice system,
supported court's assessment that guilty plea was voluntary). But see Scott v. Commonwealth,
555 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the trial court's failur to follow KY.
R. CRiM. P. 8.08 requires reversal for a new trial).
' Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54; Lynch, 610 S.W.2d at 904.
722As the court explained in Lynch, 610 S.W.2d at 904: "[W]hen the record contains
some indicia of understanding on the part of the accused, the correct path is to remand
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Based on the outcome of that hearing, either the
plea stands or the judgment is reversed with instructions for a new trial." See Kotas, 565
S.W.2d at 447; Hartsock v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1974) (holding
that a new trial was not required and that remand for evidentiary hearing was appropriate
because plea was fairly recent and record was not altogether silent).
72 Turner v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (explaining
that the failure of trial court to inform defendant of mandatory service nature of his
sentence did not violate due process); see Jewell v. Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 593,
594-95 (Ky. 1987) (involving a defendant who claimed his guilty plea was invalid
because he was not informed of the range of sentences which could be imposed);
Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Ky. 1969) (holding that the defendant
intelligently and voluntarily waived right to ajury trial by pleading guilty); Centers, 799
S.W.2d at 55. In Holcomb, 441 S.W.2d at 142, the court expressed this premise quite
well:
The appointment of counsel would be a mockery ifhis professional advice [to
plead guilty] was ineffective because the defendant was not specifically advised
of each and every consideration upon which the attorney based his judg-
ment .... The wheels ofjustice cannot be reversed every time a defendant who
has been sentenced on a guilty plea has a speculative afterthought that he may
get off better the next time around, with or without a jury trial.
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each of the defendant's enumerated rights.' If the record turns out to be
insufficient, then the proper remedy is to allow the movant to withdraw the
plea."25
This area of the law still engenders considerable uncertainty and
turmoil n6 The recommended course of action for bench and bar is to make
the guilty plea proceedings as accurate and complete as possible, including
in the record specific questions directed toward the defendants counseLm
On appeal, the RCr 11.42 record will be examined to determine whether the
trial court finding of fact and conclusion of law that the plea was entered
into voluntarily was clearly erroneous? 8
Over the years, incarcerated defendants have used RCr 11.42 to advance
a variety of imaginative claims purporting to show that their guilty pleas did
not involve the knowing and voluntary waiver of basic constitutional rights
required by Boykin. In one such example, it was argued that the guilty plea
was the unwanted result of taking "nerve medicine' which made the
defendant "drowsy," a contention found to be completely without merit in
Renfrow v. Commonwealth.7 Defendants have raised numerous other
claims respecting the validity of a guilty plea, some indicating physical abuse.
In Ellis v. Commonwealth, the defendant's claim that his guilty plea had been
induced by solitary confinement and limited diet (imposed after a jailbreak
attempt) was rejected because of the trial judge diligent guilty plea
inquiry!'* The Ellis situation was similar to that in Cunningham v. Com-
monwealth, where severe maltreatment, including beatings, allegedly rendered
r Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988).
r Raymer v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1973) (holding that the
defendant's prompt assertion of his innocence when motion for probation was overruled
and the lack of compliance with KY. R. CW P. 8.08 should have caused the court to
permit withdrawal of guilty plea).
' See the recently overruled case of Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275, 1279 (6h Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1061 (1990), overmded by Parkev. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517 (1992),
which required proof of the Boykin inquiry to be both dear and convincing and which placed
the burdenuponthe state, notthepetitioner. This radical departure fix= nomal post-conviction
practice indicates the confusion still existing more than 20 years after Boykin. See also United
States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d
1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 907 (1990). The Supreme Court's decision
in Parke v. Ralley, 113 S. CtL 517 (1992), essentially overruling Dunn and retuming the burden
to the petitioner, has hopefully clarified the case law.
' The Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts has produced three forms which
comprehensively cover not only the plea but also the plea bargami agreement. Their use
was held constitutional in Commonwealth v. Crawford, 789 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Ky. 1990).
7n Lynch v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
- 459 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Ky. 1970).
70 462 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Ky. 1971).
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the defendants guilty plea involuntary.!" The Kentucky high court resolved
the issue against Cunningham on the basis of the trial court's finding that
whatever hardships Cunningham suffered were the result ofjail discipline and
were not sufficient to render his plea involuntary.7
A plea may still be "voluntary" even though there are constant, perhaps
even unique, pressures on the defendant to enter a guilty plea, such as the
threat of the death penalty or a persistent felony offender charge if the case
proceeds to trialY3 The simple fact that by going to trial the defendant will
face the possibility of a stiffer sentence and that the defendant has been so
informed by counsel is not relevant to the inquiry!' A guilty plea cannot
be considered involuntary merely because the defendant asserts that an
alleged involuntary confession or the purported existence of illegally obtained
evidence left him with no choice but to plead guilty. Where such
constitutional infringements exist, the defendant has the option of going to
trial and challenging admissibility at that time!7 6
In many RCr 11.42 motions, the defendant questions his competency to
plead guilty. Under Kentucky law, the standard used to determine competency
to plead guilty is the same strict standard required to determine that a
defendant is competent to stand tral, s a position recently upheld by the
United States Supreme Court.7
Conley v. Commonwealth dealt with, under RCr 11.42, the question of
the trial court failure to require a competency hearing 9 A mental
-1 447 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (Ky. 1969).
7 Id. at 84.
1 Helems v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. 1970) (involving threat of
death penalty); CWm'ngham, 447 S.W.2d at 83 (involving threat of persistent felony
offender or habitual criminal indictment); McFalls v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 78, 79
(Ky. 1969) (involving "pressure" from jailer and county sheriff that defendant would
receive probated sentence with a guilty plea).
' Capps v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ky. 1971) (finding no coercion by
defense counsel in eliciting defendant's guilty plea where counsel merely inforned
defendant of the possible consequences of going to trial).
" Wheeler v. Commonwealdi, 462 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky. 1971) (holding that defendant
waived his right to challenge admissibility of his confession when he pled guilty).
r' McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768 (1970).
7 Conley v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Littlefield
v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Ky. Ct. App.) (holding that Kentucky has
adopted the view that "no higher standard of competence is required to enter a guilty plea
than to stand trial"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1977); cf. Short v. Commonwealth, 519
S.W.2d 828, 833 (Ky. 1975) (holding that defendant, when competent to stand trial, can
validly waive jury trial and Miranda rights).
11 Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680,2686 (1993) ('[W]e can conceive of no basis for
demanding a higher level of compliance for those defendants who choose to plead guilty.").
7" 569 S.W.2d at 684-86.
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examination ordered after indictment revealed that the defendant was
competent to stand trial. A second examination, designed to determine
criminal responsibility on the day of the crime, was never completed because
he pled guilty. The appellate court ruled that the trial court's action in
ordering the initial examination did not create a 'reasonable doubt" as to the
defendant competency to enter a valid guilty plea.74 If a defendant wishes
to contest the issue of competency, then a request for additional examinations
"must be made before the trial or guilty plea."
74
'
A defendant may also allege ineffective assistance of counsel in
overturning a guilty plea Under the U.S. Constitution, the performance of
counsel in a guilty plea proceeding is analyzed under the standards of
Strickland v. Washington.' For such an attack to succeed, the RCr 11.42
challenge must cross several hurdles. First, the defendant must demonstrate
that the activities of counsel were ineffective. Second, the defendant must
prove prejudice by showing a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel
errors, he [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.'  Finally, if the state is accused of not adhering
to the plea bargain agreement, RCr 11.42 does not apply and the defendant
should seek relief by appeal.'4
D. Sentencing Error
Error in sentencing is specifically enumerated under RCr 11.42 as a
ground for relief Not every sentencing error, however, rises to the level of
740 Id. at 686.
"' Id.; see Mozee v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 757, 757-58 (Ky. 1989) (explaining
that the trial court was not "absolutely bound' by medical experts in determining
competency); Pate v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1989) (finding no duty to
hold additional competency hearing absent change in defendant's condition).
446 U.S. 668, 694-96 (1984); see supra notes 655-78 and accompanying text; see
also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that, in a challenge to a guilty plea
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, two-part St'cMand test applies to evaluate
counsel's competency and to determine whether counsel's alleged prejudice influenced the
defendant's decision to plead guilty).
' Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ky. CL
App. 1994) (holding that appellant had not proved prejudice although grand jury was
improperly empaneled); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. CL App.
1986) (explaining that errors of attorney must create reasonable probability that defendant
would have otherwise insisted on going to trial); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d
726, 728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that advice which was not unreasonable under
the circumstances was not constitutionally defective).
' Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. CL App. 1987) (finding
appeal to be appropriate where state attempted to repudiate written agreement); cf. Misher
v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Ky. CL App. 1978) (involving the prosecuto's
fulfillment of plea bargain).
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a constitutional violation; clearly many do not. Often the sentencing error
results from the failure of a sentencing court to follow the Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure or the sentencing statutes. A deviation from
either rule or statute, however, is not generally sufficient to render the
judgment void or otherwise lead to RCr 11.42 relief.
A whole series of cases has resulted from the failure of trial courts
to follow RCr 9.84(2), which allows the court to impose sentence when
the defendant enters a plea of guilty, except where death is within the
statutory range of punishment 45 If the trial court, acting alone, im-
posed a sentence of less than death when death was an available
alternative, the trial court's action would be merely erroneous.7' An
error in violation of RCr 9.84(2), therefore, is not of sufficient constitu-
tional dimensions to render the judgment void.47 Moreover, a right to
have a jury recommend punishment is procedural and can be waived,7
after which the court is within its rights to impose sentencing.
s E.g., Hobbs v. Stivers, 385 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Ky. 1964).
7M Id. (explaining that "error is not of constitutional proportions and does not
invalidate the judgment).
I See, e.g., id. This issue has been decided in several cases, but in each the trial
court imposed a sentence of less than death, allowing the appellate court to find that the
movant's constitutional rights had not been violated.
No case has decided the issue where death was the court-imposed sentence. It is
extremely doubtful that the Kentucky Supreme Court would reach the conclusion that the
error was not of constitutional proportions, unless jury sentencing was waived as in
Bevins v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 932, 933-34 (Ky. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1070 (1987).
The federal courts have also held that sentencing error under RCr 9.84(2) "does not
raise a question of constitutional magnitude." Angelo v. Howard, 311 F. Supp. 1234, 1236
(E.D. Ky. 1970).
' Franklin v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Ky. 1972), cert. deied 414
U.S. 858 (1973).
Kentucky is one of the few states, if not the only state, to retain jury sentencing. All
efforts to establish judge sentencing in Kentucky have proven unsuccessful despite the
widely recognized fact that jury sentencing produces grossly disparate sentences for the
same class of crimes and fact patterns. The latest attempt was made inthe 1992 Kentucky
General Assembly, when a bill establishing judge sentencing was recommended as part
of apackage of legislation proposed by the General Assembly's Task Force on Sentences
and Sentencing Practices, on which the author served as the representative of the Office
of the Kentucky Attorney General. Other proposed revisions of this longstanding
Kentucky tradition have also failed. See William H. Fortune, Kentucky Law Sur-
vey - Criminal Rules, 70 KY. L.J. 395 (1981-1982) (reporting on the demise of the 1980
rules revision to incorporate judge sentencing). For early and well-reasoned criticism of
jury sentencing in Kentucky, see generally John S. Palmore, After the Verdict: The
Problem of Sentencing and Corrections in Kentucky, 26 KY. ST. B.J. 32 (1962), and
Charles Kerr, A Needed Reform In Criminal Procedure, 6 KY. L.J. 107 (1918-1919).
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A further violation of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure,
involving a defendant who was not informed at sentencing of his right to
appeal, was alleged in Butcher v. Commonwealth; however, the motion
to vacate under RCr 11.42 was still unsuccessful.749  In Parker v.
Commonwealth, the movant's allegation that he had not been formally
sentenced, as proper criminal procedure demanded, was refuted by the
record.' 0 Other allegations of sentencing error have included the claim
that running the inmate's sentences consecutively would "do more harm
than good," '75 and that delay in sentencing had deprived the court of
jurisdiction over the defendant. 2 Where, however, the trial court
erroneously sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment greater or
less than that allowed by law and the judgment can no longer be
amended by the trial court, RCr 11.42 will lie and relief may be
granted.7
E. Venue
An unsuccessful trial motion for change of venue based upon
prejudicial pretrial publicity must be argued on direct appeal. In fact
failure to do so bars further consideration of the issue unless the resulting
prejudice was so substantial that the judgment was void and due process
was thus violated.M Unfortunately for most defendants, the same result
- 473 S.W.2d 114, 114 (Ky. 1971) (noting that judge failed to notify defendant of
his right to appeal but that no retroactive effect was given to KY. R. CRM. P. 11.02(2)).
7" 465 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1971).
" McBride v. Commonwealth, 432 S.W.2d 410, 410 (Ky. 1968) (considering pro se
"motion for concurrent sentence" as motion under KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42).
' Cole v. Commonwealth, 609 S.W.2d 371, 371-72 (Ky. CL App. 1980); Payton v.
Commonwealth, 605 S.W.2d 37, 3 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding seven-month delay).
7m Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky. 1994) (granting habeas
corpus where petitioner had been erroneously sentenced to less than the statutory
minimum, trial court had lost jurisdiction by improperly amending the judgment, and
petitioner had already served the original sentence); Curtsinger v. Commonwealth, 549
S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky. 1977) (granting Ky. R. CRILM. P. 11.42 relief where court imposed
probationary period greater than that authorized by law and probation was revoked during
the improper time). Note that Marcum, a state habeas corpus case, did not preclude the
use of RCr 11.42 in such a situation.
7' Yager v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Ky. 1968) (explaining that failure
to pursue venue issue at trial and on direct appeal constitutes waiver and precludes review
under KY. R. CRaM. P. 11.42), cert denied, 395 U.S. 939 (1969); Kiper v. Common-
wealth, 415 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ky.) (explaining that change of venue is within discretion of
trial court), cert. demied, 389 U.S. 875 (1967); see Schooley v. Commonwealth, 556
S.W.2d 912, 917 (Ky. Ct App. 1977) (explaining that, to justify relief, jurisdictional error
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is attained even where the allegation is that proper venue was unproven
or the trial court's finding of venue was incorrect. Because venue is a
quasi-jurisdictional question which the law places within a trial court's
discretion, it is an issue which must be brought on direct appeal.'
Therefore, assuming the trial court has general subject matter jurisdiction,
even if the court makes an erroneous finding of a jurisdictional fact, the
conviction remains valid unless the judgment is rendered "fundamentally
unfair."8 Stated another way, the simple fact of insufficient proof of
venue is not a ground for collateral attack on a judgment of convic-
tion.'
F. Evidence
Evidentiary issues arising out of a criminal proceeding have always
proved troublesome for trial and appellate courts, as evidentiary goals of
the prosecution and the defense conflict. Courts must constantly balance
the rights of the defendant with the jury's need for information. Protecting
the defendant from the use of evidence gathered by law enforcement in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights involves the use of the
"exclusionary rule," a court-created policy intended to curtail improper
law enforcement.' 8 Challenges to the admissibility of evidence - with
the defense arguing that the evidence should be removed from the jury's
consideration because of unconstitutional government action - are raised
at trial and frequently result in an evidentiary hearing on the issue. If the
motion to exclude is overruled, then the defendant must present the
question to the appellate court on direct appeal; RCr 11.42 is unavail-
able."5 Kentucky has lengthy experience with this process, as in 1920
it adopted an exclusionary rule which protected citizens against the fruits
of an illegal search and seizure.!' Kentucky's adoption of an exclusion-
must be of such magnitude to render conviction so fundamentally unfair that the
defendant can be said to have been denied due process of law).
" Sharp v. Waddill, 371 S.W.2d 14, 14-15 (Ky. 1963). See generally Commonwealth
v. Cheelks, 698 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Ky. 1985).
7 Schooley, 556 S.W.2d at 917.
' Warner v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1964) (finding no showing of
failure to prove venue at the trial level); Tipton v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 290, 290-
91 (Ky. 1963) (holding that the basis of petitioner's "motion [was] not one on which a
judgment could have been collaterally attacked").
7" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding from trial the evidence obtained
in an illegal seizure).
7" Collier v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1965).
Yournan v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 860, 867 (Ky. 1920). The exclusionary rule
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ary rule occurred long before the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Mapp v.
Ohio applied this practice to all states.!"
In general, evidentiary issues are ill-suited to post-conviction relief
because deciding such questions may thrust the appellate court into the jury's
role of determining the weight of the evidence on either side. As stated in
Warner v. Commonwealth, such claims are inappropriate and not cognizable
in an RCr 11.42 proceeding because the "[a]dministration of criminal law
would be utterly frustrated if post-conviction procedures such as RCr 11.42
could be made the basis for a retrial of conflicting evidence."7 2 Certainly
evidentiary challenges have come under increased scrutiny in the last thirty
years, but most of these claims are properly made only on direct appeal.
Because of this position, the activities of law enforcement personnel remain
relatively insulated in a post-conviction proceeding under RCr 11.42. This
approach has not however, prevented such claims from being raised.
1. Searches and Seizures
Most RCr 11.42 claims against law enforcement personnel arise from
allegations that evidence was procured through an unconstitutional search and
seizure. The Kentucky high court, however, has made clear through numerous
holdings that an admittedly illegal search and seizure does not provide a
ground for RCr 11.42 relief 7s The basic principle was stated in Brown v.
Wingo: 'The reason an illegal search cannot form the basis for a successful
RCr 11.42 proceeding is that an error consisting of the admission of improper
evidence, even though the evidence may have been obtained in violation of
constitutional rights, does not invalidate the proceeding or the judgment of
conviction."7" Therefore, if the prisoner wishes to challenge the admission
of evidence, he or she must do so at trial and on direct appea76
had already been operating in the federal courts for some time, but the Yownan decon
stirred controversy in Kentucky. Compare John J. Howe, Comment on Decisions in
Criminal Cases in 1922, 11 Ky. L.L 115, 123-30 (1922-1923) (critically discussing the
adoption of the exclusionary rule in Kentucky), with Martin R. Glenn, Evidence Obtained
by Illegal Search and Seizure, 22 KY. L.J. 63 (1933-1934) (supporting Kentucky's
position).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
385 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. 1964).
Brown v. Wingo, 396 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Ky. 1986).
7 Id. at 786; see, e.g., Carter v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. 1970);
Stidhmm v. Commonwealth, 444 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that the
"admission of illegal evidence amounts to nothing more than rial error and does not
render the proceedings void"); Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky.
1966); Collier v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1965).
Wadsworth v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.), cert. demied, 393 U.S. 969
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2. Confessions
An unconstitutionally obtained confession which was admitted at trial
must be challenged on direct appeal and is not a ground for relief under
RCr 11.42.'" Even assuming a confession was illegally obtained, if it
was not admitted into evidence at trial, the issue is irrelevant in an RCr
11.42 proceeding." A valid guilty plea, moreover, moots any issue
raised in an RCr 11.42 motion alleging an illegal confession'f Howev-
er, a Bruton769 violation may warrant RCr 11.42 reliet as the Kentucky
high court held in Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, but only if the totality of
the circumstances indicates prejudice to the defendant."
3. Persistent Felony Offender (Habitual Criminal)
It is inappropriate in an RCr 11.42 motion to raise an issue regarding
the constitutionality of prior convictions which have been used to enhance
the sentence for which the defendant is presently in custody. The court
held in Alvey v. Commonwealth that "this jurisdiction requires [the
(1968); Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965) (explaining that, in
KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42 proceeding, the defendant is not in a position to challenge legality
of search and seizure), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 976 (1967), overruled on other grounds by
636 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1982).
76 Cox v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Ky.), cert. demed, 387 U.S. 946
(1967).
' Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 767-68 (1970) (holding claim that guilty
plea was triggered by coerced confession to be insufficient to warrant post-conviction
hearing); Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 462 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky. 1971) (holding that
defendant who voluntarily enters guilty plea waives right to challenge its admissibility);
Harris v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1970) (explaining that an allegation
of coerced confession, without any supporting evidence, was insufficient to warrant
hearing for relief); Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Ky. 1969) (holding
"evidence of guilt immaterial on his plea of guilty"); Triplett v. Commonwealth, 439
S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1969) (providing no relief under KY. R. CRm. P. 11.42 where
confession was not used against defendant); Cox, 411 S.W.2d at 321 (explaining that
where defendant pled guilty, it was not necessary to use confession).
7" Brton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding that the right of the accused
to confiont the witnesses against him is violated by admitting into evidence non-testifying
co-defendant's confession which incriminates the accused). Bruton was held applicable to
the states and retroactive in Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968). However, a
Bruton er may be harmless. Harington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); Allee
v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Ky. 1970) (holding that where overwhelming
evidence of guilt exists, no prejudice occurs), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971).
77 439 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Ky. 1969).
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defendant] to raise any issues about the validity of those earlier convic-
tions at the time he is tried as a persistent felon. If he does not, he is
precluded from contesting the validity of the earlier convictions in
subsequent post-conviction proceedings.""' In Commonwealth v. Gadd,
the court held that the constitutionality of a prior conviction must be
challenged by pretrial motion in the circuit court where the initiating
indictment of the persistent felony offender stands to be tried.' The
movant does not go back to the circuit court where previously convict-
ed. 3 Gadd reaffirmed that this type of challenge was foreclosed under
CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42." 4 Failure to attack the validity of the prior
conviction at the proper time waives the defendant's right to raise the
issue in a post-conviction proceeding under RCr 11.42.'7
4. Other Evidentiary Claims
As a general matter, issues of admission or non-admission of
evidence are not found within the scope of RCr 11.42. This principle
encompasses specific claims of insufficiency of evidence, such as
insufficiency of proof of a jurisdictional fact or the allegation that the
defendant was convicted on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice.' 6 In specific cases, for example, the courts have held
that any alleged insufficiency of evidence must be raised on direct appeal,
not brought forward in an RCr 11.42 motion.' Efforts to revive a lost
7 648 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Ky. 1983) (collecting cases supporting the proposition); see
Fortune & Welling, supra note 653, at 397-99.
772 665 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Ky. 1984). Under the recent decision of McGuire v.
Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky. 1994), a preliminary hearing need only be
held if the defendant claims denial of assistance of counsel in the prior proceeding. This
decision rests on Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1994) (applying this rule
of law to federal persistent felony offender proceedings).
7" Gadd, 665 S.W.2d at 917-18.
774 Id.
' Commonwealth v. Jones, 704 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Ky. 1986), overruled on other
grounds by Thompson v. Commonwealth, 736 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ky. 1984); see also Lovett v. Commonwealth, 858
S.W.2d 205, 207-08 & 207 n.1 (Ky. CL App. 1993) (noting philosophical conflict
between Gadd and language in Corbett v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1986)).
76 Page v. Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 552, 552 (Ky. 1969) (explaining that KY. P,
CRD& P. 11.42 is not a substitute for appeal).
'Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Ky. 1972) (explaining that
appellate court will not permit use of KY. R. CEIM. P. 11.42 to try or retry issues that
should have been raised on direct appeal, absent showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel); Boles v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Ky. 1966) ("[AIn attack upon
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case through newly discovered evidence are controlled by an RCr 10.06
motion for new trial, and new evidence is thus not a proper ground for
relief under RCr 11.42.'M An allegation of perjured testimony at trial
is also not a cognizable claim in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, 9 nor is a
belated attack on the credibility of a witness."' Finally, courts have
noted that the admission at trial of an in-court identification allegedly
tainted by a prior lineup raises only an evidentiary issue, as opposed to
a constitutional issue, particularly where the defendant does not object at
trial8 1f however, the defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel, thus preventing the preservation of the issue for direct appeal,
evidentiary error which otherwise would not be ground for relief under
RCr 11.42 may be considered."n
G. Jury
Jury issues provide only limited grounds for the reversal of a
conviction in post-conviction proceedings, but movants have raised
numerous challenges related to jury issues. Movants have attempted to
a verdict of conviction on the ground that it was not supported by the evidence is not one
that can be presented by RCr 11.42."); Williams v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 788, 790
(Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
m Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Ky. 1969); see, e.g.,
Willoughby v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1966), cert. den'ed, 386 U.S.
920 (1967); Roark v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Ky. 1966); Bell v. Common-
wealth, 395 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966);
Perkins v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Ky. 1964); Commonwealth v. Basnight,
770 S.W.2d 231, 238 (Ky. CL App. 1989).
' In Jennings v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Ky. 1964), the court held
that false or incompetent evidence could be "grounds for vacating the judgment only if
there is at least a substantial possibility that in the absence of such evidence the verdict
would have been different" This view was later modified, as the Kentucky high court
concluded that such allegations should be excluded from consideration in all RCr 11.42
cases. See Bartley v. Commonwealth, 463 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1971); Hendrickson v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 234, 235 (Ky. 1970); Fields v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d
638, 639 (Ky. 1966); Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1965);
Basnight, 770 S.W.2d at 238.
7' Brock v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. 1972).
7" Butcher v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 114, 114-15 (Ky. 1971); cf. Stidlham v.
Commonwealth, 444 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky. 1969) (approving police showup).
m Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Ky. 1972) (holding that, absent
a good faith allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant's claims should have
been raised on direct appeal).
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win new trials by alleging juror bias or prejudice,'7 improper mention
of probation or parole,"' relationship between a juror and the prosecut-
ing witness,785 separation of the jury during a three-day trial," jury
composition,7v and an improper question by the trial court about
separation of the jury.'
Using another approach in Warner v. Commonwealth, the prisoner
also contended that the sheriff had entered the jury room during
deliberations but did not claim that any impropriety or jury tampering
occurred." The high court rejected the claim that the sheriff had
illegally entered the jury room during deliberations, holding that it could
' Brown v. Commonwealth, 788 S.W.2d 500, 500 (Ky. 1990) (alleging juror bias);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. 1971) (alleging racial prejudice);
Maggard v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Ky. 1965). The Maggard court
stated:
In the absence of specific reasons why the opportunity of examining the jurors
on voir dire, the concomitant right to challenge for cause, and the right to seek
a change of venue were not ample and sufficient protection against prejudice,
[the claim] is a vaporous allegation without sufficient substance to warrant
mqwry.
Id. at 895.
' Fanner v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Ky. 1970).
7" Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1966) (finding that a "simple
assertion" of improper relationship was not enough to result in a constitutional violation).
In this case the allegation was not specific, but it is apparent that a secret relationship
could, in appropriate circumstances, rise to the level of a constitutional violation
warranting RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02 relief.
' Iles v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 296, 296 (Ky. 1966), cert denied, 384 U.S. 993.
7" Newsome v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1970) (finding no basis
to an objection regarding jury composition because defendant had waived right to jury and
pled guilty).
n Warner v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky. 1964). Tle Kentucky high
court conceded that it was reversible error under RCr 9.66 for the trial court to ask
defense counsel, in the hearing of the jury and in a capital case or where life imprison-
ment could be imposed, if counsel would consent to the separation of the jury. Id.
However, in considering such a claim on collateral attack, the Warner court concluded.
[W]e are unable to say that such an error is of that gravity which would render
the judgment void. We are unaware of any constitutional right which would
have been denied the defendant under such a circumstance. Thus, if any such
error had occurred, it would not be available under RCr 11.42.
Id.; see Collins v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Ky. 1968) (granting no relief
under KY. R. CRiM. P. 11.42 even if the jury was improperly separated); Adams v.
Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. 1968); Kinmon v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 930 (1966); King v. Commonwealth,
387 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Ky. 1965).
70 385 S.W.2d at 65.
[Vol 83
KENTUCKY POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
not be raised in an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate "absent some other
showing which could be said to be a denial of due process."7 ° A
similar approach was taken in Kper v. Commonwealth, where the court
held that although error had occurred when the trial court placed the jury
in the custody of the sheriff and his deputies, all of whom were material
witnesses, RCr 11.42 relief was not appropriate since the prisoner
presented no "claim or proof that there was misbehavior on the part of
the Sheriff his deputies, or a juror."' An even more novel approach
was the attempt by affidavit, to impeach and to vacate the judgment of
life imprisonment eleven years after the judgment of conviction; since the
only other available punishment for the defendant's crime was death, the
appellate court upheld dismissal without a hearing.7' In summary,
absent extraordinary circumstances, jury errors are mere trial errors
cognizable on direct appeal and therefore not appropriate grounds for
relief under RCr 11.42Y'
H. Waiver by Guilty Plea
A valid guilty plea is highly effective in limiting the issues that can
be raised in a post-conviction relief motion because it waives all grounds
which arose prior to the plea itself; except for jurisdiction.' Thus, the
'm Id.
415 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Ky.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 875 (1967).
Grider v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Ky. 1966).
Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666, 667-68 (Ky. 1972) (involving
allegations that excessive publicity tainted jury and that jurors discussed the case during
recess).
7" Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (explaining that defendant could
only attack voluntary and intelligent nature of guilty plea through showing of ineffective
counsel); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1994) ("The general rule
is that pleading guilty unconditionally waives all defenses except that the indictment did
not charge an offense:); Davis v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Ky. 1971);
Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Ky. 1970) (explaining that guilty plea
"waives all defenses other than that the indictment charges no offense"); Haris v.
Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth v. Watldns, 398
S.W.2d 698, 701 (Ky.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 965 (1966); Centers v. Commonwealth,
799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky. CL App. 1990); Sanders v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 216, 218
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
A guilty plea is not as successful at eliminating claims on direct appeal since a
guilty plea may be conditional, thereby reserving the right to raise certain issues despite
the guilty plea. KY. R. CRM P. 8.09; see, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d
801, 802-03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (involving a judgment based on conditional guilty plea
which was vacated on direct appeal).
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allegations of the indictment are confessed when the defendant pleads
guilty.'s This result is simply a matter of sound public policy. When
a guilty plea is entered, the defendant, at the most basic level,
forfeits the right to protest at some later date that the state could not
have proven that he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty. To
permit a convicted defendant to do so would result in a double benefit
in that defendants who elect to plead guilty would receive the benefit
of the plea bargain which ordinarily precedes such a plea along with the
advantage of later challenging the sentence on grounds normally arising
in the very trial which defendant elected to forego.796
Numerous cases decided under RCr 11.42 follow this basic principle,
which is applicable as long as the plea itself meets constitutional
standards.7
A valid guilty plea, therefore, waives search and seizure claims.7
Other types of errors waived by a constitutionally valid guilty plea are
threat of admission of an allegedly coerced confession, pretrial
7" Whitworth v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 731, 731 (Ky. 1969) (holding that
indictment was not void and guilty plea admitted all allegations within the indictment);
Boles v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Ky. 1966) (holding that indictment was
not void and guilty plea admitted all allegations within the indictment).
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
7 't In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975), the Supreme Court explained
that "a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where
voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."
For this reason, the only challenges left available are those which go to the jurisdiction
of the court or the plea itself. Stated another way,
a defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may challenge his
conviction on any constitutional ground that, if asserted before trial, would
forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him,
regardless of how much the state might endeavor to correct the defect. In other
words, a plea of guilty may operate as a forfeiture of all defenses except those
that, once raised, cannot be "cured."
Taylor, 724 S.W.2d at 225 (citing Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214,1226
(1977)); see also supra notes 714-44 and accompanying text (discussing attacks on guilty
pleas).
7" Sanders, 663 S.W.2d at 218 (explaining that guilty plea waives evidence issues).
79McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Wheeler v. Commonwealth,
462 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ky. 1971) ("When the defendant voluntarily enters a plea of guilty,
he waives his right to challenge the admissibility of the confession.; Triplett v.
Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1969).
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irregularities," loss of right to appeal,"' being held without bond
prior to trial," beatings by police officers," 3 denial of compulsory
process,' and ineffective assistance of counsel where the defense was
not prejudiced.803
I. Pretrial Publicity
An allegation that pretrial publicity made it impossible "to receive a
fair and impartial trial" warranted an evidentiary hearing in Baldwin v.
Commonwealth.' The court took note of two recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases and decided that although the allegation was conclusory,
the subject matter does not lend itself to specificity of pleading,
especially [since it was written by] a person in confinement and without
reputable counsel. We hardly expect that the movant will be able to
prove the existence of publicity comparable with that in Estes and
Sheppard, but neither this court nor the trial court can take judicial
notice that it was not enough to have probable effect upon his trial. 7
Similar claims, however, were rejected in Collins v. Commonwealth'
and Thomas v. Commonwealth.' In Wolfe v. Commonwealth, the
movant's claim that pretrial publicity had robbed him of a fair trial
'0 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 72, 72 (Ky. 1970).
.01 Greer v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. Ct App. 1986).
" Messer v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1970).
'0 Harris v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1970).
'' Bruner v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970).
'0' Quarles v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 693, 693 (Ky. 1970); Centers v. Common-
wealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (involving allegation of counsel's Ihilur
to fully advise regarding consequences of plea); Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.W.2d
338, 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding KY. R. CruM. P. 11.42 motion precluded by entry
of guilty plea and petitioner's favorable response when asked questions about counsel's
performance by the court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
... 406 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1966) (involving radio and newspaper coverage of
armed robbery trial).
1" Id. The two decisions discussed were Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding
that televising of criminal swindling trial over objection of petitioner was error) and
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (holding that the trial court failed to control
prejudicial media activity in murder trial).
"' 433 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Ky. 1968) (involving a single newspaper account of armed
robbery "confession").
0 437 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Ky. 1969) (involving a "few news items" regarding
appellant's trial), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 956 (1970).
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fourteen years earlier was properly overruled without a hearing because
the same contention and evidence had been rejected in a change of venue
motion prior to the 1954 trial." On the other hand, the failure of the
defendant to pursue a change of venue motion at trial on the basis of
alleged pretrial publicity constitutes a waiver of the issue and precludes
review or relief under RCr 11.42!"
J. Presence and Competence of the Accused
The purpose of the criminal trial is to rigorously develop the
competing facts of the case, as perceived by both prosecution and
defense, and to place these facts in front of the judge or jury. The
defendant, of course, is constitutionally guaranteed a right to present a
defense to the charges. Two related types of claims have frequently
formed the basis.for RCr 11.42 review: claims relating to the defendant's
physical presence at the proceedings and claims relating to his or her
competency to stand trial. First, a fairly large mmaber of inmates have
claimed that their convictions should be held void because they were not
physically present at certain proceedings. Sometimes the defendant has a
"bad memory," and the court will uncover documents that indicate that
the defendant was in fact present at a particular proceeding. In other
cases, it is apparent that the defendant was not present, at which point it
becomes incumbent upon the movant seeking collateral relief to
demonstrate prejudice." The defendant does not have to demonstrate
prejudice where the nature of the proceeding is such that the presence of
the defendant, unless waived, is always required"
For example, in Kentucky, the accused in a felony case has the well-
settled right to be present at every important phase of the trial8 4
However, a flat assertion that the defendant had not been present during
all stages of his trial is not enough to warrant RCr 11.42 relief, and the
claim is waived where no evidence of prejudice in support of this
810 431 S.W.2d 859, 859-60 (Ky. 1968).
... Yager v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Ky. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
939 (1969). The court noted that the defendant could have pursued a change of venue on
direct appeal as well. Id.
81 See infra notes 814-17 and accompanying text.
... See inffra notes 814-17 and accompanying text.
1 See Powell v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ky. 1961) (holding it to be
reversible enr for defendant's attorney to be out of courtroom when defendant was
sentenced to death); Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 769, 771 (1879)
(finding court's receipt of verdict without the presence of defendant or counsel to be
erroneous).
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assertion is presented at the hearing.""5 Provided the accused is repre-
sented by counsel, the defendant's presence is required at preliminary
hearings and proceedings only when the issues to be resolved go to the
question of guilt or innocence.""6 In general, an accused has no right to
be present during pretrial motions, and relief based on such absence has
been properly denied.8 7
The question of the accused's competency to stand trial raises a
different set of issues. In contrast to the jury issue of the accused's sanity
at the time of the offense, which does go to guilt or innocence, this
particular issue deals with the ability of the defendant to participate in his
or her own defense. Initially, the legal issues presented under Kentucky
law are similar to those already discussed relating to standards of
competency to plead guilty,"'8 and the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
concluded that, under the Constitution, the competency standard for
waiving the right to counsel or for pleading guilty is no higher than the
competency standard for standing trial.8 .9 Two issues are typically
presented. First, a defendant may utilize RCr 11.42 to claim that he was,
in fact, incompetent to stand trial at the time of his original convic-
tion. ' A trial or the entering of a guilty plea which occurs when the
,," King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. 1966) (finding that the record
showed that defendant was present at entering of judgment and during tridal itself), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 924 (1967).
,16 As one court explained.
Appellant complains that a 'material portion of his trial was conducted in
his absence" What he refers to is a conference inthe trial judge's chambers at
which his own counsel and the prosecuting attorney were present and at which
certain legal questions were argued.... [Our cases] teach that the accused in
a felony case must be present in person through every stage of the trial, but as
appellant concedes, Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 285 S.W.2d 489, recites that
the presence of the accused is not required during consultation or other
preliminary proceedings which do not affect the question of his guilt or
innocence.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Ky. 1969) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 956 (1970). Another area in which this concept applies is the witness
competency headng. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744, 747 (1987) (holding
that the trial court may prohibit defendant from attending an in-chambers competency
hearing in order to protect the child victim), rev'g Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d
939 (Ky. 1986).
17 See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Ky. 1971) (involving
motion for continmance); Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W. 230, 233 (Ky. 1920)
(involving preliminary examination on admission of evidence).
' ee supra notes 737-38 and accompanying text.
'* Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1993).
2 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ky. 1970); Conners v.
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defendant is incompetent or insane results in a void judgment, and RCr
11.42 relief is thus available."1 Or, a defendant may move for RCr
11.42 relief upon the lack of a court-ordered hearing or examination to
determine competency, when a reasonable basis for doing so existed.'
The issue of incompetency has been raised in RCr 11.42 motions in
a variety of ways. In Lett v. Commonwealth, the defendant waited twenty-
nine years after conviction to allege that he was incompetent to stand
trial, but since the defendant's hospitalization for mental problems
occurred four years after conviction, he was not entitled to a hearing on
this issue.' The court in Matthews v. Commonwealth comprehensively
summarized Kentucky law regarding pretrial hearings to determine the
defendant's capacity to stand trialY As the Matthews court interpreted
RCr 8.06:
A hearing for the purpose of determining the mental capacity of a
defendant is required under this rule only in a situation where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is insane. The
reasonable grounds for such belief must be called to the attention of the
trial court by the defendant or must be so obvious that the trial court
cannot fail to be aware of themY s
Allegations of incompetency to stand trial were held insufficient to
warrant RCr 11.42 relief in Bartley v. Commonwealth,2 6 McElwain v.
Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967).
A claim that the defendant was incompetent or insane at the time of the commission of
the crime, however, cannot be brought in an RCr 11.42 motion and does not war-ant a
hearing. Mullins, 454 S.W.2d at 690; Conners, 400 S.W.2d at 520.
"' Barnes v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 44, 44 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Ky. 1964).
' Scott v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 623, 626-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that trial cort ened by fhiling to hold competency hearing when the cour's order
' recommended" brain scan and complete psychiatric examination in prison).
m 461 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1970).
468 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971). A person is considered
incompetent to plead guilty or defend in a criminal proceeding if he does not have the
"substantial capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceeding
pending against him and to participate rationally in his defense." Commonwealth v.
Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1964).
',' Matthews, 468 S.W.2d at 314.
463 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. 1971) (involving extensive psychiatric examination and
a pretrial hearing, yet resulting in a jury finding that the defendant was not insane at the
lime of commission of the crime).
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Commonwealth, Mullins v. Commonwealth,' and Brister v. Com-
monwealth.' The trial court's finding of competency typically will be
upheldY0 However, one defendant's allegation, supported by inmate
affidavits, that drugs administered to aid in treatment of his gunshot
wounds kept him "practically incoherent" prior to trial and prevented him
from assisting in his defense, did warrant a hearing. 3' A special factual
situation was presented in Vincent v. Commonwealth.' In that case, the
defendant was adjudged insane on the same day his guilty plea was
accepted. Vincent was in fact committed before he was sentenced.
Nonetheless, the Kentucky high court declined to hold the judgment
void.33
K Bail
Unless prejudice is shown, RCr 11.42 motions objecting to various
aspects of bail amounts and procedures have generally been rejected by
the courts, even when a violation of constitutional rights is assumed.
400 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ky. 1966) (involving a defendant found competent to
stand trial who was found seven months later to have a schizophrenic reaction).
'n 454 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ky. 1970) (holding that defendant who failed to use insanity
defense at trial could not subsequently bring it as grounds for vacating judgment).
m 439 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Ky. 1969) (noting that noncompliance with Kentucky statute
requiring persistent felons to undergo mental examination '!nether voids the judgment of
conviction nor presents a proper ground for relief in post-conviction relief proceedings
under RCr 11.42"); see Capps v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Ky. 1971)
(explaining that failure to give psychiatric exam to habitual criminal did not void
conviction and was not basis for setting aside judgment under KY. PL Cum P. 11.42);
Davenport v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Ky. 1965) (holding that failure to
examine defendant's mental capacity was not ground to void judgment), cert denied, 383
U.S. 970 (1966); Lairson v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ky. 1965); Etherton
v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1964); cf. McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368
S.W.2d 331, 333 (Ky. 1963) (finding a possible violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment when indigent defendant, unable to pay for a mental
examinatfon, requested and was deied an examination pursuant to Kentucky's persistent
felony statute).
30 Plumb v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 729, 730-31 (Ky. 1973) (holding that trial
court's finding the defendant was competent was not clearly erroneous); Dye v.
Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Ky. 1972) (affrming trial court's finding that
'mnemory lapses" did not prevent defendant from participating rationally in his defense).
,31 Barnes v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 352, 353-54 (Ky. 1970).
" 394 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965).
3 Id. at 929.
3
4 Dupin v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1966) (holding that excessive
bail "does not ipso facto finish a ground for attacking the judgment of conviction or
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Thus, "[u]nless being held in jail prevented appellants from making
adequate preparations for, or otherwise detracted from the fairness of the
trial, their confinement under excessive bail is completely irrelevant to the
validity of the judgment under attack."835
L. Indictment
In general, an RCr 11.42 motion may not be used to challenge defects
in an indictment,8' since "no defect in an indictment short of one that
completely vitiates it affects the validity of the proceeding." 7 This
general provision has been specifically held to apply to a number of
imaginative and technical allegations of error. Using RCr 11.42,
defendants have charged that post-conviction relief should be forthcoming
based on the following: the indictment gave the wrong date for the
commission of the crime,8" the indictment was "without merit, 'v 9
the indictment was designed to frighten the movant into pleading
guilty,"4 the habitual criminal indictment contained a defect"' 1 and
the indictments were improperly consolidated.' Claims have also been
based on defects in the indictment, including failure to indicate a specific
statutory section," failure to show the endorsement of the names of
sentence'; see also Messer v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1970) (holding
that three-month cofinement without bond and questioning without counsel were
insufficient to vacate judgment because no evidence gained as a result was used against
defendant at trial).
US Dupin, 404 S.W.2d at 281; see also Messer, 454 S.W.2d at 695.
U6 See Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.2d 689, 689 (Ky. 1965) (holding that
defective indictment did not constitute grounds for relief under KY. R. CU m P. 11.42);
War v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 77, 77-78 (Ky. 1964) ("[D]efects in an indictment
will not support a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction.").
"7 Davenport v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Ky. 1965) (citations omitted)
(involving criminal defendant who filed KY. R. CRIL P. 11.42 motion alleging improper
indictment), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966); Harrod v. Whaley, 239 S.W.2d 480, 482
(Ky. 1951) (dismissing habeas petition because the stated defects "at most rendered
judgment erroneous but not void").
U3 McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1969).
Davenport, 390 S.W.2d at 663 (holding allegation to be insufficiently specific).
"
0 Irvin v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Ky. 1966) (holding that habitual
criminal indictment was not void for showing 11 prior convictions when only two were
required under statute).
"4 Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ky.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 865
(1966).
' Trodglen v. Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Ky. 1968) (holding that error,
if any, did not rise to constitutional level).
"3 Newsome v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1970); Lairson v.
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witnesses,'" failure to show the signature of the foreman,' " or other
failures in form.' Of course, RCr 11.42 is generally inapplicable in
such situations because the indictment is available to the defendant from
the beginning of the prosecution and can be amended easily by the trial
court if the prosecutor is properly advised of the defect.' 7 It would not
serve the ends of justice to allow a defendant to have built-in reversible
error by inaction and then, after losing at trial, void the conviction on
obviously technical grounds.
M. Pretrial Delays or Failure to Hold Pretrial Hearings
In dealing with claims of pretrial delays and failure to hold pretrial
hearings, it is not enough for a defendant to simply state in the RCr 11.42
motion that some particular pretrial delay, act, or omission occurred. The
defendant must present an associated showing of prejudice. This view has
been reiterated in many cases. For example, without demonstrated
prejudice to the defendant, a delay of three weeks between arrest and a
grand jury hearing does not warrant post-conviction relief. Also, the
passage of twenty-one months between arrest and guilty plea, without
more, is insufficient to establish a denial of the right to a speedy trial
under RCr 11.42.'"
The court in Nickell v. Commonwealth stated, "The assertion that the
conviction should be vacated because of failure to appoint counsel at the
preliminary hearing has no merit There is no claim that anything which
occurred at the preliminary hearing was used against the appellant at his
Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ky. 1965).
'"Jones v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1965).
u4 Satterly v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ky. 1969) (holding that
defendant's claim was refuted by the trial record); Nicholas v. Thomas, 382 S.W.2d 871,
872 (Ky. 1964).
"6 See. e.g., Carter v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 165, 165 (Ky. 1965).
"7 Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1965) (noting that since an
indictment is "public record," defendants '"had a right to examine [it] had they so
desired!).
'" Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
976 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Henderson v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 648
(Ky. 1982).
'"Bruner v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970); cf. Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ky. 1970) (denying defendant's claim of lack of
speedy trial where delay in trial resulted from defendant's claimed mental illness).
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trial on the merits." In Rat, Kentucky courts have consistently said that
no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing exists; thus, the failure to
provide the accused with such a hearing (also called an examining hearing)
does not demand RCr 11.42 relief absent "extraordinary circumstances. '
Unless the accused can show prejudice at tial, his or her post-conviction
claims will fail 3
N. Miscellaneous Grounds
Falling into this category are those complaints which may be broadly
classified as simple trial errors. For years, the Kentucky appellate courts have
had difficulty in convincing inmate litigants that the post-conviction remedy
of RCr 11.42 was not created as a substitute for a failed appeal and that it is
not available to correct all errors which might have occurred before, during,
or after trial.'M As the court stated in lipton v. Commonwealth: "RCr 11.42
does not authorize relief from ajudgment of conviction for mere errors of the
trial court." 5 Because many of the alleged errors detailed in this section
involve the trial courts discretion and not matters of substantive constitutional
rights, even "prejudicial error on the trial courts part would render the
judgment erroneous but not void.:"8 That statement is true, of course,
unless the error rises to the point. of a violation of due process.
Grounds which fall into this general category include the following:
illegal arrest, promise of leniency to a witness testifying for the prosecu-
"0 451 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Ky. 1970).
851 Little v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Ky. 1968); see also Messer v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. 1970) (finding no constitutional right to a
preliminary hearing); Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1965) (finding
no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing).
" Russell v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1971) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Watkins, 398 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Ky.), cert. dened, 384 U.S. 965 (1966)).
' Bruner v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970); t. Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ky. 1970).
854 See, e.g., Clay v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Ky.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 943 (1970); Adams v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. 1968); Kiper v.
Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Ky.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 875 (1967); Short
v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Ky. 1965); King v. Commonwealth, 387
S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. 1965).
8" 376 S.W.2d 290, 290 (Ky. 1964) (involving challenge of conviction for improper
venue).
86 Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Ky. 1969) (holding that
volunteered statement by witness at trial, which was not considered mistrial by judge, was
not grounds to vacate).
87 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. 1971) (explaining that
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tion,s" double jeopardy,859 errors in instructing the jury,8" denial
of a continuance,"' failure to advise the defendants of the charges
against them," denial of compulsory process, 3 failure to try defen-
dants separately," concealment of exculpatory evidence by the prose-
cution,8" polygraph exam," and prejudice by the trial judge.
illegal arest is "not the basis for post-conviction relief under RCr 11.42"); Triplett v.
Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1969); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 417
S.W.2d 234, 234 (Ky. 1967); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky.
1966).
' Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1966) (finding allegation
of promise of leniency for testifying witness to be insufficient to render judgment void
or to warrant hearing).
" Bruce v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Ky. 1971) (involving a second tria
conviction more severe than the first, which had been reversed due to illegally gained
evidence).
' King v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. 1966) (holding defendant's
claim of error in instruction to be without merit and irrelevant to KY. R. CRL P. 11.42
relief), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 924 (1967); Boles v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 853, 855
(Ky. 1966); Uwaniwich v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 658, 658 (Ky. 1965) (explaining
that "erroneous instructions do not invalidate a conviction").
' King, 408 S.W.2d at 205.
" Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 75, 76 (Ky. 1965) (explaining that the
Commonwealth was not required to read indictment to defendants until they were "put
on trial).
SBruner v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1970) (explaining that since
defendant had made no allegations of fact to support his claim that he was denied
compulsory process, his claim must be denied); Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d
860, 862 (Ky. 1966).
' Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Ky. 1969) (noting that
decision by court as to how to try cases was a ' iatter of discretion!); Kinmon v.
Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Ky. 1964). The Kinmon court stated.
A defendant has no constitutional right to a separate trial, so even if there were
a showing of some specific prejudice from being tried jointly there would have
to be presented an extreme case of unfairness to warrant relief under RCr 11.42,
which requires a showing of grounds that would subject the judgment to
collateral attack
Id.
m Clay v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 109, 109-10 (Ky.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943
(1970).
C"Gbbs v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.2d 871, 875-76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
"s Claims of prejudice by the trial judge were unsuccessful in McCarthy v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ky. 1970), where the prosecutor in the
movant's first trial and conviction was the trial judge in the movant's second trial, and
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1966), where the trial judge had
been the Commonwealth's Attorney at the time of the prior prosecution conducted by the
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney.
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Most of these challenges cannot be brought on an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate, and Kentucky courts have repeatedly rejected them. It would be
very unusual for an RCr 11.42 motion to vacate to be granted based upon
the simple errors of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
If the states are to retain their primacy in the trial and disposition of
criminal cases, then they must maintain systems of post-conviction relief
which allow the immediate correction of state errors in state courts. In
Kentucky, RCr 11.42 provides a generally effective system of post-
conviction review. Its emphasis on evidentiary hearings for disputed
issues of fact, representation of indigent movants by appointed counsel,
and returning the movant, if necessary, to the sentencing court, all serve
to ensure that an adequate record will be developed and the movant's
meritorious claims fully explored. Kentucky's system further ensures
adequate review in the higher Kentucky courts for death penalty cases
and in federal court on habeas corpus motions. Although the actual
number of cases in which a new trial is granted at the appellate stage is
very small, the possibility of such review is a check upon the trial court
and is an important component of the Kentucky appellate and post-
conviction review system.
Although not constitutionally required, post-conviction review of state
criminal convictions is here to stay. States need to have at least the first
opportunity, through hearings in state trial courts and through appellate
review, to correct their own errors. Deference to states is widely
recognized in the federal system, where most federal courts are keenly
aware that they are reviewing the convictions of a co-equal state
judiciary. In the long run, the process of state court review of criminal
convictions in light of both state and federal constitutions is relatively
efficient. It is certainly more efficient than the only other alternative for
the states - simply abrogating their responsibilities by shifting all post-
conviction review to the federal courts.
However, this efficiency does not mean that RCr 11.42 is without its
problems. Because post-conviction review under RCr 11.42 is so
pervasive and is utilized by so many inmates, it imposes significant
strains on Kentucky's criminal justice system. Some of the reforms
suggested in this Article - for example, the use of a form in filing the
RCr 11.42 motion - could relieve some of the strain at the trial court
level, where the bulk of the work in deciding RCr 11.42 cases occurs.
Although the "time for filing" limitation and the other changes adopted
in 1994 should alleviate some of the pressures on both trial and appellate
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courts by reducing or eliminating stale claims, further gains can still be
made while fully protecting the integrity of the process and defendants'
constitutional rights.
The adoption of the suggestion to give the Kentucky Court of
Appeals the power to review RCr 11.42 appeals on a discretionary basis,
except in death penalty cases, would allow significant trial court error to
be corrcted while saving a great deal of adjudication time. This change
would also provide a mechanism by which decisions of special impor-
tance could be considered and published. Frivolous or routine cases, now
fully briefed and ruled upon in formal unpublished opinions, could be
dealt with more simply and quickly. This and other proposed reforms
could have a significant impact on the efficiency of Kentucky's criminal
justice system without compromising the due process rights of defendants
or the ability of this state to correct errors before the defendant has a
chance to petition a federal court. It is hoped that the Kentucky Supreme
Court will soon take a comprehensive look at post-conviction practice and
procedure and attempt to further improve Kentucky's already progressive
system of post-conviction review.
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